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Notes from the Editor
Dear readers,
I am thrilled to present you with the Spring 2020 – 2021 issue of The Hilltop Review. Over one
year ago, our university rapidly converted its offerings into online formats to allow students a
safe education in the face of COVID-19. This issue serves as a collection of works submitted
throughout our virtual experience as graduate students. The global pandemic has continued to
affect our higher education system in major ways, and I am grateful to the incredible effort these
authors invested in their work during such uncertain times. As an editor, it was my pleasure to
continue offering students across disciplines the opportunity to publish their work.
Serving as the Director and Editor has provided me with an invaluable opportunity to manage the
publication process of an interdisciplinary journal. First, I would like to thank the Spring 2020 –
2021 Executive Board of the Graduate Student Association for their assistance in communicating
the needs of the journal throughout a virtual academic year. Next, I wish to thank the former
President of the Graduate Student Association, Craig Morris, for his support throughout this
term. In addition, I am thankful to those who served on the 2020 - 2021 Editorial Board for
providing additional insight on manuscripts. Finally, I would like to offer a special
acknowledgement to all who served as peer reviewers, for this issue would not be possible
without their voluntary commitment to our journal’s success.
Sincerely,
Jessica M. Rocheleau
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The Effect of Respondent Race
and Sex on Police Use or
Threatened Use of Force
By Viola L. Sawyer
Abstract: This study examines the interacting effects of race and sex on police use of force.
Survey data drawn from the Police-Public Contact Survey were used to conduct a binary
logistic regression to assess effects of different configurations of self-reported race and
sex identities, respondents age, and absence of deference to authority on self-reported
police use or threatened use of force in interactions with police officers. Results indicate
that the multiplicative effect of respondents’ race and sex overall, had a statistically
significant relationship with the likelihood of reporting police use or threatened use of
force in police-public contacts. Additionally, age, overall, was found to have a
statistically significant relationship with police use of force. Further, respondents who
reported displaying insufficient deference, were more likely to report police use or
threatened use of force in their interactions with police than those who did not.
Limitations are discussed and directions for future research are proposed.
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In the last few years, incidents of police violence against Black people in
the United States have sparked a national discussion about the function of police in
our society, the militarization of our police forces, police brutality, and, most
importantly, police accountability. In the summer of 2014, we bore witness to the
police shooting and killing of 18 year old Michael Brown in St. Louis, Missouri,
and the use of an illegal chokehold on Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York,
which ultimately killed him (Hill 2016). The deaths of Black men and boys, like
Tamir Rice, garnered extensive coverage that appears to render invisible the
experiences of Black women, and other people of color in their interactions with
police.
Sandra Bland was a twenty eight year old Black woman who was on her
way to start a new job when she was pulled over by Officer Brian Encinia, for
failing to signal while turning on July 10th, 2015 (Pitman, Ralph, Camacho, and
Monk-Turner 2017). Upon initial observation, this appeared as a routine traffic
stop. However, this situation escalated after the state trooper took note of her
irritated disposition, and her refusal to put out her cigarette at Encinia’s request. In
response to Bland’s demeanor and behavior, Encinia threatened to “yank” Sandra
out of her car, refused to answer questions, and warned her that he would “light
[her] up” (Pitman et al. 2017: 1). When he ordered Bland to step out of her car, the
state trooper threatened her with a Taser, injured her arm while throwing her to the
pavement, and charged Bland with assaulting a public servant (Graham 2015;
Pitman et al. 2017: 1). Within three days of her arrest, authorities reported Bland
dead in her cell (Graham 2015). The medical examiner ruled that Bland’s death was
a suicide. However, this finding has been widely contested as many argue that
Bland did not take her own life (Graham 2015; Rogers 2016). Ultimately, the
fundamental and common components in the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric
Garner, Sandra Bland, and many others, are twofold: while Michael, Eric, and
Sandra were racially marginalized, Sandra experienced racialized gender
marginalization as a woman. Their interactions with police are situated within a
social context informed by the interlocking systems of oppression that we call
White supremacy and patriarchy, hence, their movement through social spaces-and
their interactions with police officers were racialized and gendered. Secondly, at
the core of the interactions between these three individuals is the issue of police use
of force.
The purpose of the present study is to provide evidence that the intersection
of race and gender is an important dimension of police use of force in police-public
contacts. Since the summer 2014, we have continued to see the streaming of
incidents in which police officers exert excessive and lethal force on unarmed
civilians, who are often racially marginalized. We have borne witness to the rise of
#BlackLivesMatter, #SayHerName, as responses to the public brutalization of
Black men, women, and gender nonconforming people by police. We have also
seen the backlash to such claims taking the form of “Blue Lives Matter.” In this
paper, I review the pertinent literature about factors that influence police use of
force, provide an overview of intersectionality theory and examples of
intersectionality in criminology. Then, I discuss the logistic regression of the
Police-Public Contact survey data (2008). Ultimately, the results of the binary
3

logistic regression provide support for the contention that the multiplicative
identities of race and gender have an effect on police use, or threatened use, of
force.
Research on Factors Influencing Police Use of Force
The relationship between a suspect’s race and police use of force has been widely
examined (Engel and Calnon 2004, Lawton 2007; McCluskey and Terill 2005). The
relationship between race and police use of force is one informed by an historical
legacy of racialized social control (Blackmon 2008; Bass 2001). Bass (2001) asserts
that during slavery, slave patrols constantly policed the movement of slaves and
tracking down runaways whom they would punish with impunity. Further,
Alexander (2010) argues that the hyper-surveillance of Black bodies and the
exposure to physical force from state agents of social control continued after
slavery ended, throughout Reconstruction, and through Jim Crow. Jim Crow refers
to the period after the Civil War, between the 1870s and the 1960s, during which a
brutal, formal, codified system of racial segregation emerged and crystallized in the
American South (Blackmon 2008; Alexander 2010).
Immediately after the Civil War, almost every Southern state implemented
several “interlocking laws essentially intended to criminalize black life” and routine
black behaviors (Blackmon 2008: 53, 67). For example, by 1865 almost every
Southern state outlawed unemployment (vagrancy); vagrancy was loosely defined
so that any formerly enslaved person “not under the protection of a white man could
be arrested for the crime” (Blackmon 2008: 53). Often Blacks were arrested for a
range of actions including carrying a weapon, “riding on the empty freight train
cars…. , speaking loudly in the presence of White women” (Blackmon 2008; 67),
failing to show deference to Whites in public spaces, violating segregation laws,
“mischief” and a variety of behaviors that appeared to threaten the dominant racial
social order (Kelley 2016: 19; Alexander 2010: 31).
Another behavior that appeared to threaten White supremacy was eye
contact. Throughout slavery, slaves who made eye contact with whites were seen
as committing an act of rebellion (Hill 2016: 69); this idea pervaded Jim Crow.
Black men and women who made eye contact with whites and police officers were
suspected of being “insufficiently deferential,” and starting trouble (Taylor 2016;
Kelley 2016). This characterization of mundane behavior engaged in by Black
people towards whites and police officers as “insufficiently deferential” persists
today. When Black men and women fail to demonstrate appropriate deference, in
the form of suspicious eye contact police officers or “talking back, they are often
regarded by police officers as committing a “sign of guilt, an act of disrespect, and
an affront to state power” (Hill 2016: 6). Because these assumptions remain today,
Black men and women are often more likely to experience the threat of use of force
or use of force from police officers when interacting with them (Hughey 2015).
Studies on police stops appear to be consistent with the persistence of the
overrepresentation of racially marginalized people in stops. Findings from the
Ferguson Report (2016:5) reveal racial dimensions of police stops:
4

Data collected by the Ferguson Police Department from 2012 to 2014 shows
that African Americans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations,
and 93% of arrests made by FPD officers, despite comprising only 67% of
Ferguson’s population...These disparities are also present in FPD’s used of
force. Nearly 90% of documented force used by FPD officers was used
against African Americans. In every canine bite incident for which racial
information was available, the person bitten was African American.
As this evidence shows, the current era of neoliberal colorblindness has not
encouraged a decline of the hyper-policing of Black communities. In fact, it has
persisted.
Although the historical legacy of racialized social control of Blacks in the
United States is an important element of understanding likelihood of police use or
threatening to use force in police-public contacts, it is equally as important to
explore the effects of racialization for other groups in the United States. In their
study about the intersectionality of race and gender among Latino participants, Bell
(2013) asserts that most research examining the intersection of race and gender is
limited to Blacks and Whites. Incorporating Hispanics into the current study aids
in disrupting binary understandings about race. Armenta (2017) considers the
institutional production of immigrant criminality regarding Latinos and reveals the
mechanisms by which Latinos are criminalized. This process occurs through the
construction and implementation of facially neutral and colorblind policies, police
practices, and through encounters with police, as part of the emergence of the
“crimmigration” system (Stumpf 2006). Although Armenta’s (2017) work
illustrates the unique process by which Latinos are criminalized, they do not
consider the intersection of race and gender, and how criminalization of Latino
people impacts differentially racialized and gendered Latino people.
While it is established that race is a prominent factor in terms of how often
individuals from certain groups are likely to interact with police and experience
police use of force (Brunson and Weitzer 2009; Russell-Brown 2009; Crutchfield,
Skinner, Haggerty, Anne McGlynn, and Catalano, 2012), there are several different
factors documented in the literature that inform police use of force. Westley (1953)
found that police were more likely to deploy force when confronting a suspect who
did not demonstrate respect for officers, and as a method to gain information.
Paoline et al.’s (2018) study resulted in similar findings. They found that both
White and Black police officers used force in response to suspects’ actions that
undermine their authority. However, while their study suggests that Black officers
only respond to threats to their authority, White police appeared to use more
forceful actions against Blacks who undermine their authority as a result of the
absence of deference and because of the suspect’s race (Paoline et al. 2018). In
other words, for White police officers, the need to maintain control over the
encounter is informed by both their status and potentially perceived racial
superiority.
Additional factors that are consistently identified with increasing the
likelihood of police using force in interactions with citizens include evidence of
criminal behavior being present (Paoline and Terill 2004), suspect is in possession
5

of a weapon (Rydberg and Terill 2010), officer is in the presence of conflict
between citizens (McCluskey and Terrill 2005), and police officer is arresting the
suspect (McCluskey and Terill 2005). In addition, Rydberg and Terill (2010) found
that social class impacts officer likelihood to use force. They found that lower class
individuals have a greater risk of experiencing officers’ use of force during
encounters. Bolger (2015) argues that there still exists uncertainty regarding the
effect of the suspect’s sex on police use of force. In response to this uncertainty,
Bolger (2015) suggests that the type of force used by police officers may impact
the relationship between suspects’ sex and use of force.
Intersectionality
Multiracial feminism and intersectionality provide a useful lens through which we
can explore how the intersection of race and sex impact police use of force.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, women of color feminisms were challenging
taken-for-granted explanations of women’s and people of color’s experiences. As
a tenet of both Black feminism and critical race theory, intersectionality (Collins
2006; Potter 2013; Delgado and Stefancic 2012) acknowledges that oppression is
not experienced along one dimension of social inequality. Davis (2008: 68) defines
intersectionality as the interaction between race, class, gender, and “other locations
of inequality in individuals' lives, social practices, institutional arrangements and
cultural ideologies, and the outcome of these interactions in terms of power.” In
other words, an intersectional analysis takes into consideration and centers certain
forms of intersecting systems of oppression (e.g., race, gender, class inequalities)
and challenges us to acknowledge that these systems of oppression work
simultaneously to produce inequality and injustice (Collins 2006).
Critical race and Black feminist scholars have used intersectional
approaches to examine how the intersection of race and gender shape various
experiences, including interpersonal victimization, criminal offending, and
interactions with police. For example, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) applied Black
feminism to understand how anti-racist and anti-violence against women
movements, which either centered Black men or White women, erased Black
women and neglected their interest. Because these movements were mobilized
along single dimensions of social inequality (i.e., race and gender, respectively),
Black women’s experiences as racialized gendered people, experiencing
oppression as a result of their Blackness and femininity, were rendered precarious
and vulnerable to racialized gendered violence in ways the Black men and White
women were not. Similarly, Beth Richie (2012) deployed Black feminism to
understand how Black girls and women uniquely experience gendered violence. In
her work, she develops the male violence matrix, which is comprised of the
“intersectional relationship between male violence and ideology around race,
gender, sexuality, and class” (Richie 2012:132), and illustrates how Black girls and
women experience physical and sexual assault, and emotional manipulation is
unique ways. Bell (2013) used a multiracial feminist and intersectional approach
explore offending across the early life course,and found that the intersection of
race and gender is significant for young adult offending. Ritchie (2017) explicitly
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explores the ways in which differently racialized women experience encounters
with police, while demonstrating the historical and contemporary role of policing
of gender and sexuality in the criminalization of communities of color.
While intersecting identities shape women of colors’ experiences with
victimization, criminal offending and how they experience policing,
Messerschmidt (2014) argues that intersecting identities also shape boys and men’s
engagement in crime. Rios’ (2011) work demonstrates just how intersecting
identities and systems of oppression shape youths’ interaction with formal social
control agents. In Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys, Rios
(2011) highlights the significance of exploring the relationship between racialized
gender, class, and age, and policing for young Black and Latino adolescent boys in
Oakland, California. Specifically, he examines the effect of racialized masculinity
and policing, and found that these youth used the commission of crime and
interactions with various social control agents, including police, as a method
through which they construct and demonstrate their manhood. Rios (2015: 66) has
also discussed issues regarding young Black and Latino boys and their expression
of resilience and resistance in ways that were “were often rendered deviant, and the
boys were excluded as criminal.” In sum, intersectionality has been used to examine
the experiences of both boys and men, and girls and women in the criminal
processing system.
Although attributing the concept of intersectionality to Black feminism is
important, my use of intersectionality in the current study looks at two other
racialized groups: Whites and Hispanics. Therefore, I am also drawing on a
multiracial feminist perspective. According to Burgess-Proctor (2006: 28),
multiracial feminism was developed by women of color who recognized the need
to develop approaches to studying gender that called attention to issues of “power
and difference in ways that previous models had not.” Like Black feminists,
multiracial feminists reject gender-alone analyses of social phenomena. They
assert that gendered experiences are informed by race, class, age, sexuality,
physical ability, and “other locations of inequality;” and that the “social relations
based on gender and race [are] interactive terms and not just additive” (Baca Zinn
and Thornton Dill 1996: Burgess-Proctor 2006: 36). Thus, where Black feminism
centers the lived experiences of Black women and other Black genders, and
sexuality, marginalized people, multiracial feminism provides a framework to
examine, and hold relationally to each other, differential racialized genders, and the
effect that race and gender have on police use of force in police encounters.
The Present Study
Data, Methods, and Hypotheses
The survey data set in this study is from the Police-Public Contact Survey (2008),
a supplement of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The data were
obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
The Police-Public Contact Survey (2008) was administered via telephone and in
person interviews with a stratified, multistage cluster sample of U.S. households.
It was administered as a supplemental survey in 2008 to all persons 16 years old or
7

older within households sampled for the NCVS (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2008).
The purpose of the Police-Public Contact Survey (2008) was to gather data
regarding the nature and characteristics of face-to-face contacts between police and
the public, including the reason for the contact and contact out comes (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 2008). Respondents were asked about police officer behavior
during face-to-face interactions, whether police used force in interactions, whether
they felt the use of force was excessive, whether respondents were injured in
interactions with police and the type of injury suffered, whether respondents were
arrested and handcuffed in this police-citizen interaction, as well the nature of their
behavior when they interacted with police. Respondents were also asked about the
reasons for contact with police, and a series of questions that pertained to traffic
stops, specifically. Additionally, respondents were asked about whether they were
searched by police in their interaction with them, and outcomes of other contacts
with police (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2008). Demographic data including race,
ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status were also collected. Ages of those
surveyed ranged from 16 to 90, with a mean of 39.84 and a median of 38.
Respondents were 53.1% male and 46.9% female, while 74.9% were White, 10.3%
Hispanic, 9.5 % Black, 3.5% Asian/Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 1.1% two or more
races, .7% American Indian/Alaskan Native (N= 37,872,494).
For the purpose of this study,1 I identified one dependent variable from this
data set-- likelihood of police use or threatening to use force in face-to-face
interactions with citizens. The specific question used in this analysis was, “During
this contact, did the police USE or THREATEN TO USE force against you for any
reason?” The frequency distribution of for this question can be found in Figure 1.
A large majority reported that the police had not used or threatened to use force
against them, 98.60%, while 1.40% reported that the police had used or threatened
to use force against them. The dependent variable was dummy coded, where 1 =
yes and 0 = no.
Figure 1 Frequency distribution of police using or threatening to use force in police-public
contacts

Source: Police-Public Contact Survey, 2008

Independent Variables
1

A filter was created so as to only include those who indicated that they had a face-to-face contact
with a police officer in the last 12 months.
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Primary independent variables for this study include race and sex, while
control variables include age, verbal altercation with the police,2 respondent
disobeyed the police, respondent tried to flee from the police, and respondent
resisted arrest. All independent variables except for the intersectionality and age
variables were transformed into dichotomous dummy variables (1= yes, 0= no) for
analysis. The intersectionality variable is comprised of the sex and race variable
and consists of six categories: White male, White female, Black male, Black
female, Hispanic male, and Hispanic female.3 Age4 is a six-category variable
comprised of the following intervals: 16 to 19, 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to
59, and aged 60 and older.
Review of literature regarding police use of force suggests that race is an
important factor in police use of force, while the effect that sex has on use of force
is fairly inconclusive. I hypothesize that, generally, the intersection of race and sex
will have an effect on use of force. Specifically, I hypothesize that Black males,
Black females, Hispanic males, and Hispanic females will have greater likelihood
to report police use or threatened use of force than White males. I also expect White
females to have a lesser likelihood to report police use or threatened use of force
than White males.
Youths, adolescents, and young adults tend to have greater encounters with
the police than older people (Langton and Durose 2013). As a result, I hypothesize
that because they have more contacts with police, respondents between the ages of
16 and 19, and 20-29, will be more likely to report police use or threatened use of
force than older respondents.
Displays of “insufficient deference” with police have been linked with
police use of force, historically and contemporarily (Hill 2016: 69; Taylor 2016;
Kelley 2016). Therefore, I hypothesize that respondents who indicated they had
verbal altercations with police, disobeyed the police, attempted to flee the presence
of the police, and attempted to resist arrest would be more likely to report police
use or threatened use of force than respondents who did not indicate engaging in
any of these behaviors.
Analysis
The dependent variable in my analysis of the Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS)
data was dichotomous. As a result, I ran a binary logistic regression model to assess
the likelihood of respondents reporting that police either use or threatened to use

2

The survey question was: At any time during this contact did you (a) disobey or interfere with
the officers(s) (b) Try to get away? (c) Push, grab, or hit the police officer(s)? (d) Resist being
handcuffed, arrested, or searched? (e) Physically do anything else? Please specify
3
Multicollinearity is not a problem as tolerance and VIF values were within the acceptable range
of greater than .40 and less than 2.5, respectively (Allison 1999)
4
Multicollinearity is not a problem as tolerance and VIF values were within the acceptable range
of greater than .40 and less than 2.5, respectively (Allison 1999)
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force when interacting with people. Because this study relies on a binary logistic
regression, I do not run the risk of violating core assumptions of the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regressions, including linearity (Pampel 2000). Moreover, there are
multiple statistics that are used in the logistic regression analysis. The chi-square
statistic shows me to determine whether the model is statistically significant, while
the unstandardized slope, B, represents the change in the dependent variable based
on the independent variables in log odds (Pampel 2000). For this logistic regression
analysis, I use the Wald statistic to determine the statistical significance of the
independent variables. In addition, the odds ratio estimated in the logistic regression
allows me to determine the likelihood of a statistically significant independent
variable increasing or decreasing the extent to which police used force or threatened
to use force when interacting with respondents (Bachman and Paternoster 2004).
Missing Data
Listwise deletion of missing data in the logistic regression resulted in an
insubstantial loss of cases in the data set; .5% of the 9,504 cases were dropped due
to missing data.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of my logistic regression using the PPCS data. The
model χ2 is statistically significant, indicating that the model significantly reduces
the -2 loglikelihood (χ2 = 962541.164, p = .000). The Hosmer and Lemeshow test
for goodness of fit of the model to the data is statistically significant, suggesting
that we reject the null hypothesis of good fit (χ2 = 19506.671, p =.000).
McFadden’s pseudo R2 shows there is a 17.3% reduction in error compared with
the null model.
Table 1 Police-Public Contact Survey (2008): binary logistic regression
coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratios for police use of force
Variable

Coeff.

se

Odds

Black Female

.646**

Hispanic Male

.180**

.00
4
.00
5
.00
5
.00
5

.459

Black Male

.779**
.789**

White Male White
Female

2.201
1.909
1.197
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Hispanic Female

-.696**

.008

.498

Age 50-59

.058**

.009

1.060

Age 40-49

.595**

.008

1.814

Age 30-39

1.003**

.008

2.727

Age 20-29

1.594**

.007

4.924

Age 16-19

1.599**

.008

4.947

Verbal Altercation

2.733**

.005

15.386

Disobeyed

3.530**

.008

34.111

Flee
Resisted Arrest

.951**
1.405**

.015
.013

2.588
4.076

Constant

-5.442**

.007

.004

Model χ2

962541.164*
.007

.004

Age (60 or older)

*
Omnibus χ2 for Race, Sex
and Age

962514.164

McFadden pseudo R2

.173

Hosmer

19506.671**

and

Lemeshow
Test

**p<.01, *p<.05 one tailed tests

The results of the regression indicate that the intersectionality variable,
RaceSex, overall, had a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of
reporting police use or threatened use of force in police-public contacts. When
observed as individual categories, being Black male (β = .789, p < .01), Black
female (β = .646, p < .01), and Hispanic male (β = .180, p < .01), had statistically
significant positive relationships with police use of force. Black males and females
were about 2 times more likely to report police use, or threatened use, of force in
police-public contacts than White males. Hispanic males were 19.7% more likely
to report police use, or threatened use, of force in interactions with police than
White males. These results support the hypotheses about the overall effects of the
intersection of race and sex, on police use force, and they also support the
hypotheses about the effects of being Black male, Black female, and Hispanic male
on police use of force.
It was found that being White female (β = -.779, p < .01), and Hispanic
female (β = -.696, p < .01), had statistically significant negative relationships with
police use of force. White females were 54.1% less likely to report police use or
threatened use of force in police-public contacts than White males, while Hispanic
females were 50.2% less likely to report police use or threatened use of force in
police interactions than White males. While results for White females support the
hypothesis about the effect of being White female on police use of force, the results
11

for Hispanic females contradict the hypothesis about the effect of being Hispanic
female on police use of force.
Age, overall, was found to have a statistically significant relationship with
police use of force. For respondents between the ages of 50 and 59 (β = .058, p <
.01), they were 6% more likely to report police use, or threatened use, of force than
the oldest respondents, aged 60 and older. Respondents between the ages 40 and 49
(β = .595, p < .01), were 81.4% more likely to report police use or threatened use
of force. Those between the ages of 30 and 39 (β = 1.003, p < .01), were 2.7 times
more likely to report police use or threatened use of force than the oldest
respondents. Respondents between the ages of 16 and 19 (β = 1.599, p < .01), and
those between the ages of 20 and 29 (β = 1.594, p < .01), were about 5 times more
likely to report police use, or threatened use, of force in police-public contacts than
the oldest respondents. These results are consistent with the hypothesis about the
youngest groups of respondents--those aged 16 to 19 and 20 to 29—would be most
likely to experience force or the threat of force in police encounters.
Consistent with the hypotheses about the effect of absence of deference
variables on police use of force, it was found that all four absence of deference
variables had statistically significant positive relationships with police use of force.
Respondents who indicated they disobeyed or interfered with the officer(s) (β =
3.530, p < .01) during contact were 34 times more likely to report police use, or
threatened use, of force than those who did not. Respondents who claimed to have
argued with, cursed at, insulted, or verbally threatened the police (β = 2.733, p <
.01) were 15 times more likely to report police use, or threatened use, of force in
contacts with police, than respondents who did not. Additionally, respondents who
indicated that they resisted being handcuffed, arrested, or searched (β = 1.405, p <
.01), were 4 times more likely to report police use, or threatened use, of force by
police in police-public contacts. Respondents who claimed that they tried to get
away from the police (β = .951, p < .01) were about 2.5 more likely to report police
use of force than those who did not such attempts.
Discussion and Implications
This research analyzed whether the combined effects of respondent race and gender
identities on police use, or threatened use, of force are significant. My hypothesis
that the intersection of race and sex will have an effect on use of force, generally,
was supported. The more specific hypotheses regarding Black males and females,
White females, and Hispanic males were supported, while the hypothesis about
Hispanic females was not supported. Because there remains a need for the
quantitative exploration into the combined effect of race and gender on police
officers use or threatened use of police force when interacting with civilians, this
study aimed to address this need in the literature. The revelation of the positive
association between Black males, Black females, and Hispanic males and police
use of force is consistent with literature regarding racially marginalized populations
and policing in the United States (Jacobs 2017; Kelley 2016) and may be related to
police officers having racialized gendered expectations of members of
marginalized groups (Kelley 2016, Paoline et al. 2018).
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The significance of the insufficient deferential authority measures, and the
significant effect that age has on police use of force in this model suggests that
police officers also have racialized and gendered expectations for deference,
especially among younger people. In his study about Black and Latino youth, Rios
(2015) suggests that youth of color may engage in behaviors toward police officers,
that police likely interpret as inadequate deference. As a result, police may feel the
need to deploy force to “keep them in their place” (Bonilla-Silva 2014: 42).
However, the likelihood of reporting that the police threatened the use of force or
used force in their interactions, by respondents between the ages of 40 and 49 is a
surprising finding; there is an expectation that the quality of interactions with police
should improve as respondents age. This is a change we can see in the gradual
decline in odds between those respondents in the response categories of 20-29 and
30-39. It is worth conducting an in-depth analysis on the factors and influences that
shape respondents’ experiences with police who fall into the age range between 40
and 49 years old.
White females’ reduced likelihood to report police use or threatened use of
force compared to White males was consistent with my expectations about effect
of this combination of respondent’s race and sex, because White female’s position
as the normative standard for femininity (Jacobs 2017) may afford them an
assumption of innocence not extended to women of Color. In their study about
Black women’s perceptions of the police, Gabbidon, Higgins, and Potter (2011)
note White females are less likely to be arrested for violent offenses and
incarcerated for drug offenses than Black females. White females’ lower arrest rate
compared to their Black counterparts suggests that they also have fewer contacts
with police than Black females. Additionally, White females’ social status may
render them less likely to have interactions with police informed by the conflation
of their racialized gender expressions with deviance, hyper-sexuality, or
aggression-- all of which may been viewed as needing to be restrained (Jacobs
2017). It appears that Black females are disadvantaged by misogynoir, or the coconstitutive, anti-Black racist misogyny that Black women experience (Bailey
2010; Bailey and Trudy 2018), in their interactions with police in ways that White
females are not.
The findings for Hispanic females suggest that, unlike their male counter
parts who are more likely than White males to report police use or threatened use
of force, they are less likely than White males to report that police used or
study aimed to address this need in the literature. The revelation of the positive
association between Black males, Black females, and Hispanic males and police
use of force is consistent with literature regarding racially marginalized populations
and policing in the United States (Jacobs 2017; Kelley 2016) and may be related to
police officers having racialized gendered expectations of members of
marginalized groups (Kelley 2016, Paoline et al. 2018).
The significance of the insufficient deferential authority measures, and the
significant effect that age has on police use of force in this model suggests that
police officers also have racialized and gendered expectations for deference,
especially among younger people. In his study about Black and Latino youth, Rios
(2015) suggests that youth of color may engage in behaviors toward police officers,
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that police likely interpret as inadequate deference. As a result, police may feel the
need to deploy force to “keep them in their place” (Bonilla-Silva 2014: 42).
However, the likelihood of reporting that the police threatened the use of force or
used force in their interactions, by respondents between the ages of 40 and 49 is a
surprising finding; there is an expectation that the quality of interactions with police
should improve as respondents age. This is a change we can see in the gradual
decline in odds between those respondents in the response categories of 20-29 and
30-39. It is worth conducting an in-depth analysis on the factors and influences that
shape respondents’ experiences with police who fall into the age range between 40
and 49 years old.
White females’ reduced likelihood to report police use or threatened use of
force compared to White males was consistent with my expectations about effect
of this combination of respondent’s race and sex, because White female’s position
as the normative standard for femininity (Jacobs 2017) may afford them an
assumption of innocence not extended to women of Color. In their study about
Black women’s perceptions of the police, Gabbidon, Higgins, and Potter (2011)
note White females are less likely to be arrested for violent offenses and
incarcerated for drug offenses than Black females. White females’ lower arrest rate
compared to their Black counterparts suggests that they also have fewer contacts
with police than Black females. Additionally, White females’ social status may
render them less likely to have interactions with police informed by the conflation
of their racialized gender expressions with deviance, hyper-sexuality, or
aggression-- all of which may been viewed as needing to be restrained (Jacobs
2017). It appears that Black females are disadvantaged by misogynoir, or the coconstitutive, anti-Black racist misogyny that Black women experience (Bailey
2010; Bailey and Trudy 2018), in their interactions with police in ways that White
females are not.
The findings for Hispanic females suggest that, unlike their male counter
parts who are more likely than White males to report police use or threatened use
of force, they are less likely than White males to report that police used or
threatened to use force in their interactions. This indicates that the there is
something unique about occupying a social position in which one is both Hispanic
and female, that reduces the likelihood of police threatening or using force in their
interactions with Hispanic females. Additionally, the institutional and structural
dynamics that shape Hispanic females’ interactions with police officers may have
a different impact on Hispanic males and may differ from those that influence Black
males’ and Black females’ interactions with police. Future research should examine
the broader social forces that shape Hispanic females’ interactions with police, and
when police are more likely to threaten to use, or use, force when interacting with
Hispanic females. In the last few years, we have seen anti-immigrant rhetoric
targeting Hispanic and Latinos and their presence in the body politic, so it is
important to consider how the more recent political climate influence interactions
between police and Hispanic females.
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Limitations
Although the results from this study have afforded us some insight into the effects
of the intersection of race and sex on police use of force and provide support for
the claims of criminologists who conduct intersectional analyses, this study is not
without its limitations. First, I only examined the likelihood of police use or
threatened use of force. Further questions raised by the results of this study include
whether and to what extent the race*sex intersection predicts specific use of force
outcomes, like the use of a Taser on a suspect, or being shot by the police.
Additionally, due to the dichotomous nature of the use of force outcome in the data
set, I was not able to examine whether there is a linear relationship between
race*sex variables and use of force. Therefore, future research should examine
more specific use of force outcomes and develop continuous measures of use of
force to assess whether there exists a linear relationship between race*sex and other
important variables. In particular, the use of continuous outcome variables may
present an opportunity to conduct more complex analyses in the future.
Second, because this research utilizes a cross-sectional design, causality
cannot be inferred from the model. While it may appear that the independent
variables tested in this variable are in fact predictors of police use or threatened use
of force in police-public contacts, it is also very much possible that variations in
police behavior, like type of force used by individual police officers may influence
the effect that the interaction of race and sex has on police use of force (Paoline and
Terill 2004). Therefore, I propose the following suggestions. Future research
should use a longitudinal research design to examine the effect of the intersection
of race and sex on police use or threatened use of force, across time. Currently,
there are several police-public contact survey data sets available, so it is a possible
option for future researchers. It may be useful to test three-way interactions between
respondent race, sex, and officer race, as well as respondent race, sex, and each of
the different insufficient deference variables.
The use of secondary data sources presents a unique set of limitations for
the present study. The purpose for collecting these data was to provide information
about the nature and characteristics of face-to-face contacts between police and the
public, including the reason and outcome. While these data were helpful in gaining
insight about the effect of race and sex on police use or threatened use of force, I
was still left with some less than ideal measures that resulted in the removal of
categories from some variables that may have enriched the current study. The most
pressing problem with using this data set is that there does not exist a gender
variable. Because “sex” is being used as proxy for gender in this model, it is
important to exercise caution about the conclusions that can be made about the
combined effect of race and sex on police use of force. In other words, as sex refers
to biological traits, not the more fluid and dynamic social construct that is gender,
caution must be used when attempting to generalize these claims. Future research
should merge available data sets from the police-public contact survey to provide
enough cases in certain variables (e.g., race categories including two or more races),
as a remedy for the former issue. For the latter, it is important that surveys and
questionnaires that collect official data include items treating gender and sex
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separately, including more than two sex categories for those who are intersex, and
including more categories in the gender item beyond the binary “woman/man”
categories to capture more than these two genders.
While this study draws on Black feminist and multiracial perspectives, the
variables in the study do not allow for an exploration into the ways in which the
Black, Hispanic, and White females and males are experiencing their interactions
with police officers in uniquely gendered ways. In other words, we are not able to
gain insight into how the context within which the situations in which police
officers threatened to use force or use force in their interactions with civilians, are
experienced differently by males and females. This is another direction in which
future research may be directed.
Given the different odds ratios revealed in these analyses, future
researchers may begin more in-depth, qualitative studies to explore the dimensions
of racialized gender identities that either increase the odds of certain racially
marginalized people to experience and report police use of force in interactions
with police, anddecrease them for others, compared to White males. Additionally,
along with theorizing about how White maleness and masculinities are privileged
in this society and how these privileges appear to make respondents more or less
likely to report police use of force, we should conduct qualitative studies to
explore those who identified as both White and male to understand what other
social conditions, and identities enhance or minimize their likelihood to report
police use, or threatened use, of force in interactions with police. Lastly, another
possibility for future research might be to look at the interaction between
intersectionality and the absence of deference items on likelihood to report police
use, or threatened use of force in interactions with police.
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Freedom or Responsibility? On
the Unreason of Public Reason
By Mitchell L. Winget
Abstract: This article argues that the public reason tradition of political normativity is flawed. As
a result, I argue for a politically normative approach that rationally justifies morally
legitimate political power for democratic political societies from outside the paradigm of
public reason. To this end, I propose that neo-Aristotelian virtue theory lends us such a
framework. Furthermore, I’ll defend this framework against the objections that such a
theory of political normativity is unreasonable and anti-democratic.
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Introduction
When considering what justice means in a contemporary liberal society, some
notion of freedom often comes to mind. To paraphrase the late Gerald Gaus, our
freedom is normatively basic and the onus of justification always falls on those
who try and coercively limit freedom (Gaus, 2011, p. 17). But in the realm of
politics whereby certain decisions always rule over the free will of others,
freedom can be a rather paradoxical concept. In fact, since the Enlightenment,
Western political philosophy has produced a long lineage of thinkers attempting to
unravel this paradox while rationally preserving the moral value of freedom in
political life. These thinkers belong to an intellectual tradition known as
philosophical liberalism and for many centuries, one of the most prominent
theories regarding the moral legitimacy of political power within that tradition has
been public reason liberalism.1 Public reason liberals argue that freedom is
preserved in political life when certain principles of political power can be
demonstrated as justifiable to all reasonable persons who are subjected to such
power.2 But again, one might wonder what sort of principles guiding the use of
political power could ever achieve such a feat given that persons regularly reach
opposing political conclusions in their reasoning. This is why contentious issues
concerning what is just dominates our political discourse and political power
always fails to secure comprehensive agreement among all rational persons who
are subjected to it. Nevertheless, public reason liberals argue that in being
reasonable, rational persons can converge on common principles of political
power.
So then who are the reasonable and what kind of political power do they
endorse? This article explores the answers to these questions offered by the public
reason tradition and ultimately argues that the answers prove to be untenable.
However, I’ll argue that a neo-Aristotelian framework of political virtue can avoid
these pitfalls while providing a rational framework for political normativity. Of
course, this transition is sure to elicit some serious objections. Firstly, the neoAristotelian account strikes many public reason liberals as unjustifiable.
Secondly, the account seems at odds with democracy. In section I, I will survey
the normative perspective underlying public reason liberalism and its theory of
justice. In section II, I will explore the normative perspective of a neo-Aristotelian
account and its own theory of justice. Then, in section III, I will argue that only
the latter conception of justice is rationally acceptable. Lastly, I’ll conclude by
briefly touching base on the practical implications of what I have argued.
According to Gaus, “social contract theory was fundamentally and explicitly concerned with
identifying a source of public reason” (Gaus, 1996).
2
Various theorists will expand and contract the scope of “political power” as it concerns justice.
For Rawls, justice applies only to constitutional essentials and the distribution of primary goods
but not any further decisions of the legislature under such an order. See Rawls (2001, p 91). For
other contemporary arguments in favor of public reason liberalism, see Nussbaum (2011) , Gaus
(2011), Quong (2010), Estlund (2008), Nagel (1991), Larmore (1987). Some have extended the
tenets of public reason to moral epistemology itself. Gaus (2011), Darwall (2006), and Scanlon
(1998).
1
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The Freestanding Self
Perhaps the most influential articulation of the politically normative framework
known as public reason liberalism comes from John Rawls. Rawls perceived the
problematic contentions of society as marked by the fact that persons come to
possess incompatibly doctrinal conceptions of a good life and thus they inevitably
contend on the distribution of ‘primary goods,’ which is to say the liberties and
economic means necessary to effectuate that life. Rawls referred to this as the fact
of reasonable pluralism. Given this contention, Rawls felt that the chief task of
political philosophy was to delineate political principles governing the
distribution of primary goods that all rational persons can accept. In his seminal
work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempted to derive these political principles
with the construction of a thought experiment now famously known as The Veil
of Ignorance. From behind The Veil, all rational persons are eclipsed from the
many incompatible doctrines - or “burdensome judgments” - that facilitate our
political contentions with one another so that we can freely and fairly choose
principles of justice to govern our society. This experiment exemplified what it
means to be reasonable according to Rawls. When deliberating on the issues of
distributive justice, the reasonable are “mutually disinterested” persons who
dismiss any burdensome political judgments in order to locate political judgments
that all rational persons can assent to (Rawls, 1999 [1971], pp. 6-7, 58 – 59,
81-82).
Due to the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls believed that no society
could reach or maintain any actual consensus concerning just political power and
so our natural freedom would never be preserved in politics. Nonetheless, Rawls
demonstrated that a kind of political freedom is preserved by advancing mutually
disinterested principles that all freestanding rational persons can still accept in
abstraction from the various incompatible doctrines that facilitate our contentions
to begin with. Such a consensus is what Rawls would later refer to as an
“overlapping consensus” (Rawls, 2005, p. 26). For Rawls, rational disagreement
in the realm of everyday political discourse posed no threat to the overlapping
consensus that reasonable persons uphold. For our purposes, we can think of this
general argument as the Public Reason Argument for Justice (PRAJ), which goes
as follows:
(1) All rational persons have sufficient reason to be mutually disinterested
(i.e. reasonable).
(2) All mutually disinterested persons have sufficient reason to endorse a
certain form of political power.
(3) If all rational persons have sufficient reason to be mutually
disinterested, and all mutually disinterested persons have sufficient reason
to endorse a certain form of political power, then all rational persons have
sufficient reason to endorse a certain form of political power.
(4) Therefore, all rational persons have sufficient reason to endorse a
certain form of political power.
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So what exactly are these certain forms of political power that all rational persons
have sufficient reason to endorse? Ultimately, Rawls delineated what he argued
were the two principles of political power concerning the distribution of primary
goods in this respect. The most controversial of these principles departed from
classically liberal conceptions of economic justice and included a maximin
scheme of state redistribution that ensured the greatest possible gains for the
comparatively least well off. This “new liberal” take on economic justice was part
of a principle that Rawls called the “difference principle.” 3 Many rational persons
in liberal societies endorse the difference principle, but many rational persons in
liberal societies reject its highly redistributive powers in favor of the free market
justice advocated by classical liberals. This contention is not unfamiliar in debates
concerning economic justice today. However, let’s recall that mere disagreement
alone does not challenge the public reason liberal. The point is to locate
principles that preserve our political freedom by appealing to an overlapping
consensus. In fact, this is precisely why Rawls rejected classical liberalism. Rawls
believed that the free market conception of justice championed by classical
liberals was unreasonable because it was not predicated on mutually disinterested
reasoning but rather burdensome judgments concerning the moral supremacy of
private property, and a doctrinal perception of persons as comprising a competing
network of private associations. On Rawls’s account, classical liberalism could
never maintain a publicly acceptable notion of justice because it fails to respect
persons as freestanding individuals whose interests always stand prior to the
doctrinal preferences of classical liberalism (Rawls, 2005 pp. 11, 264 - 65).
Although Rawls remained committed to the PRAJ, he would eventually
begin to question how the principles he’d prescribed could be the practically
feasible principles of any social order given that there was no guarantee that
rational persons in a pluralistic society would come to see that they have reason to
uphold mutually disinterested political principles over whatever principles might
be entailed by the various doctrines that often guide us in our everyday lives (ibid,
p. 18). In effect, Rawls had acknowledged that premise 1 of the PRAJ could not
be accepted as true in the absence of certain antecedent conditions. Thus, Rawls
conceded that nothing of his theory had established that the principles of justice
could be those of both a just and stable society. However, in Political Liberalism,
Rawls argued that his principles of justice could be stably upheld from within a
politically liberal ethos and its cultural perception of the self. According to Rawls,
political persons in liberal societies generally have, above all else, a freestanding
conception of the self as well as others in the public sphere as “self-authenticating
3

See Rawls (2001, p. 42). Maximin redistributions will permit economic inequalities over more
equitable redistributions if such distributions would ultimately decrease the economic standing of
the least well off under liberal market conditions. Because of this, not all egalitarians agree with
Rawls. For example, socialists like G.A. Cohen have pointed out that the difference principle
makes economic justice dependent upon the interests of the property-owning classes who
otherwise have the capacity to threaten the economic standing of the least well-off in response to
redistributive taxation under liberal market conditions, thus making greater economic equality
appear unjustified by the standards of the difference principle. According to Cohen, no economic
principle permitting such an imbalance of power could be a principle of justice. See Cohen (2008).
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sources of valid claims”(ibid, pp. 26, 169). Therefore, liberal cultures are
generally disposed to accept a “duty of civility” to actually uphold the mutually
disinterested principles of political power that all freestanding rational persons
can accept over the various doctrines that otherwise guide so many of us in our
everyday lives.4
Moving onto the next section, we’ll consider an alternative tradition of
political normativity. Such a tradition departs from public reason liberalism’s
commitment to the mutually disinterested judgments of freestanding rational
persons and moves towards what can be called the virtuous judgments of
responsible rational persons.
Virtue and Responsibility
When it comes to political normativity, Aristotle may have left us with an
important insight:
“The city does not exist for the sake of an alliance…nor for
exchange and [commercial] dealings…whoever is concerned about
good government keeps an eye on political virtue and vice. It is
therefore evident that virtue ought to be a care for every city that is
truly…called a city. Otherwise, the city becomes an alliance…and
law becomes a treaty...not that which makes the citizens good and
just” (Aristotle, 1280a34-b12).
The suggestion here is that a legitimate political society will be one where persons
flourish in the cultivation of virtuous ideals and the just political institutions that
serve those ideals. But more must be said about virtues and human flourishing.
Drawing from the MacIntyrian account of virtue, I’ll present a neo-Aristotelian
account of political virtue.
On the neo-Aristotelian account of political normativity, there are two
dimensions of human value: The external goods of distribution and the internal
goods of human virtue (MacIntyre, 1993[1981]). The external goods of
distribution (e.g. wealth, power, opportunities, etc.) are akin to what Rawls called
“primary goods’ and include any good that is external to the agent. We might
think of external goods in the sense that any external good that I have is one that
you don’t have. On the other hand, the internal goods of human virtue are internal
to human practices. Such goods are an acquired human quality, the possession and
4

This is also called the internal conception of public reason liberalism. For contemporary
advocates, see Estlund (2008) and Quong (2010). However, it should be noted that this assumption
that politically liberal persons have reason to endorse public reason liberalism in virtue of what it
means to be liberal, is controversial. Liberal perfectionists, for example, reject the tenets of public
reason while maintaining their own commitment to liberal values. For a prominent defense of
liberal perfectionism, see Raz (1986).
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exercise of which are of a cumulative value benefiting all who share in its
collective developments (ibid, p. 232). So to further understand what a virtue is
we must look to the concept of a practice as stipulated within the neo-Aristotelian
tradition. According to MacIntyre, a practice constitutes: an ongoing context
present within human life whereby certain goals and themes of conflict present
themselves, and whereby virtues can and have been realized, refined, and
extended over time through a continued recognition of, and engagement with, its
practical and relational structures. It’s from the standpoint of one’s engagement
with a practice that rational persons can begin to recognize certain virtuous ends,
which is to say: any feasible human pursuit, the cultivation of which rationally
serves to overcome and improve upon the challenges of the practical and
relational structures in which they are situated while remaining internally
consistent with other similarly situated virtues. Correspondingly, whatever ends
fail to characterize these features while perpetuating the practical and relational
challenges of the practice, are understood as vices. Therefore, virtues are
constitutive of any successful – i.e. flourishing - practice (ibid.)
Given this framework, recognizing political virtue requires one to
acknowledge their own engagement with (i.e. responsibility to) the practical and
relational structures of politics as a practice. Since a practice constitutes an
ongoing context present within human life whereby certain goals and themes of
conflict present themselves within its practical and relational structures, political
life arguably embodies a certain practice. Political life is that ongoing context
whereby one must attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst contention,
principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold them. In
other words, the practice of politics is essentially communal reasoning and this
kind of activity is of course prior to any governing institutions. Furthermore, it’s
important to recognize that politics is the most basic of social practices because it
is inherent to all communities, as all communities have the capacity to reason with
one another concerning community issues. Upon the recognition of politics as a
practice, recognizing political virtue means calling into question those
characteristic pursuits that rationally serve to overcome and improve upon the
challenges of the [political] practical and relational structures in which they are
situated while remaining internally consistent with other similarly situated
virtues.
Given the practical and relational structure of the political practice, the
neo-Aristotelian tradition is able to derive at least three virtues of political life:
The political virtue of honesty as derived through experience with what it means
to successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst
contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold
them. Furthermore, the political virtue of courage as derived through experience
with what it means to successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or
uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who
must uphold them. Lastly, the virtue of justice as derived through experience with
what it means to successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or
uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons
who must uphold them. In summary, flourishing political societies require rational
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persons to be honest, courageous, and just if they are to successfully attempt to
communicate and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all
rational persons who must uphold them. Public reason liberals needn’t find this
general perspective to be that contentious. However, notice that on a neoAristotelian account, the normativity of justice is conceived somewhat differently
than for public reason liberals. This is because neo-Aristotelians hold that one can
only successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst
contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold
them, in the event that all rational persons in question are responsible to the
relevant practices in question.
In closing this section we now have two competing conceptions of
justice:
(1) the public reason conception of justice as issuing mutually disinterested
principles that all freestanding rational persons can accept and (2) the neoAristotelian conception of justice as issuing virtuous principles that all
responsibly rational persons can accept. As we continue, I’ll argue that the first
conception is not successfully pursuant of any principles that are justifiable to all
rational persons who must uphold them. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of
public reason liberalism, the essence of justice is to resist the allegedly
“burdensome” moral judgments of virtue in political life. This objection will need
to be overcome in order to proceed with the argument.
Freedom or Responsibility?
Any declaration concerning what persons ought to do in the event that such
persons do not already wish to do so is undoubtedly controversial. In fact, the
burdensome character of politically telling persons what they ought to do is what
motivates the search for public reason. For the public reason liberal, it’s the fact
that we have so many varying social circumstances and conceptions of the moral
good that we’re incapable of true freedom in the form of normative principles that
we all can accept. This is why any virtue theoretic approach like that of the neoAristotelian tradition generally strikes public reason liberals as unjustifiable.
Nevertheless, the tendency to reject the virtue theoretic approach as unjustifiable
comes predominantly from one of two misconceptions. The first misconception
concerns the hierarchical and rather unscientific conception of teleological virtues
found in the classical Aristotelian tradition. On the classical Aristotelian account,
virtuous character was something available only to persons who were naturally
inclined towards that purpose. Such a conception understandably lends itself to
the contemporary notion that virtues are elitist. The second misconception
concerns the Enlightenment conception of virtues found most readily in the work
of David Hume. On Hume’s account, virtues were thought to be those qualities of
human character that arouse in others the “pleasing sentiments of approbation”
(Hume, 1998[1751], I.10). Such a conception understandably lends itself to the
contemporary notion that virtues are non-rational, and hence the importance of
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moral neutrality for the liberal tradition.5 Consequently, neither account was
capable of explaining how it could be rational to say that any particular person
ought to be virtuous. But none of this means that the prescriptive claims of virtue
are rationally unjustifiable; it simply means that they are rationally unjustifiable if
we assume that they are terms used simply for denoting naturally superior humans
or an affectively pleasing character.
The neo-Aristotelian tradition allows for a rationally justifiable
understanding of virtues. This is because wherever rational persons are engaged
with (i.e. responsible to) any ongoing context present within human life whereby
certain goals and themes of conflict present themselves…through the continued
recognition of its practical and/or relational structures, then it’s rational to say
that such persons ought to pursue what proves to be a feasible human pursuit, the
cultivation of which rationally serves to overcome and improve upon the
challenges of the practical and/or relational structures in which they are situated
while remaining internally consistent with other similarly situated virtues. For
example, an educational practice consists of such virtues as patience,
attentiveness, and studiousness (among others). Now one may not be able to
rationally derive the arbitrary conclusion that they ought to be patient from the
simple fact that they are a rational person. However, from the fact that they are a
rational person engaged with (i.e. responsible to) the practice of education, it can
be rationally derived that they ought to succeed at doing what an educator does.
Depending on the circumstances this might entail, among other things, patience,
attentiveness, and studiousness. But notice that educational virtues do not depend
on what an educational institution mandates, or whether virtues of education are
emotionally agreeable, or whether the natural purpose of such a person is to be an
educator. Instead, they depend on whether they serve to rationally overcome and
improve upon the challenges presented by the practical and relational structures of
education; challenges to which the virtuous practitioner perceives themselves
responsible. Therefore, persons who are rationally responsible to education judge
various preferences, affective approbations, and institutional mandates in
accordance with virtue so that they can succeed in realizing the internal goods of
the practice. To do otherwise suggests that one is either being irrational or does
not see oneself as responsible to the practice of education.
Although public reason liberals generally reject the neo-Aristotelian
tradition, they must adopt its framework in their own theory of justice. This is
because to say that one ought to uphold the mutually disinterested principles that
all freestanding rational persons can accept can only be rationalized in the event
that one also perceives themselves as responsible to an attempt to communicate
and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational
persons who must uphold them. We might also think of it this way. If any persons
in question were not political persons but were rationally self-interested persons
5

Many have argued that such a principle of neutrality is central to liberalism. See Rawls (2005,
pp. 56-57). Larmore (1987), Dworkin (1985), Ackerman (1980). See Simmons (2005) for a
libertarian endorsement of the principle. Even J.S. Mill, a utilitarian, seemed to embrace the notion
in his categorical rejection of legal moralism. See Mill (1859, Ch 1).
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who, rather than engage themselves responsibly as political citizens, seek to
overcome practical and relational contentions with actions that suppose no
justifiability whatsoever but merely the effectuation of their immediate interests,
then such a person could not possibly rationalize any obligation to justice.
One might object and say that invoking the practice of politics is
irrelevant. Of course public reason justice isn’t justified to self-interested persons.
The point of public reason justice is that it is justified to the freestanding rational
perspective that everyone - even rationally self-interested persons – possesses at
some level. However, this reply would be unsuccessful because all that can be
said of the freestanding rational person from the public reason perspective is that,
amidst contentions, persons attempt to rationally effectuate their ends and that
such ends will require the use of external goods. But to assume that one is
committed to doing this in a justifiable (i.e. political) fashion, rather than the
apolitical nature of rational self-interest, is to move beyond the freestanding
perspective of rational persons and to encumber them with certain tendencies
towards resolving contention; tendencies that are not intrinsic to freestanding
rational humanity but developed through experience. No political principle could
be rationally justifiable to all freestanding rational persons merely in this sense
because freestanding rational persons, in being freestanding, have no
responsibilities to the practice of politics.
In securing the neo-Aristotelian framework, we can establish that claims
of justice are justifiable to any rational persons in question if and only if (1) the
rational persons in question are responsible to the practice of politics, and (2)
what norms are being prescribed are successfully justifiable to all rational persons
who must uphold them. The rational sensibility of such a framework is arguably
why Rawls recast his theory of justice in Political Liberalism. If the principles he
put forward were to be that of a just and stable social order, they had to be
predicated on certain developments allowing persons to even rationalize the
pursuit of justice to begin with. Rawls placed confidence in that achievement
through the developments of a politically liberal culture where rational persons
are said to perceive themselves as responsibly political yet otherwise freestanding
rational persons. Thus in coming to recognize the antecedent conditions of a
politically responsible community to which justice is prescribed, public reason
liberals meet condition one. However, if the principles themselves are to meet
condition two, then the principles must be virtuous principles from the standpoint
of rational persons who are further responsible to whatever practice the norms in
question apply. In other words, it must be a feasible human pursuit, the cultivation
of which rationally serves to overcome and improve upon the challenges of the
practical and relational structures in which it is situated while remaining
internally consistent with other similarly situated virtues. It’s in meeting this
condition that public reason liberalism fails to deliver because although it
recognizes persons as politically responsible, it still presumes that they are to be
otherwise freestanding with regards to whatever practice in which one has
become political. Moving forward we’ll consider a particular domain, or practice,
in which these shortcomings of public reason liberalism prove to be problematic economic life. On this particular issue, the public reason liberal’s disposition
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allows for no further rational normativity because just as rational persons must be
responsibly political persons (in pursuit of political virtue) in order to rationalize
the norms of political life, rational persons must be responsibly political and
economic persons (in pursuit of politically economic virtue) in order to rationalize
the norms of a politically economic life.
Near the end of section I, I alluded to liberal society’s inability to
rationalize to one another the norms of economic justice given the incompatible
ends of new liberalism and classical liberalism. However, Rawls diagnosed this
particular problem, not as a failure of public reason’s conception of justice, but
rather the burdensome moralizations of unreasonable persons - i.e. classical
liberals - when attempting to recognize justice. In other words, classical
liberalism’s arbitrary attempt to characterize political persons as fundamentally
private consumers complicates our understanding of principles that are justifiable
to all rational persons who must uphold them. Although this criticism may have
challenged Nozickian or Randian-style libertarians, the critique does not
undermine the claims of prominent public reason liberals like John Tomasi. Such
theorists ground their classically liberal conceptions of economic justice on
mutually disinterested principles that all freestanding rational persons can
allegedly accept.6 Unfortunately, however, two public reason liberals attempting
to advance rationally inconsistent principles of justice cannot be said to
successfully communicate and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are
justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold them. Therefore, public reason
liberals have failed to advance the principles of economic justice.
Of course, staunch defenders of either Rawlsian or classically liberal
justice within the public reason tradition will reject this conclusion. From the
standpoint of public reason, someone is still being unreasonable by issuing
political principles predicated on “burdensome” doctrines concerning socially
situated conditions (such as a practice), or moral conceptions of the good (such as
virtues) rather than a political yet otherwise freestanding rational perspective from
which we all can agree. But let’s look more closely at this political yet otherwise
freestanding rational perspective that all rational political persons can supposedly
use to derive the same principles of economic governance. Such a person is of the
judgment that one must have, amidst economic contention, certain political
principles of economic governance in order to politically and economically
effectuate their conception of a good life. This judgment is political yet otherwise
rationally freestanding because all rational political persons would still possess
such a judgment in abstraction from the otherwise incompatible doctrines that
guide their economically contentious lives. But as we continue, it turns out that
this judgment concerning the politically economic effectuation of any good life is
complicated further by reducing to competing questions of acquisition and
possession.

6

For public reason arguments against new liberalism and in favor of classical liberalism, see
Tomasi (2012, pp. 241-243), Gaus (2011, p. 514).
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Rawlsians argue that their political principles of economic governance are
the reasonable ones because when rational persons abstract themselves from the
various incompatible doctrines that guide their economically contentious lives, it
becomes clear that all rational persons would accept the difference principle and
its maximin redistributions of economic wealth as just. But this can only be true if
we assume that politically protected acquisition is the only political yet otherwise
freestanding means by which one economically effectuates their conception of the
good life. After all, Rawlsian justice will always discriminate against certain
political yet otherwise freestanding rational persons seeking political protection of
the possessions by which they economically effectuate their conception of the
good life. Rawlsians may attempt to reject appeals to possession as unreasonable,
but this cannot succeed because possession is not an economically doctrinal
concept like private property. All political yet otherwise freestanding rational
persons can accept the basic proposition that in order to effectuate one’s
conception of the good life, one must have the possessions needed to
economically effectuate that conception of a good life. As a result, reasonable
persons can still recognize that Rawlsian justice will produce a continuous class
of freestanding possessors who will perceive themselves as unjustifiably
subordinated under such a social order.
However, the same problem confronts public reason liberals in the
classical sense. They argue that if persons abstract themselves from the various
incompatible doctrines that guide their economically contentious lives, it becomes
clear that all rational persons would accept extensive private property rights along
with the efficiently generated wealth of politically liberated markets as just. 7 But
this can only be true if we assume that politically protected possession is the only
political yet otherwise freestanding means by which one economically effectuates
their conception of the good life. After all, classically liberal justice will always
discriminate against certain political yet otherwise freestanding rational persons
seeking political acquisition in order to economically effectuate their conception
of the good life. Classical liberals may attempt to reject appeals to acquisition as
unreasonable, but this cannot succeed because acquisition is not an economically
doctrinal concept. All political yet otherwise freestanding rational persons can
accept the basic proposition that in order to effectuate one’s conception of the
good life, one must have the acquisitions needed to economically effectuate that
conception of a good life. As a result, reasonable persons still recognize that
classically liberal justice will produce a continuous class of freestanding
acquisitors who will perceive themselves as unjustifiably subordinated under such
a social order.
Politically protected possession and acquisition are not doctrinal
considerations of economic life but rather practical and relational structures that
can be rationally deduced from any economic effectuation of a good life. In other
words, any economic effectuation of a good life will necessarily entail some
7

Some classical liberals even argue for small levels of social assistance. See Tomasi (2012).
However, they reject the maximin scheme of redistribution that new liberals endorse, as well as
egalitarian economic justice in general.
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interpersonal dimension of acquisition and possession. Therefore, no political yet
otherwise freestanding rational person could dismiss the practical and relational
reality of either acquisition or possession within any economic life while still
remaining rational. If the production, distribution, and political management of
economic goods were not practically and relationally situated but rather an
entirely separate function from the body politic capable of producing economic
goods while both providing for the acquisition of such goods as well as protecting
private possessions, perhaps the institutions of this somewhat miraculous
conception of a political and economic reality would be justified to all
freestanding rational persons. Of course, public reason liberals do not actually
have such a cartoonish notion of society, nor would its institutions need to be
predicated on Rawlsian or classically liberal justifications. Nonetheless, only such
a freestanding manifestation of society could be justified to all freestanding
rational persons. Thus public reason liberals face a dilemma. If public reason
justice requires reasonable persons to deny the place of possession and acquisition
in economic life as doctrinal, then it cannot offer a practically feasible pursuit, the
cultivation of which rationally serves to overcome and improve upon the
challenges of the practical and relational structures in which it is situated. But if
they permit this understanding, their principles will not be internally consistent.
Therefore, the issuing of mutually disinterested principles that all freestanding
rational persons can accept cannot be justifiable to all rational persons, and is thus
not the virtue of justice.
One might try and argue here that the public reason principles of economic
justice are those that impose upon acquisitive and possessive interests the least
and that this is the operative concern when discerning principles from the
standpoint of reasonable persons. This would acknowledge the place of
possession and acquisition in economic life, but notice that applying this line of
reasoning would not give equal respect to possessive and acquisitive persons as
they are but rather it would attempt to aggregate them into categories of least
imposing and non-least imposing while institutionally respecting only those
persons who fall into the former camp at any given time. Therefore, this approach
would not only fail to be just in creating an unjustifiable class of subjugated
rational persons with regard to economic life, it isn’t even public reason
liberalism. Conversely, it’s economic utilitarianism – a position that public reason
liberals already reject for these reasons.
As this argument has shown, the freestanding perspective championed by
public reason liberals is precisely what eviscerates us of rational normativity to
begin with, while once again perpetuating the very structures of unjustifiable
subordination that we wish to escape in political life. In economic life, the
freestanding rational person is devoid of the practical and relational structures of
possessive and acquisitive tendencies - tendencies that could otherwise be
tempered by the virtues of responsible persons with any understanding of a
politically economic community. Fortunately, however, this void isn’t exactly
hopeless. Persons arguably have a continued recognition of the practical and
relational challenges of possession and acquisition that comprise the ongoing
context of a politically economic practice. Such practical and relational challenges
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have been recognized with regard to something of vicious possession in the (e.g.
greedy) possessors who politically neglect persons who are unwillingly destitute
and vulnerable, economically speaking. Similarly, there is something of vicious
acquisition recognized in the (e.g. exploitative) acquisitors who attempt to
politically exploit one another’s economic contributions with no intention of
making any contributions of equal value in return. Virtues and vices reveal
themselves to rational persons who responsibly recognize a politically economic
community, and thus political reasoning on these matters beyond the standpoint of
freestanding persons speaks to feasible human pursuits, the cultivation of which
rationally serve to overcome and improve upon the challenges of the practical and
relational structures of an economic life. Furthermore, such virtues are internally
consistent when guiding institutional design within the community, and are thus
justifiable to all politically and economically responsible persons who must
uphold them. This is because configurations of political power concerning both
property and redistribution can be justifiable to all rationally responsible
possessors and acquisitors alike.8
But what if virtues are fundamentally illusory to begin with? After all, I’ve
conceded that the attempt to justify political norms in and of itself cannot be made
rational from the standpoint of rational self-interest. For such persons, the
justifiability of one’s actions is of simply no concern and so if humanity amounts
to nothing more than this will to power, what is to rationally keep us from
navigating our lives as so? Such a nihilistic position undermines political
normativity of any kind. But I suspect that this is not a fact of human nature so
much as a despondent reply to the rational failures of previous political traditions.
Fortunately, nihilism cannot succeed as a critique of the neo-Aristotelian tradition
because such a tradition allows for rational persons to transcend the paradoxical
implications of preceding political traditions. There will always be unjustifiable
subordination in the pursuit of political freedom or utility given the practical and
relational reality of any social order, but this is not inevitable to the politically
responsible pursuit of virtue. Recall an educational community and its virtues. For
those who have committed themselves to a recognition of the practical and
relational structures of an educational practice, internal goods - albeit demanding are no longer deemed oppressive but rather an opportunity to cultivate feasible
human pursuits, the cultivation of which rationally serves to overcome and
improve upon the challenges of the practical and relational structures of
education. The only means by which the cultivation of these internal goods
becomes an oppressive proposition to the educator is in the event that they find
themselves more concerned with external goods or mere self-interest. This is
something gravely misunderstood in political life by utilitarians, public reason
liberals, and their nihilistic successors. Under these circumstances, the responsible
This is somewhat akin to the Aristotelian conception of justice as “treating equals equally” since
its conception of justice shows equal regard for the ends of virtue, but not freestanding ends that
are unequal in the eyes of virtue. See Aristotle (1130b-1132b). As neo-Aristotelians note, however,
Aristotle’s own elitist philosophy falsely assumed that certain humans were naturally inclined
towards virtue, and thus his conception morally expected subservience to such persons.
8
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choice would be to resign from education, while the responsible choice for the
latter would be to resign from government.
Although a nihilistic response to the rational failures of public reason
liberalism is not irrational, one can still question the value of dismissing any
attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are
justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold them. Afterall, such a person
lives either in continuous exile or proceeds politically with no more regard for
courage, honesty, and justice than the cowardly, deceptive, and imperious
tendencies of a tyrant. The immense existential challenge of either exile or
indifference suggests that such a life is not only more demanding than justice but
a far less viable path to human flourishing. Therefore, one might fare better in
first trying to recognize the unresolved practical and relational conditions that
have compelled them towards exile or indifference to begin with. The neoAristotelian tradition allows one to recognize these unresolved contentions while
positing rational resolutions in response.
This leads us to our last criticism. Why should the neo-Aristotelian
tradition justify the institutional structure of a democratic political society? After
all, the virtue theoretic tradition can invoke antiquated notions of political life that
once advocated subservience to authoritarian governance. But once again, the
misconceptions surrounding these conservative applications of virtue should only
be attributed to classical Aristotelian thought.9 Principles of subservience in
political life fail to be virtuous because politically responsible rational persons
recognize that if anything is to be a justifiable principle, then its authority must be
rationally grounded in something other than the persons who issue those
principles because such persons are fallible. Thus, if persons are fallible in the
issuance of political principles, then politically responsible rational persons know
that there is never any reason to be subservient to them. Hence the virtuous
principle of mutual accountability that guides the institutional design of
democratic governance is also pursuant of justice as issuing virtuous principles
that all politically responsible rational persons can accept.
Conclusion
Public reason liberals continue to reject the neo-Aristotelian tradition of political
normativity as unreasonable because they claim that the concept of virtue is
inevitably unjustifiable to others. But as I’ve argued, not only is this criticism
predicated on a misconception of virtue theory, no politically normative principle
is capable of achieving rational justification from outside the neo-Aristotelian
9

In fact, this kind of elitism was not only prevalent in classical Aristotelian thought, but also the
proto-liberal work of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, who was no fan of Aristotle, attempted to issue a
political – i.e. allegedly justifiable – argument in favor of subservience to an absolutist state. See
Hobbes (2010, pp. 106 – 112).
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tradition of political normativity. This void is precisely why the public reason
tradition itself continues to fracture into the oppositional camps of Rawlsianism
and classical liberalism whereby allegedly “reasonable” persons still perceive one
another as unreasonable in economic life. Therefore, the purpose of this argument
has been to show that public reason liberalism has no good argument in rejecting
the democratic voices of those who are politically guided by what virtues have
been discerned through knowledgeable experience with the underlying practical
and relational structures that our institutional powers come to govern.
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The Macroeconomic Impacts of
Entitlements
By Ateeb Akhter Shah Syed
Abstract: The worries expressed by Alan Greenspan that the long run economic growth of the
United States will fade away due to increasing burden of entitlements motivated us to
empirically investigate the impact of entitlements of key macroeconomic variables. To
examine this contemporary issue, we estimate a vector error-correction model to analyze
the impact of entitlements on the price level, real output, and the long-term interest rate.
The results show that a shock to entitlements leads to decrease in output and lends
support to the assertion made by Alan Greenspan. Several robustness checks verify that
the results remain unchanged qualitatively.
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Introduction
Since the end of the great moderation era, the slowing down of the
economic growth in recent years is appearing as a defining challenge for
macroeconomists. In the United States (U.S.), this slowdown is generally
attributed to increased spending on entitlements. The increasing share of
entitlements in GDP of the U.S. has been a matter of serious concern for
economists and policy makers. Since last two decades, numerous experts are
expressing concerns by highlighting that theAmericans are turning into a nation of
takers and the Government of the U.S. has become an entitlements Machine
Eberstadt (2012). This disproportionate growth in entitlements is viewed as
unsustainable and would have serious repercussions for fiscal balances and
economic growth.
The former Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke warned lawmakers
that they need to fix the entitlement system. He pointed out that if early and
meaningful action is not taken, the U.S. economy could be seriously weakened,
with future generations bearing much of the cost. By attributing the rising burden
of entitlements on budget to aging population in the United States, he emphasized
that if difficult choices are not made, financial stability and healthy economic
growth will be lost Bernanke (2010). Similar fears were expressed by Alan
Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve Governor. While discussing the causes and
implications of secular stagnation at the conservative American Enterprise
Institute, he pointed out that spending on entitlements is crowding out gross
national saving leading to decreased investment and low productivity Greenspan
(2016). He warns recently in an interview that though in the short run economy
looks reasonably good, the gains in the economy are draining out from the
increasing entitlements and in the long run economic growth will fade away due
to crowding out of capital investment Cox (2019). Like Bernanke, he attributes
the rise in entitlements to aging population. Samuelson (2016), a renowned
columnist highlights the thoughts of Greenspan and emphasizes repeatedly to
control over growing burden of entitlements arguing that entitlements are draining
funds productivity-enhancing investments.
The term entitlements are referred to benefits that are conferred on any
person or unit of government that meets the eligibility requirements established
by legislation (Congressional Budget Reform and Impoundment Control Act of
1974) History Art & Archives United States House of Representatives (2020).
Social security, Medicare and Medicaid compose more than 75% of entitlement
programs in the United States, therefore they are synonymously used as the term
entitlements. As pointed out earlier, economists, researchers, analysts and
politicians are showing great concern over the rising entitlements spending which
is staining the budget, deficit is on the rise since several years. This situation is
projected to turn into a nascent fiscal crisis and will fade away economic growth
amid pandemic
The share of entitlements spending in GDP is growing year after year and
is projected to increase further. As reported in CBO report 2020, mandatory
spending on social security and major health care programs make 10.3 percent of
the GDP which is projected to be 12.4 percent of GDP by 2030.The budget deficit
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is projected to climb to 5.0% of GDP in 2030 from 4.6 percent of GDP in 2020.
Because of the large deficits, federal debt held by the public is projected to
grow, from81 percent of GDP in 2020 to 98 percent in 2030. The economic growth
is projected to slow down. From 2021-2030, output is projected to grow at an
average annual rate of 1.7 % CBO report (2020).
Based on the above concerns and statistics, it appears that there is little
doubt over the fear that entitlements are one of the major responsible factors for
low economic growth and there should be cuts on entitlement expenditures or
increase in taxes. However, Lawrence Summers (2013), the former U.S. treasury
secretary warned the world about the secular stagflation in a seminal speech at the
International Monetary Fund headquarters in New York. He suggested that the
solution is increased government spending Summers (2013). Further, Summers
(2020) asserts, “We don’t need fewer entitlements for the American middle class.
We need more”. He argues that several other structural factors are responsible for
slowing economic growth rather than increased entitlement spending. He explains
that secular stagnation is due to persistent low interest rate, global in-equality, and
low productivity growth. He believes that real interest rate required to achieve full
employment level is so far into negative territory which is effectively impossible.
Hence, there is little room for monetary policy to be effective to increase
investment and growth. He prescribes that more social insurance will enhance the
demand in the economy and increase in interest rate will push the economy
forward and contribute to financial stability.
Despite the serious concerns expressed on the role of entitlements in
slowing down the growth, the recent literature provides little empirical evidence.
Some studies examine the fiscal context of major entitlement programs such as
social security, Medicare and Medicaid and recommend reforms in these
programs by cutting these spending or increasing tax revenues [see for instance,
Palmer (2006) and Gist (2007)]. The increased entitlements are due to aging
population in the United States. Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and David
Powell (2016) estimate the economic impact of aging population in the states of
U.S. over the period 1980 to 2010. They document that 10% increase in the
fraction of population ages 60+ decreases per capitaGDP growth by 5.5% of which
two-third is due to slower growth in labor productivity whereas one-third is
caused by slower labor force growth. They predict that annual GDP growth will
slow down by 1.2 percentage points this decade and 0.6 percentage points in the
next decade due to population aging. However, Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual
Restrepo (2017) investigated the impact of aging on economic growth across
countries including OECD economies and conclude that the data do not verify the
negative impact of aging population on economic growth. On the other hand,
Sheiner (2018) analyzed the long-term impact of aging on the federal budget and
showed that debt path of the United States is not sustainable. The literature though
limited focuses on the impact of aging population on debt, budget deficit and
economic growth. There is no empirical research which investigates the direct
impact of entitlements on economy such as economic growth, interest rate and the
price level.
The relationship between spending on entitlements and slow economic
growth is yet to be empirically investigated as stated by Robert J. Samuelson,
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“What other economists will think remains to be seen. An obvious question is
whether Greenspan’s relationships are correlations, not cause and effect”
Samuelson (2016). Hence, this article is an attempt to address the question raisedby
Samuelson. It will contribute to the existing literature in the following way; to
best of our knowledge, it will be the first study to use a monthly dataset to
empirically investigate the macroeconomic impact of entitlements in the U.S.
using a VECM framework.
Data Description
The data for all the variables used in our paper is taken from Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Database (FRED). The main variable of interest is the
entitlements. We use the seasonally adjusted personal current transfer receipts,
government social benefits to persons measured in billions of
U.S. dollars as our measure of entitlements (E). As our sample runs
through the time of the great financial crisis, we use the Federal Reserve’s assets
(A)1 as a measure of monetary policy. We add A in our analysis to control for the
monetary stimulus as it also has the ability to stimulate the economy in the
short-run. We follow Wheeler (1999) in selection of variables that represent
macroeconomy of the U.S., that is, the price level, real output and a long-term
interest rate. For this purpose, seasonally adjusted industrial production is
included as a measure of real output (Y), seasonally adjusted consumer price
index, all items in the U.S. is included as a measure of the price level (P) and the
10-year government bond yields in included as a measure of interest rate (R). All
the variables except the interest rate are in log-levels. The interest rate is in levels.
The variable A is available only on a weekly basis; therefore, monthly average
1
was taken to form the monthly variable. A is also not seasonally adjusted at the2
data source; therefore, it is seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Bureau of Census
X11 seasonal adjustment program in statistical analysissoftware (SAS).

1

For a detailed know-how on the unconventional policy approaches at the zero-lower bound, see
Clouse et al. (2003), Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bernanke et al. (2004) and Kuttner (2018).
2
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Empirical Analysis
In our paper, we have considered two sample2 periods for empirical
analysis. We start our analysis by testing each variable for stationarity. For this
purpose a series of Dickey and Fuller (1981) unit-root tests (ADF) were conducted
on each variable. The results of these unit-root tests in presented in Table 1.
Introduced by Schwarz (1978), we use the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to
determine the optimal lags to be used in the ADF tests. Panel A of Table 1 shows
the results of the ADF test with drift. The test reveals that variables E, P, A and Y
are non-stationary in log-levels. R is found to be non-stationary in levels.
However, all these variables are stationary in first difference.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the results of the ADF test with trend and drift.
Similar to the drift test, the test reveals that variables E, P, A and Y are nonstationary in log-levels. R is found to be non-stationary in levels. However, all
these variables are stationary in first difference. All these variables are nonstationary in log-levels/levels; therefore, they should be first differenced to
3
achieve stationarity. However, Engle-Granger (1987) points out that a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model estimated in log-levels/levels is miss-specified if the
variables are cointegrated. Therefore, we tested the data for presence of
cointegration due to Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).
Johansen’s [(2000), (2002)] small-sample correction is also employed. The results
of the cointegration analysis were obtained using CATs in RATs, version 2
(2005).
BIC is used to determine the optimal lags for cointegration test. BIC
suggested to use 6 lags for the test cointegration. The results of cointegration trace
test are presented in Table 2. The trace statistic shows that one cointegrating
vector exists among the variables. Therefore, to evaluate the impact of E on the P,
Y and R, we employ a VECM model estimated using the Engle- Granger (1987)
two-step estimator.
We estimate the VECM containing variables E, P, A, Y and R. To
preserve degrees of freedom, a maximum lag length considered is 6 lags for the
model. The pre-sample extends from2002M12 to 2003M6, and the estimation of
the VECM models is carried out over 2003M7 to 2019M06. The lag length for the
model is chosen with the BIC. The BIC suggested a lag length of 5. The residuals
from each VECM equation are required to be white noise. To test for serial
correlation among the residuals from each VECM equation, we conducted a series
of Ljung-Box (1978) tests with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Q-

2

The first estimation sample is from 2003M7 to 2019M6 (henceforth, short sample). The
pre-sample for lags in the ADF tests and VECM for short sample extends from 2012M12 to
2003M6 (1 lag for the difference and 6 maximum lags for the estimation). The second estimation
sample is from 2004M2 to 2019M6 (henceforth, long sample). The pre-sample for this exercise
extends from 2012M12 to 2004M1 (1 lag for the difference and 12 maximum lags for the estimation).
To conserve space, we only report the results of model using the short sample. The results
qualitatively remain the same when long sample2 is used for the analysis.
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The results of the model are presented in terms of the impulse response
functions (IRFs). To compute IRFs, the residuals from the VECM must be
orthogonalized. One technique to compute orthogonalized residuals is Choleski
decomposition of contemporaneous relationships. Under the Choleski
decomposition, variables in the system are required to be ordered in a particular
manner. Variables higher in the ordering contemporaneously influence the
variables lower in the
ordering and not vice versa. We use the Choleski decomposition with
ordering E, A, P, Y and R for our model, when short sample is used.
The current study is concerned with the response of the P, Y and R to a
shock in E. This is consistent with the hypothesis we are testing. An increase in
entitlement spending may act as a fiscal stimulus and impact the macroeconomy.
Hence, it is placed first in the ordering. The key element of our ordering is
positioning of policy variables E and A first in the ordering. This permits shocks to
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these variables impact other variables in the system with in the same month.
However, these variables have an impact on E and A through the lags in the
system. Hence, like Wheeler (1999), we assume that the policymaker’s
information set only contains lags of P, Y and R.
In the short-run, certainly contemporaneously, prices are sticky. Hence, Y
shocks do not have an impact on P. This places P above Y. Assuming markets are
efficient and interest rates reflect all the available information quickly, R is placed
at the end. P, Y and R are placed below E and A, the placement of these variables
relative to each other is a matter of indifference as long aswe are testing the impact
of E on Y, P, and R. The conclusion of the model does not change when we alter
the ordering of P, Y, and R relative to each other or use alternate ordering.3
Therefore, wereport results with ordering E, A, P, Y, R.
In order to determine if the lag 6 of each variable in the system enters the
equations of each variable in the system significantly, we performed a joint
significance test on coefficients of this lag. we found that the coefficients on this lag
is jointly insignificant. This provides further evidence that lag 5 is appropriate.
However, as a robustness check, we also estimated the base model with 6 lags. The
results obtained from this robustness check exercise qualitatively remained the
same.
Results and Discussion
The results4 of our model are presented in Figures 1 through 3. Figure 1
indicates a shock to E has a positive and significant impact on P at first 4 forecast
horizons. It also produces a negative and significant impact on P at forecast
horizons 6 and 7. Hence, we find that entitlement expenditure is initially
inflationary. We know that the funds transferred from the U.S. government to the
economic agents leads to an increase in demand; therefore, it will lead to an
increase in the price level. However, this impact dampens and eventually becomes
insignificant forecast horizon 8 onwards.

3

The alternate-ordering for the model estimated using 3 lags is: E, A, Y, P, R; The difference in
this ordering is the placement real output before the price level and this exercise is performed as a
robustness check. The main result of the model qualitatively remains the same. In addition to this
robustness check exercise, we performed many other robustness exercises and found that the results
remained qualitatively the same. These include: estimation of the model over the longer sample
period, change in the ordering of the variables in the Choleski decomposition for the long sample,
joint significance test on lags 5 through 12 for the long sample and estimation of the model with 6
lags [we do not use more than 6 lags for the long sample; 1) to match with the estimation exercise
performed on the short sample, that is, estimation with 5 and 6 lags, 2) due to degrees of freedom
that occurs due the use of a longer lag length].
4

The results of this paper are reported in terms of IRFs. To compute the confidence
bands for the IRFs, MONTEVECM procedure is followed in RATs program. The confidence
intervals for the IRFs are computed via ten thousand Monte Carlo draws. For each IRF, the
bootstrapped confidence bands indicate the 0.05 and 0.95 percentilesof the draws.

43

FIGURE 1 Response of the price level to a shock in Entitlements
The main emphasis of our paper is to find out, if the prosperous
performance of U.S. fades away due to an increase in E. Hence, Figure 2 contains
the most important results of our paper. An analysis of Figure 2 reveals that a
shock to E has a short lived positive and significant impact on Y at forecast
horizons 1, 2 and 5 months. However, shock to E has a negative and significant
impact on Y at 14 forecast horizons (4, 7, 8, 10 to 16, 18 to 20, 22, 24 and 30
months). This result supports the concerns that majority of the experts of the U.S.
who believe that economic performance achieved post great financial crisis will
eventually start to fade due to increasing burden of E.

FIGURE 2 Response of real output to a shock in entitlements
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Figure 3 indicates that a shock to E has a positive and significant impact
on R at first horizons 1 and 13. It also has a negative and significant impact on R
at forecast horizon 6 to 8 and is insignificant otherwise. E are financed by tax
money as well as through borrowing. Therefore, it may be the case that an
increase in E led to an increase in demand for loans through the banking system
and pushes R upward. This result is in line with a commonly known notion of the
crowding out effect, where a fiscal stimulus if financed by bank borrowing pushes
the interest rates high enough that crowds outs the private sector borrowing
through this channel. However, the impact becomes negative for a few months
and insignificant there onwards.

FIGURE 3 Response of 10-year government bond yield (interest rate) to a
shock inentitlements
Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a VECM to investigate the impact of entitlements
on key macroeconomic variables of the U.S. economy. we report results in the
form of impulse response functions. The IRFs from the base model reveal that a
shock to entitlements has positive and short lived negative, and significant impact
on the price level and the interest rate. whereas output is impacted negatively and
significantly at 14 forecast horizons. These results remain robust to a change in
ordering of the variables in the Choleski decomposition, change in the lag length
of the VECM from 5 to 6 lag and a change in the sample (short and long). Hence,
this investigation provides empirical evidence on the statement made by Alan
Greenspan that though in the short run economy is doing well; however,
entitlements will pull healthy performance of economy down. Thus, to move
positively on growth trajectory, the U.S. must manage entitlements smartly.
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Delusional Mitigation in Religious
and Psychological Forms of SelfCultivation: Buddhist and Clinical
Insight on Delusional
Symptomology
By Austin J. Avison
Abstract: This essay examines Buddhist forms of self-cultivation and development that enable a
psychosocial capacity for emotional, cognitive, and behavioral adjustment by improving
an individual's characteristic mode of interaction within the world. First, we will consider
the religious form of self-cultivation seen in the context of Buddhism and its desire to
remove delusional perspectives through developmental practices. In this, we will consider
the cultivating function of clinical psychology through the therapeutic application of
cognitive restructuring techniques as a form of cultivation. Next, considering
psychological self-cultivation, training, development, and education concerning the
treatment of schizophrenia and its characteristic criterion of delusions. Further,
Buddhism’s delusional-mitigation strategies will be compared to clinically based
treatments of psychotic delusions within the spectrum of schizophrenia. Within religious
self-cultivation is the development through the progressive growth of one's mind or
capacities through intentional action; the project of clinical psychology, in the therapeutic
setting, speaks to much of the same goals of religious self-cultivation.
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The question and nature of human suffering will continue to be one of the
most significant challenges humanity faces, and the means to alleviate human
suffering continues to be a deserving aim of human activity. Human suffering is
one of the most complex challenges we as a human species face in the forms of
extreme hunger and poverty, domestic and inter-state conflict, famine, drought,
health-care access, child mortality, racial, gender, and sexually-orientated forms
of discrimination and prejudice that pose existential challenges to human
happiness and flourishing. Central to the concerns of all the world’s religions is
the nature of human suffering in the world. Countless religious and spiritual
traditions have proposed ways of overcoming this suffering since the beginning of
human history. Religion poses a unique cognitive method of dealing with and
effectively responding and interacting with the world in which we are located.
The project of psychology shares a similar aim with that of many of the
world’s religions: alleviating human suffering. Much of the science of psychology
is directed towards the alleviation of human suffering, though the source and
means of overcoming this suffering may differ between the approaches. The
project of clinical psychology shares the goal of addressing human suffering,
where suffering may be a feature of physical or mental illness that entails real
human suffering to which psychological science seeks to alleviate and ultimately
remove (Fleischman, 1999, pp. 3-32).
It is hypothesized that religion and psychology represent independent but
compatible domains of addressing the problem of human suffering. Human beings
have the radical ability to transform themselves and the world around them, and it
is that religion and psychology enable radical human change in addressing the
real presence of suffering in the world. The aim here is to consider how religion
and psychology enable individuals and societies to effectively perceive and
interact within the world of events. Buddhism and psychology effectively train
individuals to respond to events by cultivating states of clear human perspective
that enable greater happiness and flourishing through modifying delusional
perspectives that influence human suffering.
Buddhist Perspectives on Cultivation and Delusions
Fundamental to the Buddhas’ teachings are to “avoid all evil, cultivate the
good, purify your mind: this sums up the teaching of the Buddhas” (Easwaran,
2007, p. 170: Dhammapada, verse 183). The wide range of practices seen within
Buddhism today still emphasizes cultivating what is ethically wholesome. The
process of purifying one’s mind enables an understanding of how human beings
may change themselves through a process of intentional action (Harvey, 2000).
Buddhism has a variety of teachings that function as a process of helping
individuals develop a calmer, more integrated, and compassionate disposition that
removes delusions that reduce the ability to see things as they truly are (Harvey,
2000, p. 3). Delusions are central within Buddhism; delusions cause attachment,
creating suffering for individuals and those they interact with (Harvey, 2000, p.
3). Buddhism provides a guide that enables the transformation of human
experiences away from the reality of suffering in the dharma: the nature of reality
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regarded as a universal truth taught by the Buddha, with the end of suffering
gained through reaching a liberated state in Nirvana (Harvey, 2000, p. 3).
Buddhism essentially consists of understanding, practicing, and realizing the
reality of the dharma (Harvey, 2000, p. 3).
The Buddha teaches that greed, hatred, and delusion (moha) are states that
contribute to suffering; and are harmful to the person when they arise (Harvey,
2000, pp. 9-10). When an individual is overwhelmed by negative cognitive states,
they are more likely to commit harmful deeds and suffer due to the karmic results
of their action (Harvey, 2000, p. 10). The Buddha notes that the opposite of
delusion, posed as a negative, in being non-delusional is beneficial, wholesome,
and conducive to happiness, and therefore we should undertake to remove
delusions as a means of producing happiness (Harvey, 2000, p. 10). The Buddha
places a high value on states of mind, which are the antithesis of greed, hatred,
and deluded unclarity or disorientation, as they are found to contribute to human
happiness rather than human suffering (Harvey, 2000, p. 10). Delusions are
suspended in the practitioner through the progressive development of human
insight that facilitates greater understanding and introspection (Harvey, 2000, p.
10). Buddhists see the current context of life as a result of the karmic principle of
actions, but Buddhism does not hold that individuals are to be presently blamed
for their conditions since the actions of a past life are behind them; what is
important is how they behave in the present and how others now treat them
(Harvey, 2000, p. 16). Buddhist systems of belief and practice teach that human
beings should not be judged and left to suffer, no matter the cause of such.
Essential in the teachings of Buddhism is how individuals seek to address their
conditions and how others treat them as capable of transformation.
The law of karma is seen as a natural and universal law inherent in the
nature of things, and good and bad rebirths are not rewarding or punishing per se
but are the natural result of certain kinds of actions (Harvey, 2000, pp. 16-17).
Karma is viewed as the overall psychological impulse behind human emotion and
action that influences their causes and affects karmic results (Harvey, 2000, p. 17).
Deliberately mitigating negative affectivity is understood to derive good mental
karma, where the mind is seen as continually generating good and bad karma
(Harvey, 2000, p. 18). Buddhists hold that wrong views lead to wrong thought
and that wrong speech andaction come from misperceiving the nature of reality or
being in discord with the fundamental nature of things: a delusion (Harvey, 2000,
p. 18). Wrong actions or behavior results from misperceiving reality; delusions go
against the grain of reality, and they naturally lead to unpleasant results (Harvey,
2000, p. 18).
Dukkha is of primary concern within Buddhism; dukkha is commonly
translated: as suffering, unhappiness, pain, dissatisfaction, discontentment, or
strain (Harvey, 2000, p. 33). The aim of overcoming dukkha or suffering is both a
personal and collective concern (Harvey, 2000, p. 33; De Silva, 2005, p. 107).
Buddhists come to understand the role of suffering in human existence by seeing
that they contribute to their suffering through a path of incorrect perceptions,
cognitions, and behaviors (Harvey, 2000, p. 33). Through our knowledge of
suffering, we gain the knowledge and care that others also experience similar
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qualities of suffering in existence. Individuals lack an understanding of
impermanence, where the inherent nature of change and decay operates, and this
lack of understanding concerning impermanence leads to suffering.
Impermanence does not imply a fixed nature or self, which means humans are
always capable of changing for the better and should be regarded accordingly,
rather than dismissed as unworthy (Harvey, 2000, p. 34). Labeling someone as
having a particular fixed nature often has a more harmful effect on them, whereas
respecting them helps elicit change for the better, paralleling Carl Rogers’
unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1951). Rogers held that it is necessary
within a clinical setting to support individuals despite what they have said or done
in order to facilitate positive humanistic growth (Rogers, 1951, p. 64).
Buddhists perceive delusion or spiritual misorientation as the veiling of
truth from oneselfthat obscures clear states of cognitive perception (Harvey, 2000,
p. 47). Non-delusional states entail a clarity of the mind that enables insight into
the nature of reality (Harvey, 2000, p. 47). Buddhists hold that the roots of
unwholesome and harmful actions are interrelated, where greed and hatred
manifest in delusional states (Harvey, 2000, p. 47). Buddhists highly value
developing or cultivating wisdom and knowledge to overcome deluded
perspectives (Harvey, 2000, p. 47.) In Buddhism, human behavior is assessed in
terms of its direct effects of causing suffering or happiness (Harvey, 2000, p. 47).
Within the beliefs of Buddhist practitioners, a system of cultivation or
development exists which helps individuals overcome negative states of greed,
hatred, and delusion (Harvey, 2000, p. 51). Above all, the Buddhist perspective
views prosocial behavior as part of a spiritual path that cultivates a more
wholesome character by undermining ethical defilements through developing
counteractive virtues (Harvey, 2000, p. 58). A process of gradual transformation is
seen to culminate in a state of liberation (Nirvana) from all greed, hatred,
delusion, and the subsequent suffering that follows. Liberation requires that
people have not a fixed, unchangeable self but are capable of radical
transformation brought about by analyzing the nature of the mind and behavior;
this is the essential project of psychology. (Harvey, 2000, p. 58).
In conclusion, Buddhism aims to overcome greed/attachment, hatred, and
delusion, which are seen as the roots of harmful actions, behaviors, and mental
states that are the principal conditions of human suffering. The ultimate reality
perceived within Buddhism is Nirvana, which entails the destruction of cognitive
delusions and distortions. Delusions may be mitigated by avoiding intoxication
and cultivating mental clarity that allows individuals to see things as they truly are
through meditative development that cultivates insight (Harvey, 2000, p. 122).
Clinical Insight on Delusions
Delusional symptomatology is a characteristic and chronic feature of the
schizophrenia spectrum and includes disorders such as schizophrenia, schizotypal
personality disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and other psychotic disorders
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 2013, p. 87).
Abnormalities define the spectrum of schizophrenia in one or more of the
following five domains: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking, speech,
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and grossly disorganized or abnormal motor behavior (including catatonic states),
and negative symptoms (i.e., those which take away affective or experiential
states) (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87).
Delusions are highly personal ideas or belief systems, not endorsed by
one’s culture or subculture, that are maintained with conviction despite
irrationality or evidence to the contrary (American Psychological Association
Dictionary, 2020). Delusions may be transient and fragmentary; in delusional
disorders, they are often highly systematized and elaborate (American
Psychological Association Dictionary, 2020). Statistical data suggests that
delusions are not primarily logical errors but are derived from emotional events
(Kiran & Chaudhury, 2009, pp. 3-18; American Psychological Association
Dictionary, 2020). Some research suggests that delusions may be the most
significant symptom of schizophrenia (American Psychological Association
Dictionary, 2020).
Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change considering
conflicting evidence (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). Common types of delusions are
delusional jealousy, delusions of control, delusions of reference, nihilistic
delusions, and somatic delusions (American Psychological Association
Dictionary, 2020). Persecutory delusions entail the belief that one will be harmed,
harassed, and so forth by an individual, organization, or group in the pursuit of
goals (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). Referential delusions entail the belief that certain
gestures, comments, environmental cues are directed at oneself, falsely believing
they have personal meaning or significance (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). Grandiose
delusions entail individuals believing they have exceptional abilities, wealth, or
fame (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). Nihilistic delusions involve conventions that a major
catastrophe will occur (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). Somatic delusions are
preoccupations regarding health and organ functioning (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87).
Erotomaniac delusions entail the false belief that another romantically desires
them (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). The DSM-5 does not address or specify religious
delusions as a facet of the symptomatology of delusions and instead prefers to
resist pathologizing religion. The Encyclopedia of Mental Disorders defines
religious delusions as any delusion with religious or spiritual content, which may
co-occur with other delusions (1998). It is necessary to note that beliefs
considered normal for an individual's religious or cultural background are not
delusions, regardless of their veracity (DSM-5, 2013).
Delusions may be bizarre and non-bizarre. Delusions are considered
bizarre if they are implausible and are not understood, nor are common within
same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life experiences (DSM-5,
2013, p. 87). Bizarre delusions are impossible ;non-bizarre delusions are
plausible, though they are not probable since they do not hold convincing
evidence (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). Delusions that express a loss of control over the
mind or body are considered bizarre, including believing that one’s thoughts have
been removed and other thoughts not of personal origin have been inserted (DSM5, 2013, p. 87). Another example of bizarre delusions entails believing that one’s
body is being manipulated by an outside force that entails delusions of control.
The distinction between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult
to differentiate and depends largely upon the level of conviction held with a
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particular belief despite strong and clear contradictory evidence of its validity
(DSM-5, 2013, p. 87).
Psychological Forms of Delusion-mitigation through Cultivation
In referencing psychological forms of cultivation, we employ a
comparative analysis of the respective lexical domains of religious and scientific
knowledge to consider religious cultivation in terms of development, benefit, or
improvement that essentially strongly covaries with the construct of cultivation.
The essential project of clinical psychology is aimed towards generating a healthy
cognitive and behavioral composition of the person that enables the greatest level
of functionality with a minimum amount of suffering. Psychology necessarily
entails the cultivation or development of new cognitive states of human existence
that transcend or mitigatethe effect of major mental illnesses.
Self-cultivation is hypothetically constructed to define a process of
cultivating the mind and body through a process of integration and
communication. Self-cultivation is associated with attempts to go beyond normal
states of being that enhance and continually develop an individual's capacities and
potentials (Wang, Wang, and Wang, 2014, p. 351). Self-cultivation is conceived
by Wang et al. (2014) as a psychological process that develops and improves
one’s mind and body into a more stable and organic whole (pp. 340-351). Selfcultivation is a developmental model that sees human beings as progressively
becoming integrated into larger and larger circles of human concern (Wang et al.,
2014, pp. 340-351). Self-cultivation entails the possibilities for growth towards an
individual’s potential (Wang et al., 2014).
There is a two-sided relation between nature and cultivation/improvement;
culture relates to nature in a way that dialectically combines apparent
contradictions between the nurturing of nature (Derksen, 2017, p. 202).
Development as cultivation tends to shape and change nature, but the tools of
cultivation are themselves derived from nature (Derksen, 2017, p. 202).
Cultivation suggests spontaneous growth and its regulation through a natural
process, while simultaneously, the practice of cultivation is a process that is
intended through human regulation (Derksen, 2017, p. 202). The cultivated
implies the uncultivated that comes before it; cultivation transforms and shapes
human nature, but only up to a point (Derksen, 2017, p. 202). The concept of selfcultivation in psychology offers a perspective on human nature that entails
transforming our conditions through developmental practices (Derksen, 2017, p.
202). Self-cultivation is increasingly done with the help of experts, but it is not
done by experts (Derksen, 2017, p. 202).
The pursuit of well-being broadly refers to states of optimal development,
flourishing, happiness, life satisfaction, or otherwise leading a life worth living
(Sovereign & Walker, 2020, p. 1-20). Happiness is a complex construct
describing optimal function and experience; subjective well-being is described as
the integration of several socio-affective constructs (Sovereign & Walker, 2020,
p. 1-5). Subjective well-being constructs encompass an individual’s emotional
responses, cognitive satisfaction with their lives, and global judgments regarding
their overall level of satisfaction (Sovereign & Walker, 2020, pp. 1-9). Sovereign
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and Walker (2020) note that the innate capacity for human learning, growth, and
development are regarded as humanity's greatest potentials for continual
development (pp. 1-20). Sovereign and Walker (2020) hypothesized that
cognitive mechanisms might be fortified through self-development techniques
that enhance subjective well-being (pp. 1-20). The human capacity to shape
oneself according to one’s own will has widely been held as the fundamental
premise of most psychological and counseling techniques (Sovereign & Walker,
2020, pp. 1-9). This outlook is referred to as a growth mindset, one in which
continually develops talents, skills, and abilities; and thereby increases the
likelihood of attaining their ambitions (Sovereign & Walker, 2020, pp.1-20).
Within a clinical application of psychology, the cultivation, development,
or improvement of clinically significant levels of delusional symptomatology are
endowed through a process of cognitive restructuring. Cognitive restructuring
refers to a process of recognizing negative thoughts and changing them to be
more realistic and rational (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 148). Cognitive
restructuring is designed to help patients identify and challenge their patterns of
thinking to see things in a more objective manner (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004,
p. 148). Cognitive restructuring seeks to replace negative patterns of thought and
perception with alternative thoughts that are positive, calming, and insightful
(Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 667). Cognitive restructuring entails identifying
emotions, using emotions, understanding emotions, and managing emotions
through self-regulation (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 217). In the 1960s,
psychologist Aaron Beck developed cognitive therapy based upon the principle
that maladaptive behavior (ineffective, self-defeating behavior) is caused by
irrational or deluded thinking patterns (Strickland, 2001, p. 134). Beck's theory is
based upon the idea that instead of reacting to a situation’s reality, individuals
misperceive the situation and incorrectly respond to that context (Strickland,
2001, p. 134). Cognitive-based therapy seeks to change cognitive distortions by
examining the rationality and validity of assumptions behind them; such is the
process of cognitive restructuring (Strickland, 2001, p. 134; Craighead &
Nemeroff, 2004, p. 148). One prominent therapy that employs this model is
known as Cognitive-BehavioralTherapy (CBT).
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) involves exposing individuals to
situations they apprehend until their anxiety subsides (i.e., in-vivo exposure)
(Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 74). Second, CBT replaces anxious thoughts
with a more balanced, realistic perspective, considering all possible factors rather
than assuming the worst (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 74). Third, CBT entails
teaching individuals other relevant skills that help regulate their emotions
(Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 74). CBT is a psychological treatment widely
regarded as the treatment of choice for a wide range of mental disorders,
including anxiety disorders, bulimia nervosa, and affective disorders (Craighead
& Nemeroff, 2004, pp. 74, 148). Numerous studies have demonstrated that most
patients treated with CBT benefit from treatment, and such improvements are
durable in reducing symptomatology (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 148).
Woolfolk argues that psychotherapy, a form of talk therapy, comprises an activity
involved in the development, elucidation, and application of practical knowledge
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through the cultivation of character or the development of practical wisdom that
may be applied to the worldin which they operate (2015, p. 5).
In the clinical setting, patients strive for development and improvement
through a therapeutic exercise of cultivating positive regard for themselves and
others as a means of developing a differential state of experience (Waring, 2012,
p. 25-35). In the therapeutic setting, individuals engage in structured activities to
cultivate, develop, and improve their mode of being in the world. The goals of
treatment can include positive states of mental health that transcend symptom
relief, entailing a changing of an individual's emotional, cognitive, and behavioral
dispositions in a way that increases the chances of achieving a satisfactory life
(Waring, 2012, p. 25-35). The clinical application of psychology entails
cultivating healthy psychological states through the development of practical
wisdom by restructuring individuals’ cognitive and behavioral patterns
(Woolfolk, 2015).
Delusions are fixed and false beliefs that accompany major mental
disorders (Alberini, Ye, & Johnson, 2013, pp. 81-87). Models constructed within
translational neuroscience indicate that delusions override brain mechanisms that
influence predictive learning, where prediction errors mismatch our expectancy in
a given situation, and what is actually experienced is central to the basis of
delusional formation (Alberini et al., 2014, 81-117). From the perspective of
Alberini et al., delusions form due to aberrations of brain systems that underpin
the successful anticipation of an adaptation to external and internal events (2013,
81-117). CBT therapy for psychosis has demonstrated efficacy for treating
delusions and hallucinations (Freeman, 2011, pp. 135-139). Reasoning biases,
skewed views of self, and other factors based on adverse life experiences such as
rumination, interpersonal sensitivity, catastrophic appraisals, and avoidance
behaviors all show correlation with delusions (Freeman, 2011, pp. 135-139).
Delusions entail distress for those experiencing them, and this distress contributes
to human suffering, comparable to levels seen in generalized anxiety disorder
(Freeman, 2011, pp. 135-139). Further, delusions can become exceedingly strong
and override current environmental influences and social cues (Alberini et al.,
2014, 81-117). Freeman (2011) found that by allowing individuals to discuss their
experiences constructively in a psychoeducational setting, patients experienced a
25% reduction in their worries associated with persecutory delusions (pp. 135139).
Psycho-Religious Eastern and Western Cultivation
Buddhism and Western psychology endow theoretical and methodological
systems that facilitate well-being by cultivating mental balance through
individuals intentionally and effectively addressing that which restricts human
potential (Hwang & Chang, 2009, pp. 1010-1032). Traditional Buddhist literature
does not generally discuss mental health as a topic distinct from teachings about
the path to enlightenment (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). However,
Buddhist texts extensively explain how to train the mind in ways that alleviate
suffering, which entails a psychological process of addressing the causes of
human suffering (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). All schools of Buddhist
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thought share a similar aim with Western psychology in the fundamental goal of
reducing suffering (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). The emphasis on human
well-being in the absence of suffering transcends a stimulus-driven basis and
instead depends upon the cultivation of a specific type of enduring beliefs and
attitudes developed in one’s psychological character (Hwang et al., 2009, pp.
1010-1032). This process of cultivating meaningful priorities, attitudes,
perspectives, and behaviors is prominent within positive psychology, and it is
strongly emphasized in Buddhistpractice (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032).
Western psychology and Buddhism both hold that happiness resulting
from internally mediated mental training is more likely to be durable than
externally derived happiness (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). Current
psychological research suggests a preliminary confirmation of Buddhist teachings,
which hold that the degree of one’s happiness is not fixed but instead can be
consciously cultivated or developed (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). In part,
cognitive-based therapies sustain the Buddhist principle that all of existence is a
creation of the mind, where people can gradually change their way of thinking,
feeling, and acting from psychological incongruity to homeostasis that attains
therapeutic goals (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). It is noted that Buddhist
meditation, in conjunction with psychotherapy, is effective in facilitating mood
stabilization, reduced anxiety, reduced neurotic symptoms, and greater selfcontrol (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). Buddhist meditation helps one to be
calm, relaxed, and peaceful and is effective for coping with negative emotions
(Hwang et al., 2009, pp.1010-1032).
Until recently, Western psychology primarily focused on diagnosing and
treating mental disorders; now, scientific attention has shifted towards
understanding and cultivating positive mental health (Hwang et al., 2009, pp.
1010-1032). In contrast, for the past 2,500 years, Buddhist teachings have
systematically identified and diagnosed the symptoms of human suffering,
determined their cause, and described cures for pathologies by providing a path to
happiness and lasting contentment (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032).
Buddhism perhaps signifies one of the first forms of therapeutic counseling. In
many ways, the psychologist seems to play the role of the master in East Asian
culture (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). The psychologist comprehends the
individual’s concerns and provides them with appropriate instruction on
overcoming such concerns, where the individual cultivates themselves through the
guidance ofthe psychologist.
However, it is necessary to note that the goal of cultivation within
Buddhism is quite different from the conception within Western psychology
(Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032). Instead of using systematic methods of
investigation for an individual’s authentic self, the Buddhist model encourages the
individual to cultivate an understanding of non-self (Hwang et al., 2009, pp.
1010-1032). The construct of self is a core concept in Western psychology;
contrary to this, Buddhism is based on a non-self-cultivating process that aims to
minimize or extinguish the self, leading to selflessness (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-7). The
non-self-approach involves executing the self-cultivating principles of giving up
desires, displaying compassion, practicing meditation, and seeking to understand
Buddhist wisdom, which directly concerns human suffering and the means of
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overcoming it (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10). Traditionally, Western psychology has
sought to understand psychological functioning from an individualist perspective,
emphasizing the need to satisfy, maintain, and strengthen the self (Shiah, 2016,
pp. 1-2). The origin of the individualist view of self can be traced to early
Christianity and marks an epistemological difference between the respective
theoretical approaches of Western psychology and Buddhism (Shiah, 2016, p. 2).
However, the ultimate aim of Western psychology and Buddhism is to overcome
human suffering in pain and emotional disturbances caused by life’s difficulties,
challenges, and stressors (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-8).
The Buddha’s teachings aim to attain authentic and durable happiness by
cultivating a transition from the self-state to the non-self-state (Dalai Lama, 1995;
Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10). Clinging to or being obsessed with delusions of self is a
major cause of suffering as taught by the Buddha; in contrast to the Western
construct of the self, the goal of Buddhists is Nirvana, or a state of selflessness
(Dalai Lama, 1995). Human cultivation leads to Nirvana, or the state of non-self,
in a state of total liberation (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10). However, the concept of a
totally liberated state in Buddhism is complex and transcends the magisterium of
Western clinical psychology (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10). Nevertheless, the non-selfstate includes psychological benefits, such as authentic and durable happiness,
which are of central concern to the project of clinical psychology. Ultimately
Buddhism holds that personal identity, and therefore concepts of self, are
delusional and that the individual, as the self, turns out not to exist (Shiah, 2016,
pp. 2-10). From the perspective of Buddhism, everyone who is not liberated is
‘delusional’ and is insome sense ‘mentally ill.’
Self-cultivation in Buddhism is associated with attempts to go beyond
normal states of existence and by enhancing the development of a person’s
capacities and potentials (Wang et al., 2014, pp. 340-342). Self-cultivation is a
psychological process that develops one’s mind and body to reach beyond the
normal or current state of being (Wang et al., 2014, pp. 340-342).
Sustaining and fulfilling human development encompasses both
separateness and belongingness. Any social or political system, such as
individualism or collectivism that supports individuality or connection over the
other is bound to interfere and distort human development (Wang et al., 2014, p.
340). Existential security is created through bonding, not separation (Wang et al.,
2014,p. 342). Human development comes in the presence of a secure community
that facilitates individual growth through prosocial and collective means (Wang et
al., 2014, p. 342). Liberation from emotional disturbances leads to the reclaiming
of existential and ontological security that is a human birthright or human right
(Wang et al., 2014, p. 342). In Buddhism, to reclaim this birthright means to be
reconnected with the essence of humanity through awakening the‘heart-mind’
(Bai, Cohen, & Scott, 2013).
The Eastern idea of health extends beyond pathological reduction and
instead encompasses existential and transpersonal concerns (Craighead &
Nemeroff, 2004, p. 84). In the Eastern context, health is defined in terms of
reducing unhealthy qualities, particularly regarding deluded perspectives,
cultivation of healthy qualities, and maturation to transpersonal stages of
development (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 84). As all societies’ emotional
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regulation processes have been influenced by their cultural philosophies and
values, East Asian societies have been influenced by the values of forbearance,
emotional self-control, and interpersonal harmony (Sanseeha et al., 2009; Wang,
Wei, Koay, Lo, & Lee, 2019). Forbearance is a strategy used in East Asian
cultures to regulate emotional processes through suppression, cognitive reframing,
empathy, and self-cultivation (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). In the East Asian
context, emotional regulation can involve several positive meanings and functions
towards maintaining positive prosocial relations (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423).
A component of emotional cultivation in East Asian cultures is to regulate
emotional affect by creating alternative thoughts and perceptions to understand
how one’s thoughts and actions will affect one’s outcomes (Wang et al., 2019, pp.
409-423). Emotional cultivation in East Asian cultures strongly resembles the
process seen in CBT. However, Buddhists’ conceptions of self, or lack thereof,
resembles Skinner's view that the mind does not exist (Skinner, 1974, pp. 113131). Skinner holds that the mind, and the self, as conceived in consciousness, is
an illusion, a hypothetical construct of cognitive psychology that does not exist
(1974, pp. 113-131 ). Skinner’s theory parallels the Buddhist belief that the self,
as conceived in the mind, does not exist per se but rather is illusionary in nature.
However, Pio notes that Buddhists tend to view psychological disorders as being
primarily psychogenic or psychological in origin rather than somatic
(physiological) in nature (1988, p. 127). This position of seeing disorder as
psychological indicates a position towards cognitive-based approaches rather than
a behavioral approach topsychology.
Buddhism suggests we apply the self-cultivating principle by following
certain structured activities by applying compassion and obtaining new insight to
overcome delusions of self and attain a non-self-state of authentic and durable
happiness (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10). Eastern approaches to psychology emphasize
that healthy mental states and qualities must be intentionally cultivated or
developed to ensure psychological health and maturity entailing post-formal
operational cognition and wisdom, post-conventional morality, transpersonal
emotions, and meta-motives, such as altruism (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p.
84). Post-formal operational cognition and knowledge denotes individuals who are
more flexible, logical, willing to accept moral and intellectual complexities
(Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 579).
Post-conventional morality describes individuals who live by their own
ethically formed principles expressed by moral actors who use a heuristic
framework to make decisions based upon rights, values, duties, and ideals
(Craighead & Nemeroff, 2004, p. 579).
Clinical Insight on Buddhism and Psychotic Symptomatology
This section will address the current clinical directions of research as they
broadly relate to Buddhism, schizophrenia, psychotic delusions, and studies
assessing Eastern-based cultivating practices. Raja, Azzoni, & Lubich (2000),
investigated religious delusions through an observational study of 313 acute
psychiatric inpatients admitted to emergency psychiatric care and compared
patients with and without religious delusion (pp. 22–29). The authors note that
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little is known about the clinical features associated with religious delusions and
how religious delusions may differ across various diagnostic groups (Raja et al.,
2000, pp. 22-29). Many patients were apprehended for displaying psychotic
symptoms near St. Peter’s Basilica in the Vatican City State (Raja et al., 2000, pp.
22-29). Of those assessed, 20.1% expressed religious delusions on the Assessment
of Positive Symptoms, finding no significant variation between male and female
patients in the rates of religious delusion (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 22-29). The
investigators also found that religious delusions are not associated with selfdirected harm (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 22-29). Raja et al. (2000) found that nearly
40% of those with religious delusions were diagnosed with schizophrenia and
schizophreniform disorder, and another 12% were diagnosed with schizoaffective
disorder (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 22-29). It is necessary to note that the DSM-5
defines delusions as fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change considering
conflicting evidence (DSM-5, 2013, p. 87). However, in religious delusions, cases
carrying religious themes, the question of the validity of beliefs is not relevant
since the veracity of religious beliefs cannot be assessed (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 2229).
Raja et al. (2000) found religious delusions to be common among patients
with psychotic symptoms, attributing the high rate of occurrence to regional
religious influences (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 22-29). Raja et al. found that religious
delusions occurred at similar rates in all forms of psychosis (2000, pp. 22-29).
Raja et al. (2002) found that individuals who presented religious delusions also
exhibited comorbid psychopathologies and more severe positive psychotic
symptoms compared to other patients and had more chronicity in their
psychopathological symptomatology (pp. 22-29). Raja et al. (2002) found an
association between religious delusion and more severe and chronic courses of
psychopathology (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 22-29).
Religious delusions exert an overt and covert influence on patients’
thoughts, affect, and behavior (Raja et al., 2000, pp. 22-29). Tateyama and
colleagues (see Tateyama et al., 1993, pp. 151-185; 1998, pp. 59-68) compared
the prevalence and contents of delusions of patients with schizophrenia in Japan
to patients in Germany and Austria (Lysaker, Dimaggio, & Brune, 2014, p. 32).
The number of patients with delusional symptomatology was equal in both
samples. The number of patients with delusions about world-ending scenarios and
the quantity of negative (paranoid ideas) and positive (grandiosity) delusions was
the same (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 32). However, the quality of these delusions
differed; 20% of the German-speaking sample expressed religious delusions, only
6% of the Japanese samples expressed similar delusions (Lysaker et al., 2014, p.
32). In the German-speaking samples, delusional guilt was a common feature; it
was rare in the Japanese sample (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 32). Persecutory
delusions were more common in the German-speaking sample than in the
Japanese sample (Tateyama et al., 1998, pp. 59-68). One hypothesis into the
source of these differences is that Asian religions, such as Buddhism, do not
imply apocalyptic ideation or death as a penalty for or absolution from sin
(Lysaker et al., 2014). In contrast, ideas of shame, burdensomeness, and being
viewed as worthless formed the most common context of delusions in Japanese
patients (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 33). Delusions in the Japanese sample included
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the feeling or perception that others spoke poorly about them (Tateyama et al.,
1998, pp. 59-68). It is important to stress that East Asian countries are considered
to be collectivist societies where one’s individuality is less important than the
interest of one’s social group (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 33). One’s own needs and
wishes might need to be neglected or suspended in favor of the social group’s
well-being; thus, individuals in collectivistic societies are more susceptible to
social feelings of shame and worthlessness (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 33). When
considering Eastern and Western cultures, it is necessary to note that
individualistic or collectivistic social models of organization influence an
individual’s perspective of self. In the Eastern context, collectivists view
themselves as dynamic entities, continually defined by their social context and
relationships (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 33). Individualistic societies perceive the
individual self as a stable entity that is autonomous from other people and their
environment (Lysaker et al., 2014, p. 33). Thus, differential concepts of self are
epistemologically employed. Conceptions of the self are culturally determined,
and these perspectives of the individual, in reference to the collective,
differentiates views and representations of the self.
Schizophrenia is one of the most common types of severe and chronic
mental illnesses, and it affects roughly 0.7% of the adult U.S. population at a
given time (Sanseeha et al., 2009; DSM-5, 2013). Half of all of those who suffer
from the disorder do not receive appropriate care, and roughly 90% of those with
untreated schizophrenia live in developing countries (Sanseeha et al., 2009). Rates
of psychopathology are generally similar around the world, while unique social
and cultural influences in different population groups might impart differing
perceptions of those pathologies (Sanseeha et al., 2009). Buddhism has been an
integral part of Thai culture and influences how Thais view the world and express
their beliefs (Sanseeha et al., 2009). The foundation of Buddhist morality is the
law of cause and effect or the karmic principle that operates in the lifespan of
individuals (Sanseeha et al., 2009). It is understood that malady results from
wrong deeds done in the past, and karma emphasizes the cause and effect of
deeds that willdirectly affect the person (Sanseeha et al., 2009).
Sanseeha and colleagues (2009) investigated the perspectives of Thais
diagnosed withschizophrenia and the nature of individuals' views concerning their
pathology. Sanseeha et al. (2009) selected 18 individuals diagnosed with
schizophrenia, all of whom were practicing Buddhists (Sanseeha et al., 2009). In
the study, all participants expressed a belief in the law of karma (Sanseeha et al.,
2009). Participants' responses indicated that they view the cause of their illness as
stemming from supernatural powers, bad karma from the past, or biological
factors (Sanseeha et al., 2009). Many participants and their relatives attributed the
cause of their psychopathology to bad karma (Sanseeha et al., 2009). Attributing
the cause of their psychopathology to bad karma indicates a strong underlying
role that Buddhism and its cultural values and beliefs play in individuals’
perceptions of the causes and nature of psychopathology(Sanseeha et al., 2009).
Buddhist Thai participants felt that they were discriminated against by
society and were ashamed to be considered different, felt looked down upon
because of their limitations, and felt isolated from society (Sanseeha et al., 2009).
The findings of Sanseeha et al. (2009) echo the findings presented in Tateyama et
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al. (1993, pp. 151-158; 1998, pp. 59-68) that Asian-collectivistic societies express
more significant worry with social perceptions in the context of delusional
symptomatology than do individualistic cultures, paralleling the more significant
social concern expressed within Buddhism. In Sanseehas’ (2009) study,
participants believed they were chronically ill and intentionally sought ways to
mitigate their condition in realizing they had to manage their illness actively.
Buddhist Thai practitioners did so by adjusting their self-care activities and social
behaviors, encouraging themselves, seeking mental refuge, and following dharma
or Buddhist morality to reduce the disorder’s negative impact on their lives
(Sanseeha et al., 2009). The participants used Buddhist teachings to provide
direction or guidance for being happy by practicing mindfulness, positive
concentration, meditation, and chanting to encourage one’s mind to be at peace
(Sanseeha et al., 2009).
Clinical Research on Buddhist-Derived Interventions
Over the past 30 years, a considerable number of mental health
professionals have engaged in various forms of Buddhist psychotherapy such as
compassion-based therapy, Buddhism-based grief therapy, and mindfulness-based
techniques (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032; Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths,
2014; Shiah, 2016, pp. 1-10). Mindful-based meditation techniques form the
foundation of the Buddhist process of self-cultivation (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10).
Many clinical researchers and theorists have attempted to integrate Buddhist
practices into formalized psychotherapies, often focusing on meditation, and its
effects on increasing emotional stability, positive affect, mindfulness, and
improved attention (Shiah, 2016,pp. 2-10). It is of clinical and scholarly interest to
investigate the causal relationship that is hypothesized between traditional
Buddhist practices of self-cultivation that may serve the function of
psychotherapy for individual practitioners and patients alike. For example, Zen
Buddhism is used as a mode of psychotherapy in Japan (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10).
Findings on Zen meditation’s psychological effects include reduced anxiety,
reduced neurotic symptoms, increased self-control, increased work efficiency, and
an enhanced sense of compassion (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10). The use of meditation
in conjunction with psychotherapy has been found to produce desirable effects in
lessening negative self-reprisals, mood stabilization, and a reduced tendency for
drug abuse (Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10).
Buddhist-derived practices of mindfulness in the form of mindfulnessbased cognitive therapy are supported by the American Psychiatric Association
for the treatment of specific forms of depression (Shonin et al., 2014). The clinical
utility of Buddhist-derived interventions spans a wide range of psychological
disorders, including mood disorders, anxiety disorders, substance use disorders,
personality disorders, and of concern; here, schizophrenia-spectrum disorders
(Shonin et al., 2014). Buddhist-derived interventions effectively improve
psychological well-being, cognitive function, and emotion regulation capacity in
subclinical and healthy adult populations, indicating possible benefits to a wide
range of individuals (Shonin et al., 2014). The integration of Buddhist principles
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into clinical practice is likely due to the similarities between Buddhism and
established clinical modes of treatment, such as CBT (Shonin et al., 2014). CBT
and Buddhism both encourage individuals to challenge their perceptions of the
world to enable greater human happiness and flourishing. Convergent validity is a
subtype of construct validity that measures the associations between the construct
(i.e., cultivation) and other similar constructs (e.g., cognitive flexibility, cognitive
reappraisal, and basic-psychological needs satisfaction) (Wang et al., 2019, pp.
409-423). As it is in every culture, East Asian emotional regulation is influenced
by its particular cultural philosophies and values (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423).
The East Asian perspective on emotional regulation is defined by engaging in the
practice of creating alternative thoughts to understanding how one’s beliefs and
actions will affect their outcome (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). Wang and
colleagues (2019) sought to examine the relationship between emotional
cultivation, cognitive flexibility, and cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive flexibility
refers to the ability to perceive alternative explanations or generate alternative
solutions (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). Cognitive reappraisal is the
modification of the meaning of an event to influence the experience of emotion
(Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). Wang et al. (2019) sought to establish the
convergent association between emotional cultivation and positive affect,
emotional regulation, basic psychological needs satisfaction, gratitude, and
cognitive flexibility (pp. 409-423). Wang et al. (2019) defined the construct of
cognitive emotion regulation strategies as procedures that regulate emotion
through self-control that generates alternative thoughts that consider the best for
self and others (pp. 409-423).
Cultivating emotional strategies and understanding emotional connotations
together accounted for an additional 9% of the variance explained in predicting
cognitive flexibility, 2% of the variance explained by positive affect, and 21% of
the variance in predicting emotional cultivating strategies was accounted for by
the satisfaction of basic psychological needs (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423).
Cultivating emotional strategies and understanding emotional connotations
significantly and uniquely predicted basic psychological needs satisfaction and
gratitude (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). Understanding emotional connotations
significantly and uniquely predicted cognitive flexibility (Wang et al., 2019, pp.
409-423). Emotional cultivation and cultivation emotional strategies had an
intercorrelation of .93, indicating they are 93% more alike than they are different
(Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). Cultivating emotional strategies and
understanding emotional connotations have an intercorrelation of .57, representing
32% of the variance of emotional cultivation (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423).
Wang et al. (2019) findings indicate that cultivating emotional strategies
and understanding emotional connotations explain 32% of the variables of
emotional cultivation (2019, pp. 409-423). Emotional cultivation is strongly
correlated with cognitive flexibility and reappraisal to the extent of .59 and .61,
respectively (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). Emotional cultivation is also
strongly correlated with basic psychological needs satisfaction to the extent of .66
and .31 for positive affectivity (Wang et al., 2019, pp. 409-423). The findings of
Wang et al. (2019) indicate that cultivating techniques endow a psychological
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capacity to attain basic needs and a greater likelihood of experiencing positive
psychological affect (pp. 409-423).
Conclusion
It is reasoned that Buddhist-based self-cultivating practices do represent an
effectual therapeutic intervention that endows increased psychological well-being,
cognitive function, and emotion regulation capacities (Hwang et al., 2009, pp.
1010-1032; Sanseeha et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2014; Shonin et al., 2014; Wang et
al., 2019). It is ascertained that Buddhist-derived clinical interventions that entail
cultivating practices may be effective treatments for a variety of
psychopathologies, including mood-spectrum disorders, substance-used disorders,
and schizophrenia (Hwang et al., 2009, pp. 1010-1032; Sanseeha et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2014; Shonin et al., 2014; Shiah, 2016, pp. 2-10; Wang et al., 2019).
It becomes discernible that Buddhism and Western psychology share a
desire to overcome human suffering as a core and shared goal, while significant
epistemological differences exist between these two magisterial forms of
knowledge and meaning. Buddhism does endow a psychological capacity to
mitigate delusional perspectives, but it is not towards the same aims seen in
Western psychology. Western psychology seeks the alleviation of individual
suffering; it is concerned with the individual, Buddhism is wholly concerned with
the impermanent nature of human dispositions, and as such, it opposes the
Western focus on enduring personality states. While psychology is concerned
with the present state of the individual, Buddhism is concerned with the future
direction of that individual. Western clinical psychology seeks to alleviate
symptomatology that entails human suffering in clinical populations, while
Buddhism sees the entire world as intrinsically deluded. In Buddhism, not only do
clinical populations experience significant levels of suffering, but all who are not
liberated from delusions indeed suffer.

64

References
Alberini, C. M., Johnson, S. A., & Ye, X. (2013). Memory Reconsolidation. 81117. Elsevier Science & Technology. doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-3868923.00005-6
American Psychological Association. Dictionary of Psychology. (2020).
Retrieved fromhttps://dictionary.apa.org/delusion
Bai, H., Cohen, A., & Scott, C. (2013). Revisioning Higher Education: The threefold relationality framework. In J. Lin, R. L. Oxford, & E. J. Brantmeier
(Eds.), Re-envisioning higher education: Embodied pathways to wisdom
and social transformation (pp. 3–22). Information Age Publishing Inc.
Bartels, M., & Heimann, H. (1993). Comparison of schizophrenic delusions between
Japan
and
Germany.
Psychopathology,
https://doi.org/10.1159/000284815

26(3-4),

151–158.

Craighead, W. E., & Nemeroff, C. B. (2004). The Concise Corsini Encyclopedia
of Psychologyand Behavioral Science. 74-667. John Wiley & Sons.
Dalai Lama. (1995). The Path to Enlightenment. Snow Lion Publications,
Incorporated.
Derksen, M. (2007). Cultivating Human Nature. New Ideas in Psychology, 25(3),
189–206.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.09.001
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Ed). (2013). 87.
Washington DC:American Psychiatric Association.
Easwaran, Eknath. (2007). The Dhammapada / Introduced & Translated by
Eknath Easwaran (2nd ed.). Tomales, CA: Nilgiri Press. ISBN 978-158638-020-5.; ISBN 1-58638-020-6.
Fleischman, S. (1999). I am ... , I have ... , I suffer from ... : A Linguist Reflects
on the Language of Illness and Disease. Journal of Medical Humanities
20, 3–32. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022918132461
Freeman, D. (2011). Improving Cognitive
Schizophrenia
Research,
doi:10.1016/j.schres.2011.08.012

Treatments
132(2-3),

for

Delusions.
135-139.

65

Harvey, P. (2013). An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values, and
Issues (pp. 3-122). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Hwang, K., & Chang, J. (2009). Self-Cultivation. The Counseling Psychologist,
37(7),1010-1032. doi:10.1177/0011000009339976
Kiran, C., & Chaudhury, S. (2009). Understanding delusions. Industrial
psychiatry journal,18(1), 3–18. https://doi.org/10.4103/0972-6748.57851
Lysaker, P. H., Dimaggio, G., & Brüne, M. (Eds.). (2014). Social cognition and
metacognition in schizophrenia: Psychopathology and treatment
approaches.
32-33.
Elsevier
Academic
Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-405172-0.00019-3
Pio, E. (1988). Buddhist Psychology: A Modern Perspective. 127. New Delhi:
AbhinavPublications.
Raja, M., Azzoni, A., & Lubich, L. (2000). Religious delusion: An observational
study of religious delusion in a population of 313 acute psychiatric
inpatients. Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie, Neurochirurgie und
Psychiatrie, 151(1), 22–29.
Rogers, C. (1951) Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications
and Theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 64.
Shiah Y. J. (2016). From Self to Nonself: The Nonself Theory. Frontiers in
Psychology, 7(124),1-12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00124
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). The Emerging Role of
Buddhism in Clinical Psychology: Toward Effective Integration.
Psychology
of
Religion
and
Spirituality,
6(2),
123–137.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035859
De Silva, P. (2005). An introduction to Buddhist psychology (4th ed.). 107.
Palgrave Macmillan.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230509450
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About Behaviorism (pp. 113-131). Alfred A. Knopf.
Vintage Books. Sovereign, G., Walker, B.R. (2021). Mind, Body and
Wellbeing: Reinforcement Sensitivity
Theory and Self-cultivation Systems as Wellbeing Influencers. J Happiness Stud
22, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-019-00216-5
Strickland, B. B. (2001). The Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology. 134. Detroit, MI:
Gale. Tateyama, M., Asai, M., Kamisada, M., Hashimoto, M.,
66

Tateyama, M., Asai, M., Hashimoto, M., Bartels, M., & Kasper, S. (1998).
Transcultural study of schizophrenic delusions. Tokyo versus Vienna and
Tübingen
(Germany).
Psychopathology,
31(2),
59–68.
https://doi.org/10.1159/000029025
Wang, V. C., Wang, W., & Wang, W. (2014). Handbook of Research on Adult and
Community Health Education: Tools, trends, and methodologies. 340-351.
Hershey PA: Medical Information Science Reference.
Wang, L. F., Wei, M., Koay, E., Lo, M. H., & Lee, M. Y. (2019). The
development and validation of the Emotional Cultivation Scale: An East
Asian cultural perspective. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 66(4),
409–423. https://doi.org/10.1037/cou0000346
Waring, D. R. (2012). The Virtuous Patient: Psychotherapy and the Cultivation of
Character.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 19(1), 25-35. doi:10.1353/ppp.2012.0011
Woolfolk, R. L. (2015). The Value of Psychotherapy; the talking cure in an age of
clinicalscience. New York: Guilford.

67

Justifying Advocacy of Patients’ Belief
Diversity with Support from William
James’ Lectures on Pragmatism: A
New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking, The Variety of Religious
Experiences and the Will to Believe
By Sterling Courtney
Abstract: Predating monastic healthcare in the Middle Ages (Siraisi, 2019), spirituality
and/or religion have been unified with healing, caring for the sick and consoling
the dying, as documented by historical writings as early as c.3000 BCE-c.500
BCE in Mesopotamia and followed by coinciding accounts from c.750 BCEc.280 BCE Greece and Rome (Mann, 2014). Via philosophy and science, a
movement towards secularization has been perceived (as the Renaissance faded
and the scientific revolution led into the Age of Enlightenment), therefore
creating a dichotomy between treating the physical body separate from the
metaphysical soul. In the early 1900’s, Abraham Flexner discredited any
connection between health and religion triggering reform in medical education
denying spirituality benefits (Puchalski, 2010, p. 12). In addition to a secular
tendency, the atmosphere of caregiving had changed (with technology and
scientific knowledge) from ceremonial dying with ritual fellowship to an
environment void of communal support, with death often considered a failure in
the recovery process. A brief history allows for reflection on how progress and
technology change the interpersonal dynamics of families and communities…
and valued traditions. Faith has been assessed to still be relevant to many
patients regardless of secular trends (Puchalski, 2010, pp. 4-5, 14, 90). With
reference to William James and other champions of pragmatism of the
19th century, justification of individuals’ faith or spirituality is validated and
therefore given credence; valued for consideration by caregivers and physicians
in today’s healthcare environment. James’ endorsement of pragmatism is
supported by numerous romantic (as containing elements found in
Romanticism’s literature) statements which encourage happiness and optimism.
Leaning on James’ lectures published in text The Varieties of Religious
Experience; aspects of pessimism leading to despair by virtue of a lack of faith,
or maybe… active religiosity is proposed.
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Introduction
Historically, most societies throughout the world, have shared a common
approach in dealing with sickness and death. From ancient times and well into the
20th century care for the body and spirit were integrated into what today some
may refer to as holistic medicine. Where the myriad of cultures varies with a
diversity of personal and social dynamics as well as religious practices, it appears
that caregiving and healing, or attending the dying have similar habitudes.
Although ceremonial and burial rituals vary markedly, the focus of
integrating body and spirit has commonality. The vocational caregivers in society
attended to both physical and spiritual needs according to the culture; there was
no separation between the exigency of the body versus those of the spirit. Whether
be the shaman, the witch doctor, or the medicine man; the vocational healer was
also a religious figure. Of course, in Christianity, Jesus is seen as a healer of body
and spirit. In last few decades, this dichotomy has developed resulting in
religiosity that solely functions for spiritual concerns, while science dependent
physicians focus on physical interests (Jawaid, 2014). Even though religion and
medicine were closely integrated, to exacerbate the dichotomy, spiritual concerns
are considered sentimental attachments of little value, thus ironically, health care
sciences trend toward anti-religious bias (Lucchetti, 2019); spirituality has come to
be considered an obstacle to scientific progress or worse, a burden. (Astrow,
2001).
Not confined to science, historically, philosophy has had secular influence
expressed as counter arguments to religious philosophy. Modern philosophy and
ethics are characterized by a movement toward secularization: Although
philosophical systems strive to provide an alternative to religious appreciation,
they never completely escape the influence of religion and its representation; at
least insomuch as the “Tillichian” sense of numinous faith in an ideal goodness
(Drane, 1994).
Although dated by more than two decades, the WHO (World Health
Organization), in 1998, cited health as “a state of complete physical, mental and
social well-being; not merely the absence of disease”. To briefly illustrate how
healthcare or “caregiving” has changed over time in the following narrative,
modern medicine may have depersonalized healthcare to an extreme, warranting a
focus on reestablishing and securing a nurturing environment. Advances in
technology and medical knowledge have enabled a new social group (in first
world countries): this growing group, “the survivors,” require renewed attention
to spiritual needs (Lucchetti, 2019). Putting the “care” back in healthcare, the
WHO acknowledged that, “Mechanical treatment of objective findings in patients
is no longer satisfactory.” Recreating a more holistic view of health, hope, and
compassion; including consideration of faith and spirituality, should be integrated
into healing process (Jawaid, 2014).
Although both spirituality and religion warrant attention, it is key to be
cognizant of the difference when addressing either or both. Religiousness is less
intrinsic, i.e., less elemental thanspirituality, and is deﬁned somehow in relation to
religion. Spirituality, of course, tends to be more individualized and more
personal, and may or may not be rooted in religion (Miller, 2003). Spirituality
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refers to “the way individuals seek and express meaning and purpose and the way
they experience their connectedness to the moment, self, others, nature, and to the
significant or sacred” (O'Callaghan, 2019).
A Brief Perspective History of Spirituality and Healthcare
***Renowned ethicist, Allen Verhey chronicles a historical perspective of
religion and healthcare authoring The Christian Art of Dying: Learning from
Jesus, 2011:
Philippe Aries, a medieval historian, described Middle Ages (roughly the
5th - 15th centuries) dying traditions as simple and public, referring to meaningful
rituals and attending companionship as “Tame Death.” As death was approached
as an evil, it could be tempered, hence tamed, and given meaningful respect
through rituals and the community (Verhey, 2011).
As the fall of Constantinople (1453) flourished with Renaissance
humanism, which manyneophytes to history (self-included), relate to as “the arts”,
a revival of Neo-Platonism renaissance humanists embraced Christianity; as
illustrated by some of the greatest works of the Renaissance period. The Church
patronized many works of Renaissance art. Ars Moriendi (the art of dying), a 15th
century book, considered the death of Jesus as archetypal for Christians’. The
book helped establish a tradition of “how to die well”, concerning virtues of
faithful dying(Verhey, 2011).
In 1945, 40% of deaths occurred in a hospital setting, by 1995, 90% did.
Dying well or the “dying role” has become the “sick role,” wherein patients rely
on competent medical experts and hope for recovery: Whereas most often
reference to medieval practices are rhetorically considered backwards and
confined to entertaining festivals, the afore mentioned “Tame death” has become
“medicalized death.” Medicalized dying is depersonalized, often hooked up to
machines; death symbolized by a flat line. Patients are often alienated from their
bodies, their communities, and from faith, for the sake of survival. Contrary to the
scope of humanity’s progress from the Middle Ages, tragically Ars Moriendi has
become mechanicalized and medicalized. Should death not be reduced to a mere
medical event such as “do not resuscitate” (Verhey, 2011)?
Explaining Pragmatism
If any idea or notion, whether an extrinsic suggestion/phenomenon or
intrinsically supported from one’s own imagination, inspires belief, hope, or faith,
that idea or notion iscausal; deserving consideration for having the power to create
such inspirations (Courtney,2018).
Plato’s scripted dialogue, Meno, may be considered the first recorded
pragmatic application. Socrates' discussion with Meno regarding virtue, in
summary, justifies a practical approach: Socrates tells Meno that the positive
benefits to one’s character justifies one believing in the value of a seeking for truth
or knowledge by saying “if we believe it right to look for what we don’t know”
rather than “if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don’t know
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we can never discover. Rephrased: “Pragmatic arguments are practical in
orientation, justifying actions that are thought to facilitate the achievement of our
goals, or the satisfaction ofour desires” (Jordan, 2014).
Pragmatists maintain that most reflective topics such as epistemology,
language, philosophical concepts, meaning, belief, and empirical science are all
best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes. Charles Sanders Peirce,
referred as “the father of pragmatism,” applied pragmatism and statistical
principles as aspects of scientific logic.
In his Illustrations of the Logic of Science series of articles, Peirce offers
his ‘pragmatic maxim’ in an article titled How to Make Our Ideas Clear: Consider
what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the
whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce C. S., How to Make Our Ideas
Clear, 1878)
Pierce expressed the maxim in a brief and somewhat cryptic form;
therefore, it has been interpreted in many ways (Swedberg, 2015). William James,
Peirce’s close friend and colleague(Legg, 2021) further offered:
To develop perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need
only consider what effects of a conceivable practical kind the object may involve –
what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare.
(James, Collected Essays andReviews, 1920)
This clarity in this explanation may be considered only marginally better.
Notably, Pierce and James differed in the utility of pragmatism’s philosophy.
While Pierce envisioned scientific applications, James found relevance for
pragmatism’s avail addressing the metaphysical, faith, and spirituality (Atkin,
2020). In like manner, a frequently cited quote, from William James’ 1907
published lectures supports this basic idea of pragmatism. He writes: “If
theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for
pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much (James, Pragmatism: A New
Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 1907).” Therefore, it is rationally and
morally defensible to believe a theological proposition because of the benefits
thereby yielded.
For the resolve of this paper, the integration of faith and religion as
pragmatic options must be introduced. Exploiting William James’ articulation of
the advantages of pragmatic justification of faith, spirituality, or religiousness,
which are causal for optimism and happiness; if all these characteristics have a
positive effect on healthcare and recovery, then pragmatism is worthy as a
lifestyle consideration. James’ provides justification through pragmatism (to
which he has metaphorically applied a female gender) for the process of believing
and the adoption offaith:
Pragmatism will entertain any hypothesis; she will consider any evidence.
It follows that in the religious field she is at a great advantage both over
positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious
rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the
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abstract in the way of conception. (James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some
Old Ways of Thinking, 1907).
Credited as one of the earliest psychologists to consider scientific
applications to psychology, pragmatism enables the intersection of healthcare and
spirituality. James goes on to argue pragmatism’s encouragement of spirituality in
more depth while reiterating pragmatism’s versatility:
In short, pragmatism widens the field of search for God. Pragmatism is
willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the
humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if
they have practical consequences.
Pragmatism's only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of
experience's demands, nothing being omitted. If theological ideas should do this,
if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism
possibly deny God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as ' not true'
a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth could
there be, for her, than all this agreement with concrete reality?” (James,
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 1907)
James does not make the claim of a universal truth that applies to all
individuals. James expressed that truth was distinct and personal to individuals,
and the “value” of any truth is dependent on its utility to the individual who holds
it (Borden, 2017).
An important quality for pragmatism’s effectuality in ones’ life is what
James refers to as “technical distinctions,” which, when considered, inspire action,
in the context of faith spirituality, or religiosity, the action inspired is that of
belief. Fundamentally, deadness or liveness of a given axiom or proposition is not
intrinsic but relational to the individual of which it appeals. The liveness of a
hypothesis is measured by its relational appeal motivating the willingness to act.
James stresses that maximum willingness is to act decisively and irrevocably. An
example of the contrary i.e., a dead axiom, would be religious consideration for an
atheist, the concept of religion is dead from the start. Belief is a conscious
willingness to act, the act of believing (James, The Will to Believe, 1896).
Faith via Metaphysics Versus Science
As observed with secular trends, faith, spirituality, and especially formal
religion have been challenged by philosophers of alternative disciplines since the
aforementioned Neo- Platonism revival. Religion is a metaphysical position that
is not scientiﬁcally based, which is a persuasive argument against. Historically,
science has proposed phenomena that was not empirically observable but that
could be inferred indirectly through predicted effects.
Theoretical physicists subsist on abstractions and mathematical theory,
much like theists subsist on a metaphysical conception of God. For example: It is
unclear whether String Theory makes any observable predictions. This theory
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links general relativity theory and ﬁeld quantum theoryand has eleven dimensions,
none of which have yet been observed. Apart from relying on an interesting
mathematical theory the status of String Theory is highly debated as to whether it
is metaphysics or science (Miller, 2003).
Note however, scientific theories when tested can be falsified. Philosopher
of natural and social science, Karl Popper 1902-1994, expressed “falsifiability” or
refutability to the intention of the testability of scientific/empirical theories. The
possibility of said refutation qualifies a theory as being scientific or empirical.
Metaphysical theories cannot be tested and are irrefutable by definition (Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 1962). For an
atheist, there are two approaches to the repudiation (not to be confused with
refutability) of God’s existence: One approach is to claim that there is no deity,
the other claim is that there is no evidence that proves the existence of a deity; the
former group would have to produce evidence to establish that claim, which has
not been done (Randi, 2005).
Justification of Spirituality Albeit Faith, by Pragmatism’s Allure
Invoking Immanuel Kant, James identifies the respect and consideration
that Kant had for belief in God, even though it remains an enigma as to whether
Kant nurtured an ontological argument for God or whether he was an influential
apologist for traditional Christian faith:
We can act AS IF there were a God; feel AS IF we were free; consider
nature AS IF she were full of special designs; lay plans AS IF we were to be
immortal; and we find then that these words do make a genuine difference in our
moral life... We have the strange phenomenon, as Kant assures us, of a mind
believing with all its strength in the real presence of a set of things of which no
one can form any notion whatsoever. (James, The Varieties of Religious
Experience, 2012)
With this James enlists Kant’s philosophical reputation to consider
metaphysical and/orexistential truths.
Given that we have determined that pragmatism will not attempt to prove
the existence of God, theistic pragmatic arguments support that believing that
God’s existence is rational and convincingly prudent. Considering James’
requirement for “technical distinctions” to inspire maximum willingness for
belief, one finds convincing endorsements articulated. One would expect for
maximum willingness to be irrevocable and momentous; a significant level of
ardor orfervor must be emboldened:
If religion is to mean anything definite for us, it seems to me that we ought
to take it as meaning this added dimension of emotion... This sort of happiness in
the absolute and everlasting is what we find nowhere but in religion. (James, The
Varieties of ReligiousExperience, 2012)
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Added consideration of James’s value of religion for an individual’s
existentialism was expressed when writing “A man’s religion is the deepest and
wisest thing in his life” (Anderson,2006).
Although contemporaries, Peirce, with his contribution to the philosophy
of pragmatism during the 1870’s, predates William James’ writings by two
decades. Citing a passionate acceptance of a hypothetical God and prepared for a
life of devotion:
Any normal man who considers… the hypothesis of God's reality… will
come to be stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its
august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly
hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above all things to shape the whole
conduct of life and all the springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis.
(Peirce C. S., 2010)
As previously cited, James states that pragmatism’s adoption of faith does
not depend on proving God’s existence; yet he supports God’s existence with
metaphysical revelations in which he implies that contrary to challenges for proof
of God’s existence, quantitatively satisfying“particulars” he refers:
I find it hard to believe that principles can exist which make no difference
in facts. But all facts are particular facts, and the whole interest of the question of
God's existence seems to me to lie in the consequences for particulars which that
existence may be expected to entail… In spite of its being so shocking to the
reigning intellectual tastes, I believe that a candid consideration of piecemeal
supernaturalism and a complete discussion of all its metaphysical bearings will
show it to the hypothesis by which the largest number of legitimate requirements
are met. (James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 2012)
It may be irrelevant to the theme of justification of faith for healthcare
considerations, but it would be remiss to neglect the “momentous” impression that
the phenomena of communion illustrate as “liveness” for the believer in
Christianity. James has this to say:
…elements of a theory to which the phenomena of religious life lend
plausibility. I am so impressed by the importance of these phenomena that I adopt
the hypothesis which they naturally suggest. At these places at least, I say, it
would seem as though trans mundane (existing outside the physical or visible
world) energies, God, if you will, produced immediate effects within the natural
world to which the rest of our experience belongs. (James, The Varieties of
Religious Experience, 2012)
As stated earlier, pragmatism “is willing to take anything” including the
most personal mysticalexperiences.
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James Considers the Psychology and Consequences of Lacking Faith
As a psychologist, in fact the ’Father of American psychology”, William
James encountered and addressed psychological conditions. Combining
psychology and philosophy, one can appreciate James’ logic and plausibility
recognizing a lack of faith and spirituality as causing pessimism and possibly
depression. James proposes that two of the Hellenistic philosophies, Epicureanism
and Stoicism are philosophies of despair. While admiring the dignity of
resignation that these two schools of thought practice, he is cognizant of the sense
deprivation endured. James is concerned with what he refers to as the “sensehappiness” or lack thereof. The Epicurean versus the Stoic, James says: “In the
one the hot blood has grown cool, in the other it has become quite cold” (James,
The Varieties of Religious Experience, 2012).
Spiritualism and faith are valued for resistance to depression, through a
habitude of pessimism lacking piety, one, if predisposed, is at greater risk for
depression. The paradox of happiness which results through religious demands of
sacrifice without protest well beyond the inconvenience of secular pessimism:
Devotion may require surrender and sacrifice which are positively embraced and
revered. Unnecessary sacrifices somehow ensure that happiness may increase. In
observance of states of mind lacking spirituality; the surrender is submitted as an
imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is made reluctantly. To the contrary, in
the pious life:
Religion thus makes easy and opportune what in any case is necessary.
Faith becomes anessential organ of our life, performing a function which no other
portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill (James, The Varieties of Religious
Experience, 2012)… … Affording Asceticism some appeal.
James observes a differentiation between spiritual persons who tend to be
resilient to melancholy regardless of their life circumstance and reflection upon
death. Depression stated as an extreme result of pessimism is a pathologic
melancholy which evil’s existence a “healthy- minded enthusiast” succeeds in
ignoring. Furthermore, the victim of “the most atrocious
cruelties of outward fortune,” if of healthy mind is seldom susceptible
(James, The Varieties ofReligious Experience, 2012).
Adopting Faith
Pragmatism gives spirituality flexibility in approaches to healthcare; in
practice, ones’ circumstances may nurture faith. A small study group sampling
comprised of both theist scholars and atheists was interviewed about the
likelihood of patients adopting faith when confronted with a healthcare crisis. The
group unanimously discredited the possibility, including the persons of faith, on
the basis that considering faith under those circumstances would be insincere
(Courtney, 2018). All participants were themselves healthy at the time of the
interview, and this caveat may be causal for the lack of their consideration of piety
in this context(Miller, 2003).
History reveals many notable conversions to the contrary; not confined to
the Gospel of Luke where the good thief converts while crucified beside Jesus.
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Among notable figures in history, French mathematician Blaise Pascal (Lataste,
1911) and author Oscar Wilde (McCracken, 2003), expressed demonstrative
conversions of faith while facing perceived crisis. Twentieth century
mathematician John von Neumann, inventor of “game theory,” also had a
transformational revelation. To his colleagues’ surprise, for they knew him to be a
lifelong agnostic, he turned to Catholicism when diagnosed with cancer
(Dransfield, 2003). Von Neumann reportedly divulged: "There probably has to be
a God. Many things are easier to explain if there is than if there isn't.” To his
visiting Catholic Priest, he imparted “So long as there is the possibility of eternal
damnation for nonbelievers it is much more logical to be a believer in the end”
(Von Neumann, 2004) i.e., Pascal’s Wager.
Foreboding death, influencing introspection of life’s meaning, purpose,
and transience has been professed to be the greatest threat to atheism (Lucchetti);
inspiring the aphorism “There are no atheists in foxholes” (Clear, 1942).
Likewise, research shows that atheism is rarely conspicuous among patients in
hospital units being treated for life threatening diseases including but not limited to
coronary crisis and cancer (Pargament, 2002). As a companion to the ‘atheist in
foxholes’ reference, Pastor Michael E. Cavanagh offers through experience,
“There are no atheists in oncology and bone-marrow transplant units”
(Cavanagh, 1994). A related study,
S.R. Cohen et al., questioned the perception of quality of life to both
healthy individuals and oncology patients. Their inquiry posed four dimensions to
the quality of life: Physical, psychological, social, and existential well-being.
While the healthy people reasoned all four dimensions of having equal impact, the
oncology patients, likely suffering debilitating physical pain, rather than attesting
to the ‘physical’ dimension, favored subjective well-being across existential
domains, such as life’s meaning, life’s purpose, and their satisfaction in life,
including religious beliefs regarding suffering and death (Cohen, 1996). Cohen’s
survey suggests that spiritual considerations are of greater importance than other
issues when life is threatened (Lucchetti, 2019). Faith in God provides patients
with hope, an idea that is commonly referred to in cancer care but that is not
easily quantified (Silvestri, 2003).
Gathering quantifiable data in psychology has been much more auspicious.
Not only is the evidence of improved mental health readily available, but the
measurable health benefits with improved lifestyle habits associated with
fellowship and spiritual engagement are increasingly apparent, i.e., the
relationship between spirituality and health is causal (Nelson, 2009). Duke
University’s Center for Spirituality, Theology, and Health focuses on nurturing
scholarly research regarding the intersection of religion and health. Current and
past research publications and monthly newsletters are available at
https://spiritualityandhealth.duke.edu/. Varied topics are presented, and all
invited to monthly online meetings.
Living in the tail end of the Romanticism era, James’ phraseology includes
optimism, the supernatural, and imagination: “The only thing that FAITH
unequivocally testifies to... is that we can experience union with SOMETHING
larger than ourselves and in that union find our greatest PEACE” (James, The
Varieties of Religious Experience, 2012).
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Dichotomy & Paradox
Research has demonstrated a “salutary” impact of religious belief and
practice on patient well-being (Villani, 2019); therefore, it is crucial that
spirituality and faith not be treated as quack medicine (Astrow, 2001). Yet there is
a dichotomy between physicians’ values and their patients’. Poignantly, the
specialties practiced which tend to treat patients with higher severity diseases are
represented by physicians trending further towards secularization. The Journal of
Clinical Oncology published a survey of 257 medical oncologists attending the
annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology. With a
questionnaire prioritizing seven possible aspects of healthcare, the 257 oncologists
ranked faith in God as ‘least’ important, whereas the 100 cancer patients and
family members surveyed ranked faith in God second ‘most’ important (Jawaid,
2014). Caregivers surveyed coincided with the patients choosing faith as second,
more importantly than the ability of treatment to cure the disease. All groups
agreed that the most important impact on outcome was the Oncologists’
knowledge and recommendations. Thus, in the study, most of the factor rankings
coincided apart from faith in God. Caregivers’ rankings mimicked those of the
patients’ sentiments.
In consideration of the dichotomy regarding medical specialties mentioned
above, a survey of family physicians and patients showed a reasonable parallel of
high religious orientation, as compared to a survey of psychiatrists of which the
majority were admittedly secular (Maugans, 1991). It is curious to posit why
physicians and specifically the field and scope of specialty influence their
participation in faith: The degree and realm of scientific reasoning may not
facilitate metaphysical considerations (Silvestri, 2003). Psychologists much like
the Oncologists in the study trend towards secularization (American Psychological
Association,1975), whereas a national survey of family physicians found that their
religious practices mirrored those of the general-public (Daaleman, 1999).
Conclusion
Patients and caregivers agree on the factors that are important in deciding
treatment but differ substantially from doctors. For some, faith ranks very high as
an important factor in medical decision making, more so than even the efficacy of
treatment. If faith influences how some patients decide treatment, and physicians
do not account for it, there is a disconnect; the decision-making process may be
distressing and regrettable to all involved.
Numerous studies claim to document a better health outcome in patients
with a strong religious faith. Most of these studies face vigorous debate, lacking
empirical data and having questionable scientific methodology. The metaphysical
nature of faith and healing does not afford the luxury of the mathematical theory
that theoretical physics relies upon.
Whether physicians should even address the issue of religion with patients
is also debatable, although increased participation in medical schools is a trend
along with more offerings of medical ethics (Silvestri, 2003). If physicians find it
difficult to find “common ground” with patients, at the very least, its physicians
should not discredit the strongly held beliefs that patients may have. Without
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appearing patronizing, acknowledgment, and respect by physicians of a patient’s
personal beliefs will likely lead to higher satisfaction with the decision-making
process for all involved (Silvestri,2003).
James finds pragmatism suitable for every condition confronted in life. His
referral to Pascal’s Wager during his lecture making a convincing argument for
justification of faith, The Will to Believe, he does not apologize for the perceived
insincerity of betting on God’s existence as a pragmatic gamble for God’s blessing
(James, The Will to Believe, 1896). For practical life, chance of salvation is
enough. With the following quote, pessimism and optimism are again at odds,
resignation versus hope. Maybe faith ranks high as the pious relinquish their spirit
for salvation:
No fact in human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live
on a chance. The existence of the chance makes the difference… between a life of
which the keynote is resignation and a life of which the keynote is hope. (James,
The Varieties of Religious Experience, 2012)
Whereas faith throughout this paper is confidence in a belief not
necessarily based on proof, hope is an optimistic dynamic based on desired
expectation. Faith addresses the present; hopespeaks of the future.
Solutions/Recommendations
Most data for studies cited in this report which recognize the dichotomy
between patients’ spirituality and physicians’ lack thereof, was observed in the
1990’s and early years of the 2000’s. Since highlighted, although slowly
integrated, progress to close the spirituality divide is apparent through efforts of
increased medical ethics curriculum in medical schools and the business model for
healthcare facilities. Whether efforts are made to fulfill holistic mission, vision,
and value statements are sincerely altruistic or forced upon healthcare institutions
throughpatient satisfaction and reimbursement, etc.… is not covered in this report,
but could be the source of further studies.
The Manner in which believers experience reality, as well as the way they
respond to it, is dependent on a religious narrative. Religious belief can function
as the foundation of an institution's commitment to the relief of suffering, which is
obviously seen in faith-based healthcare facilities. It can be the source of its
sensitivity as well as the justification for its respect of the patient's worth and
dignity (Drane, 1994). Several secular healthcare organizations have abandoned
mission statements with virtues of compassion and charity to expedite financial
objectives (Bart, 2002). The mission, vision, and value statements can indicate
faith-based virtues but must also present inclusive (pluralistic) rhetoric to invite
secular patients and the variety of theistic practices (Courtney, 2018).
The spiritual dichotomy in healthcare covered in this report and the facility
for correction likely has more relevance in a pluralistic society, as is the United
States. It is necessary and possible for health care professionals to address the
spiritual concerns of patients in a respectful manner without needing to sacrifice
any of the obvious gains of scientific medicine (Astrow, 2001).
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In addition to the oncology patients referenced in this paper’s Silvestri
study, it is a logical expectation to find patients with similar faith involvement
among patients receiving palliative care; many of whom may be oncology
patients. It seems advisable for palliative care services to directly ask patients and
their caregivers whether they are interested in spiritual support. Pastoral care is
appropriate: Although some secular persons may shun the idea of pastoral
intervention for discomfort from religious interaction, the phrase simply comes
from the shepherd protecting his flock. In all cultures and traditions, pastoral care
is a timeless model inclusive of non-religious and religious communities. By
directly asking at admission or another suitable time whether pastoral care is
sought, we can avoid unnecessary intrusion and focus time on those who would
benefit and appreciate this service (O'Callaghan, 2019).
Referring to the Silvestri data again, addressing the physician versus
spirituality dynamic will present a challenge. Healthcare facilities can nurture a
culture among caregivers through policies, practice, and education. If Silvestri’s
data can be expected to duplicate in numerous and varied caregiving
environments; and the caregivers had similar sentiments as their patients, then the
disconnect is burdened by the physicians. Physicians need to be comfortable
discussing spiritual concerns with their patients; carefully, respectfully, and
professionally. They must recognize when to refer patients to others for spiritual
support. From Harper Lee’s 1961 Pulitzer Prize winning novel, To Kill a
Mockingbird: Atticus gives his daughter Scout a pivotal piece of moral advice that
influences her development throughout the story: “You never really understand a
person until you consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his
skin and walk around in it” (Lee, 1960). Perhaps for physicians to respect a
person’s spirituality they must first climb into their skin and walk around in it;
physicians may need to nurture their own spiritual lives (Astrow, 2001).
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Mentalities and the Search for
Total History in the Works of
Annalistes, Foucalt, and
Microhistory
By Jason U. Rose
Abstract: In this brief essay, the links between the Annales, the works of Michael
Foucault, and microhistory are analyzed through the theoretical lens of histoire
des mentalités (mentalités). Common threads that link these approaches include
the willingness of using outside fields of analysis as well as the willingness to
work with vagueness in search of those who Foucault calls, “lost people.”
Relatedly, each of these groups and individuals are willing to analyze all aspects
of the historical record to fully understand the minds, cultures, and histories of
past people. The key to recognizing the relationship of these approaches involve
knowing and acknowledging their differences whist trying to understand them in
their own words. Furthermore, understanding the nuisances of each group as
well as learning how to utilize them “cohesively is a positive step toward a total
history of humankind.
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“A remarkable amount of the most innovative, the most memorable and most
significant historical writing of the twentieth century was produced in France.”1
- Peter Burke
Historians, by nature, need to create periods, or ways to organize time so
that events and people can be analyzed in search of patterns that demonstrate
change over time. This process is called periodization and it has been done since
historians have been telling true stories. For nearly a century, followers of the
Annales school have attempted to measure history with unique calculations,
considering lengthy spans of time as necessary for achieving histoire total, the
concept of creating a total history of humankind.2 Total history has been
described as the Annales attempt to “incorporate the methods of all the other
social sciences in one great project of synthesis.” Therefore, making history “the
queen of the social sciences by virtue of its ability to assimilate everyone else’s
methods and topics.”3 According to the Annales, a holistic study of history can
only be achieved by unfolding a society or a region layer by layer over a long
span of time. This would be done by studying historical documents, utilizing
statistical analysis, and borrowing techniques from other disciplines.4 This paper
will briefly explain the origins of the Annales as a theoretical school of thought.
Then the paper will go into a deeper analysis of their desire to create a total
history through the histoire des mentalités (mentalités) and how it has permeated
modern historical analysis via two unrelated channels: the works of Michael
Foucault and microhistory.
Origins of the Annalistes
The history of the Annales started in 1929 with the journal “Annales d’histoire
économique et sociale.”5 Founded by historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre,
the idea germinated at the University of Strasbourg when they shared the hallways
with like-minded academics from other disciplines. The journal was
1
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Origins of the Annalistes
The history of the Annales started in 1929 with the journal “Annales d’histoire
économique et sociale.”5 Founded by historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre,
the idea germinated at the University of Strasbourg when they shared the hallways
with like-minded academics from other disciplines. The journal was
interdisciplinary in nature, publishing articles from history, economics,
geography, and ethnology. This foundation helped solidify the interdisciplinary
nature of the Annales and eventually other social sciences.6 Additionally, the
journal encouraged scholars to review or submit research papers in fields outside
their expertise, as long as it was broadly historical.7 This further cemented the
legacy of the Annales and facilitated the incorporation of multiple disciplines and
subfields into their historical analysis.
The second generation of the Annales was marked and, in many ways,
dominated by Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean
World in the Age of Philip II. Braudel fashioned a broad analysis of the
geographical, social, and political factors of the Mediterranean, successfully
creating a logical and consistent tapestry of historic inquiry that used other fields,
which epitomized the Annales methodology.8 In The Mediterranean, Braudel
argued that there were three main divisions of time: geographic time, social time,
and individual time. Geographic time refers to the spatial relationship between
humans and their environment, social time delineates historical events within
cultures, and individual time is unique to individual people.9 It should be noted
that each of these times run at different speeds. Also known as the longue durée
(long duration), geographic time is considered the quintessential reference for
time within the Annales.10 Braudel’s broad approach to history was revolutionary;
studies which started with geographical analysis, then expanded to culture, and
then finally examined political and individual realities were almost unheard of in
the historical profession of the day.11 The establishment of time as a part of the
discipline was another facet that the Annales employed to integrate the social
sciences into historical inquiry.
While studying the longue durée, Braudel stressed the historical importance
of slow-changing geographic factors. This is most clearly seen when he discusses
the relationship between geography and human endeavors. Focusing on the
longue durée allowed the Annalistes to integrate statistical analysis within their
6
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historical examinations, in an attempt to fully describe the geographical, political,
economic, social, and cultural components of the past.12 Proponents of the longue
durée note that studying the past in the broadest possible time frame reveals
patterns, trends, or mentalities that may not otherwise be recognized. This could
be viewed as a way to measure the true depth and scale of change over time,
although this approach of fashioning a total history could become problematic or
unwieldy if appropriate chronological boundaries are not established. Both the
longue durée and its interdisciplinary approach as epitomized by Braudel was an
attempt to remove strict adherence to political or “great men” approaches to
history. It also echoed the next move within the Annales, one that focuses on the
histoire des mentalités to create a total history.
Mentalités
As previously mentioned, Annalistes incorporated outside fields to strengthen
their historical analysis, most notably early on with the use of anthropology,
geography, and sociology. To bolster their ability to create a total history, later
Annalistes employed psychology to help understand the past. In other words, they
advocated incorporating psychological considerations, alongside cultural and
social factors, when attempting to fully reconstruct and analyze the past. The
histoire des mentalités (mentalités) was around since the beginning of the
Annales, especially with Bloch’s work on the royal touch, but it really gained
prominence in the latter years of Braudel’s academic career; the so-called third
movement within the Annales. First, however, a definition of mentalités is vital to
understand this concept.
A working definition of mentalités is necessary to see how it fits in within
the construction of total history and the legacy of the Annales. According to
Annales historian Jacques Le Goff, “the primary attraction of the histoire des
mentalités lies in its vagueness: it can be used to refer to the left-overs, the
indefinable residue of historical analysis.”13 Le Goff uses the term “vagueness”
discipline was another facet that the Annales employed to integrate the social
sciences into historical inquiry.
While studying the longue durée, Braudel stressed the historical importance of
slow-changing geographic factors. This is most clearly seen when he discusses the
relationship between geography and human endeavors. Focusing on the longue
durée allowed the Annalistes to integrate statistical analysis within intentionally
as it allows historians room to maneuver in an effort to analyze the past with
approaches that have not been pursued before the use of mentalités. Le Goff
continues:
12
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The histoire des mentalités operates at the level of the everyday
automatisms of behavior. Its object is that which escapes historical
individuals because it reveals the impersonal content of their thought:
that which is common to Caesar and his most junior legionary, Saint
Louis and the peasant on his lands, Christopher Columbus and any one
of his sailors. The histoire des mentalités is to the history of ideas as
the history of material culture is to economic history.14
As can be seen from Le Goff, the uncertainties and ambiguities that are present in
the concept of mentalités are what makes it useful for a historian to study parts of
the past that were excluded from more traditional historical accounts.
Although Le Goff’s explanation of mentalités is insightful, it is not a
workable definition for analyzing its use in producing total histories. Roger
Chartier gives a more concrete definition: mentalités “is that of daily life and
habits; it is what escapes the individual subjects of history because it reveals the
impersonal content of their thoughts.”15 According to Peter Burke, the history of
mentalities fills “the conceptual space between the history of ideas and social
history, in order to avoid having to choose between an intellectual history with the
society left out and a social history with the thought left out.”16 But he also
cautions that the key to mentalities is to look at the people of the past through
their eyes. He further warns historians to be careful not to “overestimate the
degree of intellectual consensus” and that the belief must be one which is shared
“with a number of contemporaries.”17 Therefore, in this paper, mentalités will be
defined as something about a culture or a part of a culture that influences the
thoughts and behaviors of its people. It allows historians to analyze past moments
as a microcosm of the larger society. At least in theory, this allows the historian to
produce an analysis of the past that maintains the agency of the past subject. This
definition does have its problems. This is similar to the common historical
conundrum: are the people of the past more similar or dissimilar to people of the
present; does the building of a historical example of mentalités, especially one
based on microhistory, reduce the complexities of the society as a whole to one
person or one town? Essentially, is there a unitary thought pattern that can be used
for historical analysis? In what ways do these studies, and the subjects thought
patterns represent larger groups?18
The earliest Annales to write about mentalités is Marc Bloch. In The Royal Touch:
Monarchy and Miracles in France and England, Bloch analyzes scrofula, a
disease of the lymph modes, and the belief that monarchs could heal it by touch
due to the divine rights of kings. While Bloch details the events and incidents
14
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The earliest Annales to write about mentalités is Marc Bloch. In The Royal
Touch: Monarchy and Miracles in France and England, Bloch analyzes scrofula,
a disease of the lymph modes, and the belief that monarchs could heal it by touch
due to the divine rights of kings. While Bloch details the events and incidents
regarding the royal touch, he digs deeper and argues that the common citizens
who went to the king most likely did not believe that they would be healed.
Nonetheless, they sought the royal touch, and they did so for well over a century.
The study touches on rationalization and cognitive dissonance and attempts to see
how people dealt with or ignored it during this time.
Another example of a similar phenomenon is Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's
Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error and Cathars and Catholics in a French
Village, a key work in the study of mentalités. In this work, Le Roy Ladurie
explores Montaillou, a small mountain village in Southern France that was largely
made up of Cathars, a sect deemed heretical by the Roman Catholic Church. The
evidence used by Le Roy Ladurie comes primarily from the Fournier Register,
which was a set of records from the Inquisition by Jacques Fournier (later Pope
Benedict XII) who investigated Catharism in the region. The book, squarely
fitting within the Annales tradition by describing the geography of the area before
exploring the lives and beliefs of a handful of characters in the village: brothers
Pierre and Bernard Clergue, poor but talented shepherd Pierre Maury, and
countess Béatrice de Planisoles. This work, much like Bloch’s, contains a set of
main protagonists that suffered from cognitive dissonance as well. Pierre Clergue
was a serial adulterer and a Catholic priest, while also a Cathar. His brother was
the main magistrate, and consequently, the two were key power brokers in the
area and were able to help keep the Inquisition away from Montaillou for several
years. Béatrice de Planisoles was also a serial adulterer, including a dalliance with
Pierre that resulted in a child. These interactions all took place while they were
Cathars, who believed that intercourse was disruptive and procreation increased
suffering.19 This again demonstrates the mentalités, while showing rationalization
and cognitive dissonance of the town’s citizens.
It should be noted that the study of mentalités does more than just show patterns
of inconsistent beliefs within communities, although that is a great benefit of it as
a theoretical approach.20 Another excellent example of the histoire des mentalités
during the height of its popularity is Jacques Le Goff’s Time, Work, and Culture
in the Middle Ages. In this book, Le Goff uses both textual and material evidence
to demonstrate the controversary surrounding two conceptions of time during the
Middle Ages. The dispute is noted and crouched in the following language:
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Question: is a merchant entitled, in a given type of business
transaction, to demand a greater payment from one who cannot settle
his account immediately than from one who can? The answer argued
for is no, because in doing so he would be selling time and would be
committing usury by selling what does not belong to him.21
So, what happened? According to Le Goff, there was a change in understanding
of time during the Middle Ages, and how it can be quantified and commodified,
which emerged from differing understandings of time between merchants and the
church.22 One valued time as the ability to gain or maintain profit, while the other
believed that time is immutable and cannot be sold as it belongs solely to God.
The new understanding of time was not developed by an individual, states
Le Goff, or even a group of individuals. It was formulated by people “in the West
between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries who were in possession of sufficient
cultural and mental equipment to reflect on professional problems and their social,
moral and religious consequences.”23 Using a wide variety of primary sources,
including commercial documents and treatises from theologians, Le Goff builds a
solid case that there was a shift in the mentalité of the people regarding time and
not some form of top down mandate. Rather unusual for a historical work, Le
Goff does not show a turning point, but he unabashedly states that the “essay has
no other purpose than to stimulate a more intensive study of a history which raises
numerous problems.”24 He is seeking to show that there are explanations in both
mentalités regarding time and they can, and should, be explored. Merchants
needed a more functional use of time just as the church still operated under a
more rigid system based in antiquity. Yet one thing is unequivocally true, the new
concept of time was not teleological. This nonteleological approach to other
mentalités is also echoed in the works of Michel Foucault.
Foucault
French theorist Michel Foucault may be the most influential, thought producing,
and provocative intellectual in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Additionally, his ties to the Annales School is also complicated. The first lines in
The Archaeology of Knowledge clearly discuss the role of the Annales and
seemingly give them praise for their recent developments. Foucault says,
For many years now historians have preferred to turn their attention to long
periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying
to reveal the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the
irreversible processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that
gather force, and are then suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the
21
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movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent,
motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a thick layer
of events.25
Later in the introduction, he mentions several people who were influential to him
and his work. This included Georges Canguilhem, his mentor, and someone who
had longstanding ties with the Annales at the University of Strasbourg during the
Second World War. Foucault mentions that Canguilhem should be praised for
“the distinction…between the microscopic and macroscopic scales of the history
of the sciences” and consequently “a different history is being written.”26 This has
ties to the Annales, and the ties run deeper than a pedigree with ties to the
Annalistes.27
Another telling example of Michel Foucault as a historian that shows how
his methodology relates to the Annalistes deals with how he tries to recover “lost
people.” By studying lost people, Foucault and others seek ways to recover the
past of people who were not in power, much like the Annales. He notes in The
Lives of Infamous Men that:
All those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear
without ever having been told were able to leave traces – brief,
incisive, often enigmatic—only at the point of their instantaneousness
contact with power. So that is doubtless impossible to ever grasp them
again in themselves, as they might have been ‘in a free state’; they can
no longer be separated out from the declamations, the tactical biases,
the obligatory lies that power games and power relations presuppose.28
Foucault wants to know, just as Le Roy Ladurie regarding Montaillou, why were
these people confessing. Foucault seeks to understand how knowledge was
created and circulated, which he calls discourse. He is also concerned with how
Foucault wants to know, just as Le Roy Ladurie regarding Montaillou, why were
these people confessing. Foucault seeks to understand how knowledge was
created and circulated, which he calls discourse. He is also concerned with how
this was used by those in power, the regulation of this discourse. Additionally,
Foucault argues that humans literally police themselves, and that too is a part of
the discourse: a person confesses to a priest, psychiatrist, or their partner
regarding their “deviant” behavior. That person might also console their own
conscious by confessing their improprieties to these parties. In return, these
regarding their “deviant” behavior. That person might also console their own
conscious by confessing their improprieties to these parties. In return, these
people judge the other person in some manner, whether conscious or not and this
makes the confessor internalize social norms. Eventually, the person starts to
regulate their own behavior according to the other peoples’ terms. Foucalt
25
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constantly uses this method throughout his works and details the approach in his
book The Archaeology of Knowledge.
The Archaeology of Knowledge is Foucault’s definitive statement on his
methodological approach to history. In it, Foucault details how he does history
and how structures are supported via “discourses,” which he defines as all the
statements that remains to be discovered by future historians. According to
Foucault, using discourses does not remove individuals, but rather multiplies their
subject positions allowing for a deeper understanding of the subject and their
discourses. Furthermore, the discourse should be explored across several
individuals to get an understanding of the conditions or environments where the
discourse took place. It is in this particular manner that Foucault can illustrate
historical change (and sometimes the lack of change) over time. In the
introduction of The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault discusses in detail how he
approves of much that the Annales School has been doing and outlines how he
was expanding their ideas.29 He initially does this by showing how Annales
historians, the historians of ideas, are focusing on continuity, while Foucault is
interested in disruptions.30 Any discussion of Foucault, however, is incomplete
without talking about power and that is key to understanding his beliefs regarding
continuity.
In spite of the importance of The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault’s
work is probably best known through his discussions on power. While Foucault
has better known works on power, his History of Sexuality might be the most
useful as it shows how he refined his views over time. According to Foucault,
power works in the smallest of daily transactions, and therefore it is harder to
discern. This power is “produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or
rather from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces
everything, but because it came from everywhere.”31 Power is upheld through
what Foucault calls power relations, which maintain society.32 These relations are
invisible, and societal attitudes are how cultural norms are maintained. Power
relations are sustained through discourses, which, according to Foucault, are clues
or aspects of the dominant power relations where they were produced. Therefore,
Foucault is not so much interested in the actual words, but how they show the
landscape surrounding a subject and how it supports power. “Power is not an
institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed
with; [rather] it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in
a particular society.”33 Power relations are entwined with every other form of
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relations, including production, kinship, and sexuality and they do not need to
maintain itself via coercion, prohibition, repression, or chastisement.34
Essentially, what is said (discourse) about sexuality, or any other topic, is a
primary site of power in modern societies. According to Foucault, we are literally
“policed” by society’s discourse about norms, that what discourses say are licit or
illicit behaviors, thoughts, or activities helps shape the behavior of individual
persons.35 This is why Foucault is interested in evidence such as Catholic
confessionals, which are prime examples of how the policing of behaviors became
internalized.
Foucault also elaborates on how historians should use research and
analysis. Later in The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault details his major
opposition to traditional historical methods concerning the use of archives, and
what makes up an archive. For Foucault, everything written, as well as material
culture, is a part of the discourse and thus, the historical record.36 Historians have
taken it as their “primary task, not the interpretation of the document, nor the
attempt to decide whether it is telling the truth or what is its expressive value, but
to work on it from within and to develop it.” Foucault continues, “history now
organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in levels,
establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not,
discovers elements, defines units, describes relations.”37 Essentially, historians do
not find facts, they fashion them out of more basic elements.
Foucault as a writer is complicated, but so is his relationship with the
Annales. This can be seen in The Discourse on Language, where Foucault
declares that “history, as it is practiced today, does not turn its back on events; on
the contrary, it is continually enlarging the field of events, constantly discovering
new layers.” A statement that harkens back to the Annalistes and their interest in
finding untold historical subjects. He goes on to say that contemporary historians
look for things “more superficial as well as more profound — incessantly
isolating new ensembles — events, numerous, dense and interchangeable or rare
and decisive…”38 In this passage, there are differences from some Annalistes like
Braudel, but also some continuity with him as well as other Annalistes who
pushed the boundaries of historical knowledge and fields of study such as the
histoire des mentalités. Another difference is how Foucault liked to focus on
disruptions as opposed to continuities.39 The key to remember regarding Foucault
and his theoretical ties to the Annales is that they were not monolithic, they were
multifaceted, and they encouraged and enjoyed innovation.
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Microhistory
Related to both histoire des mentalités and the works of Michel Foucault is
microhistory. It is sometimes called Alltagsgeschichte in German or histoire
quotidienne in French, both meaning everyday life or history. According to
historian David Crew, Alltagsgeschichte is the historical attempt to understand
working-class cultures, the reconstruction of their values and attitudes, and the
identification of their needs, wants, and desires.40 By studying the past in this
manner, historians can demonstrate “the nuances, ambiguities, and contradictions
of popular experience,” the everyday life experiences of lesser studied cities and
villages.41 This research trend originally developed in West Germany as a
counternarrative to the prevailing social history and its use of structures. Crew
further states that “Alltagsgeschichte questions accepted understandings of the
‘big structures’ and ‘large processes’...by deconstructing these arid abstractions in
the flesh-and-blood human beings whose conflicting ideas and actions produced
history.”42 In Alltagsgeschichte, the historians seek to show how ordinary people
repudiated their assigned roles as passive “‘objects’ of impersonal historical
developments and attempted, instead, to become active historical ‘subjects.”43
Therefore, just as in mentalités, the scholars of microhistory seek to maintain the
historical dignity and agency of their studies.
One of the most renowned examples of microhistory is Carlo Ginzburg’s
The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller. Ginzburg
refers to this and his other works as the study of “peripheral phenomena.”44 In The
Cheese and the Worms, Ginzburg uses inquisitor trial records of a miller,
Menocchio, to study this phenomenon. Born Domenico Scandella, Menocchio
was far from a common miller of the day as he was literate and owned several
books, which was unusual for the time. But these books, as Ginzburg notes, did
not seem to influence the thoughts of Menocchio, but served to reinforce his
existing beliefs. The most notable example, represented by the title of the book,
was when Menocchio was asked about the creation of the world. He states that “in
my opinion, all was chaos, that is, earth, air, water, and fire were mixed together;
and out of that bulk a mass formed—just as cheese is made out of milk—and
worms appeared in it, and these were the angels.”45 He then explains that god was
created out of the same material as the angels and became the greatest of the
angels and was declared lord over them. Just like other historians in this essay,
Ginzburg realizes that trials are treasure troves on mentalities. By nature,
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inquisition trials were designed to extract details from those being questioned,
thus leaving a detailed account of the past.
Ginzburg’s book, however, is more than just a work about a poor miller in
northeastern Italy. The goal is to understand society through the work of
inquisitors, their relationship with the accused Menocchio, and the information
that they were able to ascertain from people. This allows Ginzburg to obtain
information about the times, class structures, and ordinary people of the past.
There are several overlaps between Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s understanding of
the people of Montaillou and Ginzburg’s understanding of Menocchio. Both raise
questions concerning nascent working-class politics and their resistance against
exploitation, their use of popular culture, and the ability to glean this information
from diverse sources that may not seem reliable. Ginzburg chooses to look at
inquisition records, specifically those of Menocchio’s trial. Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie used similar techniques in Montaillou. Michel Foucault also explored
comparable documents to a lesser extent. This approach to history has comparable
problems to those who study mentalités and Ginzburg acknowledges the
limitations of the sources he uses as well as the difficulties in building a cogent
and accurate microhistory. In his introduction, he praises works by Emmanuel Le
Roy Ladurie and notes that there are limitations when trying to unearth “collective
mentalities” especially when what historians know of these people are through the
lens of the literate upper classes, and how they interpreted them.46 David Crew
notes that these scholars were interested in “everyday survival strategies and
symbolic practices” that “comprised an alternative politics of everyday life
separate from the official and formal politics...”47 Since these sources can be
highly individual, how can we be sure if they are magnifying the particular as a
universal?48 Additionally, microhistory allows historians to examine “the
apparently ‘irrational’ features of working-class behavior. Moreover, it has
demonstrated the importance of symbolic and expressive ‘needs’ as well as
material and instrumental ‘interests.’”49 As outlined earlier, the study of
seemingly inconsistent or contradictory beliefs is relatively common amongst
those who study mentalités.
Also noteworthy is how practitioners of microhistory reconstruct the past.
According to Ginzburg, “the historian’s task is just the opposite of what most of
us were taught to believe…he must destroy our false sense of proximity to people
of the past because they came from societies very different from our own. The
more we discover about these people’s ‘mental universe,’ the more we should be
shocked by the cultural distance that separates us from them.”50 This is clearly in
line with the work of Foucault, as well as people like Braudel and Le Goff. Crew
argues that for these historians to explore the past of everyday people, they need
unconventional primary sources, “photographs… non-verbal forms of popular
5
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expression such as the ‘body language’ … [and] oral history.”51 This would all be
a part of the archeology and discourse that Foucault details in his works. Robert
Darnton, author of the microhistory “The Great Cat Massacre,” states that “what
is most valuable about” Ginzburg and microhistory in general is the insistence
that “common people of the past were not as passive as they are traditionally
portrayed… [it] shows them actively engaged in constructing a mental or cultural
world of their own that was often at odds with literate society.’”52 As shown
above, there seems to be a clear bridge from the Annales movement to Foucault,
and to microhistory, with each asking a variation of a fundamental question:
“How do you really get into a generation’s mindset and understand them as
people?” Additionally, how does these mindsets relate to their larger society as
well as our own?
Conclusion
This paper examined the common links between the Annales, the works of Michael
Foucault, and microhistory through the theoretical lens of histoire des mentalités
(mentalités). Just as the Annalistes incorporated interdisciplinary research to
strengthen their historical analysis, both Foucault and micro-historians used outside
fields, notably literature and philosophy, in their attempts to create a total history.
Using the definition of mentalités outlined in this paper and Jacques Le Goff’s
concept of “vagueness,” this demonstrates how historians can analyze the past in
ways that manifests and reflects the similarities and differences between the three
groups outlined in this paper.53 Related to this is how these groups sought to
recover “lost people,” whose lives, as noted by Foucault, were “destined to pass
beneath any discourse and disappear” except were they had “contact with power.”54
The methodological approaches of these groups are also related to the way they use
sources as evidence for their historical analysis.
Another example of their complementary nature deals with the sources used
by the Annales, Foucault, and Ginzburg. Since the records of “lost people” in the
distant past are irrevocably tied to authorities, the need to study public documents
and trial transcripts is imperative and this is the precise kind of evidence used by
the Annalistes as well as Ginzburg and Foucault. As previously mentioned, trials
are a cornucopia of mentalities as inquisition trials were designed to get the entire
minutiae of the story, thus leaving a detailed, albeit biased, account of the past.
This is the reason why Le Roy Ladurie, Foucault, and Ginzburg were interested in
analyzing Catholic confessionals and trials. Those records served as their primary
evidence to resolve their various historical questions: the relationship between
early working-class politics and their resistance, its connection to power and selfpolicing, and understanding popular culture. Foucault takes it a step further with
his theories of archaeology and genealogy and how they relate to power
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through the biases of those who wrote about these groups.56 Ginzburg even notes
that the “fact that a source is not ‘objective’ does not mean that it is useless” and
tapping into them as evidence “permits us to construct a fragment of what is usually
called ‘the culture of the lower classes’ or even ‘popular culture.’”57 Both Ginzburg
and the microhistories above seem to fall under the purview of the archeology and
discourse that Foucault details in his works.
A less compelling argument, but one that is noteworthy and cogent, is how
both Ginzburg and Foucault praise their Annales predecessors, even when going
against some of their approaches. As noted earlier, Foucault studied with Georges
Canguilhem who was at the University of Strasbourg alongside traditional
Annales historians. Canguilhem even wrote about the history of science which has
clear ties to the Annales as Annalistes continually expanded the field of history.58
Ginzburg also praises the works of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Robert
Mandrou even as he admits the limitations of exploring “collective mentalities,”
especially when constructing them via sources that originated from the literate
upper classes.59 Ginzburg’s analysis here is very instructive, as Foucault also
demonstrates his differences by focusing on the disruptions in history as opposed
to the continuity that seems to preoccupy some of the Annalistes.60 Furthermore,
most Annales historians believe that the history of mentalities is a single aspect in
the creation of total history and that it can be seen in various forms.61 As has been
shown, the Annales Movement praised innovation and is continuing to expand its
scope of inquiry. Therefore, even with some differences between the Annales,
Foucault, and those who write microhistories, the relationship is present, and
understanding them in their own words and from this perspective can help the
historical field grow. In addition, understanding the nuisances and similarities of
each group as well as developing and harnessing them cohesively is a positive
step toward a total history of humankind.
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Systematic Review of Transition
Assessments for Young Children
with Autism Spectrum Disorder
from Early Intervention to Special
Education
By Akrum Hasan Eidelsafy
Abstract: Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), their families, and teachers
face many challenges during the transition from early intervention into public
education. One tool that may facilitate and streamline this transition is the use of
a comprehensive transition assessment. The purpose of the current study was to
conduct a systematic literature review on peer-reviewed kindergarten transition
assessments for children with ASD. The systematic literature review yielded six
studies that met inclusion criterion. Within those six studies, 20 assessments
were analyzed by reviewing the (1) type of assessment, (2) assessment timeline,
and (3) use of assessment results. The results of this study showed the majority
(80%) of studies used indirect assessment measures. Of the assessments used,
20% utilized the results in an instructional manner, while the remaining were
used descriptively. Implications of these findings and directions for future
research are discussed.
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In 2019, there were 773,595 children aged 3 through 5 in the United States
being served under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This
number represented 6.6% of the resident population aged 3 through 5. Of the
disability categories included, 10.8% or 83,548 were diagnosed with ASD (autism
spectrum disorder) and 6.7% or 51,830 children were receiving early intervention
services (U.S. Department of Education, 2019).
The overwhelming prevalence of ASD has resulted in organized efforts to
understand how to assess and provide effective early interventions for children
with ASD (Lord et al., 2005). Although Special Education is far from reaching a
consensus on how to define the parameters of intensive early intervention, there is
general agreement that programs that include the use of Applied Behavior
Analysis (ABA) methodology, have significant parent and family involvement,
and have competent clinicians overseeing programs result in substantive shortand long-term effects on children’s cognition, social-emotional development,
school progress, and antisocial behavior (Barnett, 2011; Dawson et al., 2009).
Historically, intensive early intervention has been provided daily in a oneon-one instructional format within the child’s home (Akmanoglu-Uludag & Batu,
2005; Leaf & McEachin, 1999; Lovaas, 1987). Michigan's Autism Insurance
Reform legislation went into effect on October 15, 2012. For-profit, commercial,
HMO, and non-profit health insurance companies regulated by the state of
Michigan are mandated to provide an autism benefit to its insured members
covering services related to the diagnosis and treatment of ASD (The Nonprofit
Health Care Corporation Reform Act, 1980). This legislation has increased the
number young children receiving early intervention in a clinical setting.
Regardless of the location, early intensive intervention is individualized, includes
continual progress monitoring, and rapid program modification as the child
acquires skills. The parameters of early intervention (i.e., methodology, intensity,
individualization, and level of support) differ from what children will receive in a
general or special education classroom.
In a classroom, there are higher teacher-to-student ratios and activities,
and routines are not individualized to each student. Students are expected to
engage in routines and activities (e.g., lunch, recess, gym class, field trips) that
may have not been part of instructional programming during early intervention.
As a result of these drastic changes from early intervention, students with ASD
often demonstrate difficulties following directions in classrooms (Rimm-Kaufman
& Pianta, 2000). The environmental arrangement and change in expectations
between early intervention and school creates a gap that often exists between
evidence-based practices and school practices (Wesley & Buysse, 2003). This is a
multi-faceted problem that exists in early intervention, the transition process, and
in special and general education. It is possible that early intervention providers
(e.g., Board Certified Behavior Analysts, BCBA) are not assessing and teaching
skills and behaviors necessary for students to learn in a classroom format. These
behaviors include independent toileting, following teacher instructions in a group
format, and following classroom expectations (Kemp & Carter, 2000; Janus et al.,
2007). If a student is unable to engage in these behaviors independently (or with
minimal support) it will greatly interfere with their success in the classroom and
ability to access the general education curriculum and peers (Starr et al., 2016).
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All these factors make the transition from early intervention to school a stressful
process for early interventionalist, teachers, and parents.
It is possible that a transition assessment could provide structure during
the transition from early intervention into the school setting and reduce stress on
stakeholders. The Division on Career Development and Transition of the Council
for Exceptional Children defines transition assessment as an ongoing process of
collecting data on the individual’s needs, preferences, and interests as they relate
to the demands of current and future working, educational, living, and personal
and social environments. Assessment data serve as the common thread in the
transition process and form the basis for defining goals and services to be included
inthe Individualized Education Program (Sitlington et al., 1997, pp. 70-71).
In other words, transition assessments play a pivotal role in determining
target behaviors that need to be taught, target behaviors that need to be decreased
and interventions that will best support the child in the new environment. A
transition assessment could be used prior, during, and after the child transitions
into kindergarten. Specifically, early intervention providers (e.g., Board Certified
Behavior Analysts, early childhood special education teachers) could use the
transition assessment to select and teach specific behaviors (e.g., attending and
learning in a group setting, eating at a lunch table with peers). During the
transition, the assessment could help parents understand and navigate the changes
they will encounter from early intervention to school and allow teachers to
identify Individual Education Plan (IEP) annual goals and short- term objectives
and supports and interventions. An objective assessment that directly measures
specific skills would allow early intervention providers and kindergarten staff to
proactively identify the resources necessary for the student to be successful in a
classroom.
The primary purpose of the current study was to conduct a systematic
literature review on peer-reviewed kindergarten transition assessments for young
children with autism who are transitioning from early intervention into special or
general education. The second purpose of the study was to assess published, peerreviewed transition assessments and utilize a systematic search and coding
protocol. Transition assessments were evaluated to determine if the data obtained
in the assessment were used in a dynamic manner (i.e., to aid in the development
andmodification of student’s instructional targets or select intervention).
Methods
Search Strategy
A four-step model for locating studies was used in the present
investigation. First, researchers identified the search criteria (i.e., keyword
descriptors) and databases that would be used to conduct the literature review.
Searches were undertaken using a combination of the following descriptors:
developmental disabilities AND autism AND school transition. Publications were
filtered up to the year 2019 in order to index both recent and former transition
practices and were limited to peer-reviewed articles that were published in
English.
102

Second, descriptors were searched in each of the following three
databases: PsycINFO, ProQuest Research Library, and Eric ProQuest. Each
researcher was assigned a database to review. Each researcher entered the
keyword descriptors into the database and a list of articles were populated. Third,
a screening was conducted to determine which articles met inclusion criteria. The
title and abstract of each article were read to determine if the article met inclusion
criteria. An article was excluded if it did not use an assessment or did not include
students with disabilities. Fourth, the reference list of the articles that met criteria
were manually reviewed to identify additional articles that might meet criteria.
Possible articles were then located and included into the search if the article met
inclusion criteria. An initial search of PsycINFO, Eric ProQuest and ProQuest
Research Library yielded 340, 153, and 56 results respectively for a total of 549
articles. After narrowing the search to peer reviewed articles, 412 articles were
includedfor review.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criterion
For an article to be included in the study five inclusion criteria were used:
(1) the article was a peer reviewed published journal article, (2) an assessment
was administered, (3) the transition was from early intervention to kindergarten,
(4) participants included in the study werebetween the ages 3-5, and (5) the article
was written in English. An assessment was defined as any tool used to measure a
child’s skill level across a variety of benchmark and/or skill deficit areas for
student with disabilities.
Studies were excluded from the review if (1) the study focused on
vocational transitions (high school, college or employment transitions), (2) the
study utilized parent and teacher perception rather than a measure of student
behavior, or (3) neurotypical students were the only participants in the study.
Although there is valid information to be extracted from teacher and parent views,
the purpose of this study was to determine assessments that are used to assess
children’s skills prior, during and after the transition to kindergarten. Studies were
excluded if the focus involved employment, culture, adulthood or the article was
written in a language otherthan English as all of these topics falls out of the scope
of the study.
Interobserver Agreement
Interobserver agreement (IOA) was conducted across three timepoints
during the search strategy. After inclusion criteria were applied, a list of articles
was generated for each database and reviewed by each individual researcher. For
the first round of interobserver agreement, each researcher reviewed 30% of
articles of a database not initially assigned to them to determine inclusion criteria.
An agreement was defined as two observers concluding that an article should or
should not be included. A disagreement was defined when one interobserver
concluded an article should be included, while another observer concluded it
should be excluded. Interobserver agreement was calculated by dividing the
number of agreements by the number of agreements plus disagreements and
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multiplying by 100%. Interobserver agreement for the first round of IOA was
98%. Disagreements were reviewed by all three authors in order to determine
which articles met inclusion criteria. Following the first round of interobserver
agreement, five articles met inclusion criteria.
Next, the references of each of the five articles were manually searched to
determine if any additional articles met inclusion criteria. One additional article
was identified for a total ofsix articles. Interobserver agreement was conducted for
30% of the references from the secondary search, resulting in one disagreement
(IOA was 94%) which was reviewed by the three authors and a determination was
made.
Lastly, IOA was conducted a third time during the coding of articles. This
process was completed across two stages. During the first stage, each article was
individually reviewed by each of the researchers to identify and code assessments
across the following six categories: citation, standardization, direct or indirect,
indirect type, assessment timeline and assessment utilization. During the second
stage, the research team reviewed all six articles together to determine interrater
reliability. Overall IOA was 94% and all disagreements were discussed, and a
conclusion determined by carefully reviewing operational definition of each code.
Results
The initial search using the keywords listed was completed in three
databases: PsyInfo, Eric ProQuest, and ProQuest Research and yielded 340, 153,
and 56, articles respectively. The search was refined to include only peer reviewed
articles which narrowed the number of articles to 250, 116, and 46 respectively.
Of those 412 articles, six articles met inclusion criteria. The search strategy is
outlined in figure 1.
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The six articles were read and the number and name of all the assessments used in
each article was determined. Within the six articles, 31 assessments were
administered. There were 12 duplications, yielding 19 assessments for analysis. Of
the 19 assessments identified, 95% (n = 18) reported a citation which allowed
assessment characteristics to be extracted. Each assessment was categorized and
coded against five different domains: type of assessment, whether it was direct or
indirect, the type of indirect assessment used, when the assessment was
administered and what the program did with the results. These domains were
selected based on the overlapping features of each of the assessments analyzed.
To better understand how early intensive programs were using assessments, it was
necessary to explore when, how, and why assessments were being utilized. Table
1 summaries the data extracted from each article.
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Type of Assessment
Standardization
An assessment was classified as standardized if it was norm- referenced.
Norm-referenced measures compares a person’s knowledge or skills to the
knowledge or skills of the norm group. The composition of the norm group is
often a nationally representative sample of several thousand students tested under
the same context (e.g., age, grade). An assessment was classified as not
standardized if the assessment was criterion- referenced, involved a curriculumbased measure, or used an informal method which was defined as assessing a
student’s grade level, developmental diagnosis, work samples, task analysis,
portfolio assessment, and/or reported IOA on the development of the assessment.
Figure 2 depicts the results of these findings. Forty-two percent (n = 8)
were standardized, 26% percent (n = 5) of the assessments were not standardized,
and 32% (n = 6) were not reported orcould not be determined.
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Direct vs Indirect
Measurement
Each assessment was categorized as a direct or indirect measure. An
assessment was scored as a direct measure if a data collector recorded a student’s
behavior by being physically present and directly observing the behavior (Cooper,
Heron, & Heward, 2007). An assessment was defined as an indirect measure if it
involved interviews, rating scores, checklists, and/or verbal reports.. Sixty-eight
percent (n = 13) were indirect measures and 32% (n= 6) were direct measures.
Indirect Type
Category
Indirect measures were further analyzed to determine the type of indirect
measure used. Figure 3 depicts these findings. Thirty-one percent (n = 4) utilized
rating scales, 31% (n = 4) utilized questionnaires, 15% (n=2) used checklists, 15%
(n = 2) did not report or could not be determined (e.g., assessment could not be
located), and 8% (n = 1) conducted interviews.
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Assessment Timeline
Schedule
The time point at which each assessment was administered was
determined. Each assessment was scored as occurring: (1) pre-transition; (2) posttransition, (3) pre-and-post or (4) not reported. An assessment was scored as pretransition if the assessment was administered, and data were collected prior to the
transition to kindergarten. An assessment was scored as post-transition is the
assessment was administered and data was collected following the transition to
kindergarten or assessed the level of success in the classroom. An assessment was
scored as pre- and-post-transition if the assessment was administered, and data
were collected prior to and after the transition to kindergarten. Thirty-seven
percent (n = 7) of assessments were administered pre-transition; 37% (n = 7) were
administered pre-and-post transition, 10% (n = 2) were administered post
transition, and 16% (n = 3) were not reported.
Use of Assessment Results
Utilization.
The manner in which assessment data were used during the transition was
determined. Each assessment was scored as (1) instructional or (2) descriptive. An
assessment was scored as instructional if the assessments results were used to
modify instruction either prior to the transition or once the child was in the new
classroom setting. For example, research by Le Ager and Shapiro (1995) modified
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instruction using Ecobehavioral System for Complex Assessments of Preschool
Environments (ESCAPE) and Assessment Code/Checklist for Evaluating Survival
Skills (ACCESS). They quantified differences between environments and were
able to successfully adjust intervention decisions and modified instruction.
Conversely, an assessment was scored as being used in a descriptive manner if
assessment data were used in a comparative manner or to describe a student’s
transition. For example, Welchons and McIntyre (2015) used the Family
Experiences and Involvement in Transition (FEIT) and the Student– Teacher
Relationship Scale (STRS), among other assessments, to determine predictors of
socio- behavioral kindergarten outcomes. Their analyses demonstrated
correlations between parent/teacher-reported child problem behavior in preschool
and child social and behavioral outcomes in kindergarten, however, did not use
these finding to modify instruction either pre or pose the transition. Additionally,
McIntyre, Blaker, and Baker (2006) utilized measures such as the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales and the Social Skills Rating System Teacher form
(SSRS-T) to assess adaptation to school. Their analyses identified higher
intelligence quotient (IQ) and adaptive behavior predicted a more positive
adaptation to school. However, their findings were not used to inform or modify
instruction either prior to or following the transition. In other words, while some
articles made substantial claims in predicting student outcomes, veryfew used it to
identify deficits and then subsequently target and teach those deficits. More
specifically, seventy-nine percent (n =15) of assessments used data in a
descriptive manner, whereas 21% percent (n = 4) modified instruction and utilized
the results in an instructional manner.
Discussion
The purpose of the current review was to determine the number of peerreviewed transition assessments for young children with ASD who are
transitioning from early intervention into special or general education. Of the 411
articles reviewed, six articles met inclusion criteria, which yielded 20 assessments
for analysis. Each assessment was analyzed to determine the type of assessment,
when the assessment was given, and how assessment data was utilized. Many of
the assessments were indirect measures, given prior to the transition to school and
were used in adescriptive manner.
These results are noteworthy in that they suggest that assessments used
during the transition from early intervention to special or general education are
not being used in a dynamic manner toprepare students for the transition to school
or after the transition occurs, which contrasts with data-based decisions making
and best practice (Akers et al., 2015a, 2015b; Division for Early Childhood,
2014). These findings might suggest that early interventionalists and educators
need a transition assessment to aid in decision making during this transition and
might explain why people involved in this process often describe it as challenging
and stressful.
Ideally, early interventionalists and educators could use a transition
assessment to make decisions prior, during and after the student has transitioned
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from early intervention into the school setting. In order to use assessment data in a
dynamic manner to aid in selecting learning targets (e.g., early intervention targets
and IEP goals and objectives), a combination of direct and indirect measures could
be used. It is common practice in both settings to use direct measures which
would allow student progress to be monitored objectively.
In the current study, six direct assessments were identified: (1)
Ecobehavioral System for Complex Assessments of Preschool Environments
(ESCAPE; Le Ager & Shapiro, 1995; Carta et al., 1990)), (2) Assessment
Code/Checklist for Evaluating Survival Skills (ACCESS; Le Ager & Shapiro,
1995; Carta et al., 1990), (3) Independent Seatwork Activity Intervention
Checklist (Le Ager & Shapiro, 1995), (4) Procedural Checklist Classroom
Survival Skills for Independent Work (Le Ager & Shapiro, 1995), (5) The
Stanford-Binet (Thorndike et al., 1986), and (6) The delay of gratification task
(Vaughn et al., 1984). The Stanford-Binet is a traditional intelligence test
designed to assess an individual’s intelligence quotient (IQ) which would be
inappropriate to use to select instructional targets or inform the level of support
needed. The Stanford–Binet Intelligence is a test of general intellectual ability,
which is widely used both for clinical and research purposes (Coolican et al.,
2008). Although it’s intended to represent a hierarchical structure of intelligence,
the test is not generalizable to all populations including students diagnosed on the
spectrum. Holdnack and Weiss (2006) discovered an overrepresentation of
African American in special education due to the tests inability to incorporate
culturally fair and representative test revisions. Additionally, Coolican, Bryson,
and Zwaigenbaum (2006) found that using the Stanford-Binet on students with
ASD resulted in an inaccurate representation of student aptitude. The article
recommended using an abbreviated battery version with the understanding that the
abbreviated version could overestimate overall student ability as well.
The delay of gratification task (Vaughn et al., 1984) measures a student’s
latency to touch to a preferred item when told a more preferred item is available
after a delay. This is a measure of impulse control and a student’s ability to
tolerate delayed gratification. It is possible the results of this assessment could
inform instructional programing pre or post transition, but it would be difficult to
determine exactly what the assessment would be measuring in young children
with ASD. For example, if a short latency was observed, it would be difficult to
determine if the student’s responding was a function of deficits in language,
motivation, or impulse control and additional assessment would be warranted.
The Independent Seatwork Activity Intervention Checklist (Le Ager & Shapiro,
1995) measures both student and teacher behavior by measuring the duration of
activities, the number of students participating in the activity, the number of
instructions given prior to independent work, and the number of group and
individual prompts given during independent work. Although this includes a
direct measure of student behavior, data collections procedures would need to be
slightly modified to include direct measures for individual students. This
information could be used to determine how long a student can engage in
independent work without prompts. Although all three assessments involve direct
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measures of student behavior, they fail to comprehensively measure a broad range
of skills that a student needs to be successful in a classroom setting.
The three assessments that were direct and used for instructional planning
were the Procedural Checklist Classroom Survival Skills for Independent Work
(Le Ager & Shapiro, 1995), Ecobehavioral System for the Complex Assessment
of Preschool Environments (ESCAPE; Le Ager & Shapiro, 1995; Carta et al.,
1990) and Assessment Code/Checklist for the Evaluation of Survival Skills
(ACCESS; Le Ager & Shapiro, 1995; Carta et al., 1990). Two of these
assessments incorporate practices of Ecobehavioral Analysis which is an approach
to measuring environments that describes the ecology (i.e., topographical features
as well as the persons within it) and examines the interactions that occur between
the ecology and student behaviors (Carta et al., 1990). The rationale for this type
of analysis is that student outcomes are primarily determined by the interactions
the student has with the environment and the people in it. Compared with
assessments that only measure students' performance and ability, the
Ecobehavioral approach focuses on how the environment fosters or hinders
behaviors and learning to take place (Carta et al., 1990).
The Ecobehavioral System for the Complex Assessment of Preschool
Environments (ESCAPE) measures several aspects of the classroom ecology,
teacher behavior, and student behavior. Data derived from this assessment are
typically described in molar or molecular analyses. A molar analysis is the
determination of the average percentage of intervals recorded across observation
sessions for one particular variable for one child or group of children. While a
molecular analysis is the determination of the conditional probability of a specific
variable given the occurrence of one or more other variables (Carta et al., 1990).
For example, if preschoolers are more actively engaged in fine motor activities
than transitions, then practitioners can use that data to find creative ways to
increase reinforcement during transitions thus increasing student engagement. By
examining what typical days are like for children in various types of school
settings, practitioners can better understand why and how students with
disabilities especially those diagnosed with ASD, which can inform instruction in
both early intervention and the classroom.
The Assessment Code/Checklist for the Evaluation of Survival Skills
(ACCESS) was developed to allow an enhanced focus on specific behaviors that
are deemed important for success in kindergarten. This assessment focused on
group instruction, independent seatwork, and within class transitions. These three
domains have been previously identified as critical for successful functioning in
kindergarten classrooms by teachers (Carta et al., 1990; Quintero & McIntyre,
2011). Students were directly measured in one of three domain areas during 5minute observation blocks to assess student’s skill level. When students were
found to struggle in independent seatwork, instruction was subsequently modified.
Students were taught to self- assess independent seatwork and teachers were
taught to reduce prompts to low rates (which is typical of regular kindergarten
settings).
The methodological approaches used in both ESCAPE and ACCESS are
examples of direct observational systems that can be used to analyze the broad
structural differences between early intervention and kindergarten and can be used
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to modify instruction pre and post the transition to kindergarten. Based on the
available research to date, it appears ESCAPE and ACCESS are not commonly
used in peer-reviewed research during the transition from early intervention to
school. It may be the case that these are frequently used by early interventionalists
and educators and not in peer-reviewed research. A possible limitation of
ESCAPE and ACCESS is that they require intensive time, collaboration and
resources (McIntyre, Eckert, Fiese, et al. 2010; Quintero & McIntyre, 2011;
Welchons & McIntyre, 2015; Fontil et al., 2019).
Nevertheless, ESCAPE and ACCESS are direct assessments that provide a
theoretical framework for a potentially comprehensive transition assessment. A
comprehensive transition to kindergarten assessment could include the following
five criteria: (1) objective, (2) direct measures of student behavior, (3) cost-andtime efficient, (4) easily inform instructional planning, and (5) leads to objective
instructional decisions making. Given the limited results found in the current
study, there are many opportunities for future research. Educators and school
personnel are most likely using some form of assessment tool or measure to make
educational decisions when children transition from early intervention into the
school setting. Future research could survey early interventionalists and schools
across the county to determine which assessment tools are being used and how the
data collected from these tools are used. Once assessment measures are identified,
researchers could investigate the validity and reliability of these assessments and
determine their usefulness in objective decision making. This type of information
would be invaluable in the development of a comprehensive transition
assessment.
One major limitation of the current study is that only peer-reviewed
articles were included. There are likely several transition assessments that
interventionalists and schools use to guide instructional programming for young
children for ASD. For example, The Verbal Behavior Milestones Assessment and
Placement Program (VB-MAPP; Sundberg, 2008) is an assessment that contains
170 measurable learning and language milestones that are sequenced across three
developmental levels. Level 1 includes skills that typically developing children
demonstrate by 18 mos., level 2 are skills typically observed by 30 mos., and level
3 are skills typically observed by 48 mos. The VB-MAPP comprises three subassessment including Milestones, Barriers and a Transition Assessment. The
Milestone assessment include direct measures of a student’s language. play,
social, imitation, matching-to-sample, and group skills. The Barriers Assessment
is a rating scale of 24 common learning and language acquisition barriers faced by
children with ASD or other developmental disabilities. The transition assessment
is a rating scale of 18 areas that can help identify whether a child is making
meaningful progress and has acquired the skills necessary for learning in a less
restrictive educational environment (e.g., kindergarten). The VB-MAPP is
commonly used in early intervention centers that implement ABA to monitor
student progress and often times are required by insurances companies to
demonstrate child progress. Although commonly used, Montallana et al. (2019)
demonstrated substantial variability in the reliability of the milestones assessment
when used by different clinicians on the same student. The low reliability was
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likely due to the lack of operational definition of behaviors being measured in the
assessment. Currently, it is not clear how reliable the transition assessments are in
making instructional decisions and how those data are used by interventionalists
or schools, if used at all. The VB-MAPP transition assessment is one example of
an assessment that exists, and it is likely that schools use similar assessments or
develop transition assessments within their own districts to aid in the transition
process. Although these assessments undoubtedly help stakeholders make
decisions, without being researched or validated it is difficult to determine how
these types of assessments effect instructional programming which ultimately
effects a student’s success in the classroom.
Future researchers are encouraged to determine what transition
assessments are being used across the country and how these data are used in the
transition process. This information could be used to develop an objective, direct
transition assessment to aid in instructional planning pre-and post-a student’s
transition to kindergarten.
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Polluted Waters
By Elizabeth V. Netcher
Abstract: This piece relates to my graduate work at WMU because it represents
the darkness that I feel is sometimes encroaching on my "waters." The
water looks very tumultuous and hasn't quite calmed down, similar to
my current journey at WMU.
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Full Moon
By Elizabeth V. Netcher
Abstract: This piece relates to my graduate work at WMU because it represents
the waxing and waning of my relationship to work. Some days are
brighter than others, just like the moon itself.
Acrylic on canvas panel, wood frame
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Peace in Pink
By Elizabeth V. Netcher
Abstract: This piece relates to my graduate work at WMU because it symbolizes the
struggle for control that I feel, not only in my life, but specifically in academia.
The background, created through flow painting, represents my loss of control.
The lines represent me intentionally taking back my control.
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As I go Along…
By Ivylove M. Cudjoe
6

6

I would like to thank all who encouraged me to keep writing no matter what, especially Prof.
Justo B. Boleká and my personal muse. Thank you all!
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If words were colours...

If words were colours,
My soul would I paint
Upon the massive seas.
My tears would be the solution
And my words, the creation.
The creation of rainbows daily
No more waiting for a rainy day
Because all around, rainbows lay.
If words were colours,
My friends, peacocks and parrots would be;
For I would speak the reddish love
And declare the yellowish joy.
Not forgetting the peaceful blue
And the victorious green!
Together we would sing whitish purity
And feel around us its refreshing beauty.
If words were colours,
In your heart I would plant rose flowers,
To have with you always my cherished colours
And feel the effect of its powers.
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A good night's wish

Sometimes at night,
I lie back and dream
Of the wondrous mystery of the night.
I wish I lay on green grass
Facing upwards to the naked skies
Revealing its every design
With excitement in my every being,
I long to feel the cool calm breeze
Wrapping itself around me as blanket
And tickling my adventurous sense.
I long to be one with that night
To share in its mystery,
To feel its full might,
To embrace its glorious light.
I dream of this night
Hoping to one day have its full sight.
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When I was a child

When I was a child
The moon was white
It was beautiful in my sight
Everything was bright
So full of light.
When I was a child
I knew nothing of fear
My mind was clear
Dark thoughts were rare
And I had so much time to spare.
When I was a child
Daddy used to take me to school
Woke up early and bathe me like in a pool
There was nothing like shame
It was just not part of my frame.
When I was a child
The world was free
Nothing to set your heart on a spree
Everyone did love
As pure as a dove.
When I was a child
Innocence

was

a

gift

Laughter was a bliss
Joy was never a miss
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Smiles and colour, you were blessed.
When I was a child
Fresh was the air
The world was fair
The flowers were in full bloom
There was not a sight of gloom.
When I was a child
Scars of death, pain, grief and sorrow
Were stories I heard on the morrow
Man was gay
No showers left for May.
When I was a child
I never once stopped
To wonder about the end
Reality is now a new friend
All those wonders have come to an end.
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Admirador

Admirer

I think

Pienso
Pienso en muchas cosas

I think of many things

Cómo lo es normal de un

Which is normal of a human being.

ser

And I think of you

viviente

Y

pienso

también de ti

As would do any lover

Cómo es parecida de una amante

But I am neither your lover

Pero tu amante no soy

Nor do I want to be

Tampoco lo quiero ser

So why do I think of you?

Pues ¿Por qué el pensar de
ti?

It’s sheer curiosity!

¡Es
solo
curiosidad!

por

pura

Quiero saber cómo
eres
Cómo ves, vives, ríes y cómo
quieres;
El despertar del sol en tu casa
El desayunar, si lo haces
El trabajar como se debe
Y aún el amar, si en ello
crees.
Pienso
Pienso mucho en muchas cosas

I want to know how you are
How you perceive, live, laugh and
how you like;
The awakening of the sun in your
house
Eating breakfast, if you do
Working as it should be
And even love, if you believe in it.
I think
I think a lot about many things
I think of many things about you
But I am not your lover,
Neither do I believe I will be.

Pienso en muchas cosas sobre ti
Pero tu amante, no la soy
Tampoco creo que la sea.
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Te quiero tocar... (I want to touch you)

I wish I was where you are
To breathe your air
And share your bed.
I wish I could lie by you
To feel the warmth of your skin
And the beating of your heart.
I wish I could see only you
As I wake to a new day
And as I bid farewell to the old...
I wish all these and more...
Issue is, do you?

The rainbow in her face

The clouds of thoughts gathered
And darkened with doubt and fear.
My mind was gloomy, my emotions scattered.
My body ready for a flow of unending tears.
The weather was forecast as I glazed
And observed a ghostly reflection of me;
It feels like a storm today. Just for me.
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My mind, spirit and body, soon it all embraced.
The downcast emotions and darkness creeping,
It was starting, the rivers were now flowing.
Culture had taught me to always
Stay strong and be a man!
As I walked these overwhelming ways,
I felt low, but still; I was a man!
They had misunderstood!
For long such misconstrued living,
Had many a good man, the end driven!
The tears fell as I wept.
The rains poured as I slept.
For me, such a gloomy day.
For all, another stormy night.
The knocking drops awakened my eyes,
And absolutely nothing but sadness in sight.
Dreams and reality were both same,
The mind cloudy, the heart heavy,
Surely, sleep was a much better game.
So I rolled into character and thus began the play.
“Randy...
Oh my God!” she rushed to my side.
“Yes b, open your eyes.
Give me your hand and listen hard.
Believe me, I can’t imagine how you feel...” she held me tight.
“I love you...
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Very much!”
And there, the rainbow colours lay.
Night was passed,
For it was already day.
The weather now casted;
“Baby, it’s going to be okay!
The worst has passed away.”

The King of hearts

From afar I stood to steal glances of you
And little did I know that is how you stole from me.
I stayed perfectly hidden behind your strong pillar.
As you walked majestically through the garden,
You planted seeds of my longing for you,
Every time you smiled with pure intrigue.
It was the strongest spell ever cast!
So much so it daily kept me coming.
You became the sun I looked to to start my day.
Your beauty became the star light that brightened my sweet dreams.
I kept the hope to come face to face alive,
Although I always stayed perfectly hidden.
You were King and I was forbidden!

132

It was and will always be a sour wine;
The mixture of you and me.
You have stolen my heart without even knowing.
I would love to have you named King of my heart.
But as I returned the other day
Back home with others perfectly hidden;
I realized you are the King of hearts...
You stole it all and you don't even know!

Knock, knock, knock!

Knock, knock, knock!
Oh! It was him again.
Every day he will knock
waiting for me to open
and he will enter in.
It was annoying because he was always there.
And every turn I made, all I heard was
knock, knock, knock!
Knock, knock, knock!
It woke me up in the morning
and put me to bed early at night.
I was not ready to see him neither speak to him.
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He seemed so desperately in love with me
but I was deeply in love with someone else,
And yet still he would
knock, knock, knock!
Knock, knock, knock!
He had been at it for days, weeks, months,
he wouldn't give up on me
but I had given up on love.
I had my heart broken into pieces
and I am sure he was more hopeful.
I wasn't ready so I left him to
knock, knock, knock!
Knock, knock, knock!
It was another day
and I needed someone to talk to.
It had been months of loneliness
and the furniture had become friends.
Now I was desperate for him to enter
but shy and ashamed cause I had left him to
knock, knock, knock!
Knock, knock, knock!
I was glad to hear it once more.
I thought he would have moved on,
but he was at my doorstep again.
I pulled myself from my gloomy state,
took a look around my messy, lonesome house
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and opened the door when I heard him
knock, knock, knock!
And ever since he entered in,
my life has completely changed.
With his handsome self, he swept me off my feet.
Wish I had let him enter in earlier
instead of judging him like others,
but I am glad I did it sooner than later.
Now I can hardly wait for the sound of his
knock, knock, knock!
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Sin Pedir Permiso

En

mi

Without asking permission

vida

In

my

life

Viviendo como lo sé mejor

Living how I know best

Haciendo todo aunque es peor

Doing everything although it’s bad

Sin saber que hacer más

Without knowing what more to do

De

All of a sudden

repente

Love arrived.

Llegó el amor.
Cierro mis ojos para no ver

I close my eyes to not see

Cubro mis oídos para no oír

I cover my ears to not hear

Yo, con toda fuerza para
esconderme.

I, with every strength to hide
You, with all force to find me

Tú, con toda fuerza para encontrarme
Y lo lograste.
Ahora, mi
robaste.

And you achieved it.
Now, you have stolen my heart.

corazón,

Viniste
hacia mí.

lo

andando

Me capturó con su sonrisa.
La luz de tus ojos brilló
Y desapareció las tinieblas alrededor.
Así tocó el amor mi vida
Sin pedirme permiso alguno.
Desde allí en adelante
En tus manos, he estado.
De tu bondad, he disfrutado.
Por tu gracia, he vencido.
Con tu apoyo, he mejorado.

You came walking to me.
You captured me with your smile.
The light in your eyes sparked
And the darkness around
disappeared.
That’s how love came into my life
Without asking any permission.
From then onwards
In your hands, I have stayed.
Of your goodness, I have delighted.
By your grace, I have conquered.
With your help, I have improved.
And love has never let me go.

Y el amor nunca me ha
dejado.
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Us

When I feel the wind
wrap itself me around
I swear I can find
Those hands gently me hold
The clouds move along
And here I've sat for long
Finding new shapes to form
God! I know I saw your form
The birds chirp in the air
Daily as I wake and stir
Sweet music fills my ears
"I love you" is all I hear
It struck me quite fast
Those words were bound to last
Just then I knew the fact
Our love will never be past
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Tingles

The smell of your perfume excites my inner being
And your gaze touches my soul.
The warmth of your touch tickles my skin
And I sigh every time they become firmer.
I groan desires I didn't know when you hold me
And I lose my self as you hug me.
I feel your heart beat.
I feel my pulse race.
I think you read between the lines.
I think I read your mind.
I throb. I ache. I yearn. I long.
Even better, I know you do same too!
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Tus manos y yo

La lengua de tus manos

Your hands and I

The tongue of your hands

Despierta mis entrañas,

Awakens my emotions,

Aún entre tus brazos,

Still in your arms,

Me dices cómo me extrañas.

You say you miss me.

La dulzura de tu corazón

The sweetness of your heart

Carga cada palabra con la que me
alimentas.

Carries each word with which you
feed me.

!Ay amor de mi vida!

Ay love of my life!

Nunca he conocido éste,

I have never known this,

Él que comunica por medio
de dedos

He who speaks with his fingers

Y lo interpreta mi piel a mis
sentidos.
Llévame más profundo,
En este viaje tan lindo.
Nunca me escondas el secreto de tus
uñas,

And my skin makes my senses
comprehend it.
Take me deeper,
On this beautiful journey.
Never hide the secret of your hands
from me,
The necessary tools for my painter,

Las herramientas necesarias para mi
pintor,

Love that draws my emotions

Amor que dibuja mis emociones

And drives my intentions.

Y conduce mis intenciones.

What crazy relief!

¡Qué locura de tanto alivio!
¡Qué complicada sencillez!
¡Qué pasión es ésta, que
tienes haciamí!
Háblame siempre con la voz poética
de tus manos.

What complicated simplicity!
What passion is this that you have
for me!
Speak to me always with the poetic
voice of your hands.
Speak to me like this, always,

Háblame así, siempre,
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Decora mi cuerpo con tus dedos,

Decorate my body with your fingers,

Altera mi mente con tus manos,

Change my mind with your hands,

Háblame así, por favor.

Speak to me like this, please.
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Harnessing love
I choose a valentine
And I choose you.
I only long for you to be mine,
To let me drink more of your good wine;
Oh that wine, oh my, that sweet wine!
Brewed from your juicy grapevine,
Buried in the darkest space of your well divine.
Springs of love shoot out that fertile ground,
And quench my thirsty throb within.
I can't stay still when you invite me to dine
In the deep of your land.
For there, your treasures stand...
So, I will choose you for my valentine
Because you, baby, are fine!
That's a fact, I dare not deny!
And that's how you make the fireflies fly
In the thick woods of my forbidden forest.
You make it come alive;
Even the bees, all out of the hive!
And soon, a warm melody groans from the core.
Like an echo, it gets louder.
And just when I thought my walls fortified,
You proved you already had me identified!
I lay bare to your loving mine...
Valentine, only you I do pine.
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Éxtasis

Ecstasy

A veces mi espíritu brota

Sometimes my spirit wells up

Brota con palabras que decir

It wells up with words to say

Decir cosas que quiero expresar

To say things I want to express

Desde mi profundidad

From my insides

Pero me es menos los momentos

But less are the instants for me

En que tomo un papel y boli

Where I grab a paper and pen

Para escribirlas

To write them down

O
mejor
derramarlas.

dicho,

Es decir mi alma corre a una
velocidad
Que me es muy rápida

O better said, pour them out.
That’s to say that my soul
runs at a velocity
That is too fast for me to follow

para seguir Algo bonito

Something beautiful happens in my
being

pasa en mi ser

That I can’t explain

Que no puedo explicar

It’s a wonder in a wonder!

¡Es un maravillo dentro de una
maravilla!

Until my palms, fingers and arm

Hasta que mis palmas, dedos y
brazos
Aún no lo pueden describir al
momento igual como ocurre.

Even can’t describe it in the exact
moment it occurs.
For this reason I decided
To be the only audience

decidí

In the orchestra of my body

Decidí ser la única audiencia

When this divine musicality

En la orquesta corporal

Plays so sweetly in my insides

Cuando esta musicalidad
divina

And I hear at the same time that I
feel

Se toca tan melodiosa en mis
entrañas

The

Por

eso

sweetness

of

the

ecstasy.

Y oigo a la vez que siento
La dulzura del éxtasis.
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How to be Held
By Andrew Collard
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1.
The room’s so thickly shadowed, as in memory,
that any point of focus dissipates beneath my gaze:
the soft click of the rocking chair, irregular
against the humming of the box-fan, and the murmur
of occasional cars along the avenue, secures me
in my faith the ceiling holds above us, somewhere,
that the woven blankets I’ve nailed across the window
to keep the shadows in, and help my son to sleep,
still hang. On my bad days, I would call the constellations
my mind conceives to root itself in place
no more than an illusion, the lines I trace between
his weight against my chest, the walls concealed
in the dark beyond us, and the sidewalks, so accustomed
to our steps, below, no more than an imagined safety.
The route from home to homeless is too trivial a distance
to be measured, the way an injury can be revealed
in total stillness—fractures due to loss of bone mass, say—
or how, at thirty, I can’t recall a single night
my mother held me, though I know they numbered
in the hundreds. What could those arms, which then
seemed limitless in strength, have gifted me
but reassurance, through the tenderness of my containment,
that my breaths were little harmonies beneath her breath,
and that the roof would keep the wind out, if only
for a single evening, so I, in my ease, could free-fall
to a heavy rest, as my son does now, as I gently
double over, lips pressed to his still-wet hair,
to lower him toward the dark warmth of his crib.
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2.
The silent movie of my dream recedes.
A noise like a disposal crushing glass
wakes me with a start. Muddled cries
spill from the monitor beside the bed.
When I rise to draw the blind,
there’s nothing, beyond the empty bus stop
and the dubbed yards of grass, sick as newsprint
beneath the streetlight’s buzz.
Some incidents of sense are inexplicable:
Four hours ago, a dozen strangers
shuffle off the bus, and migrate
from the curb to the apartment complex
across the road, stopping traffic
like a parade, or a herd of deer,
like the spectacle of fire among the trees—

3.
In 1999, a pastor told me of a hole inside my heart,
a dark space only faith in god could fill.
Imagine my unhappiness to find, years later,
he was partly right. The hole was never in my heart,
but in the afterlife which, years into imagining,
I still found difficult to picture. The hole
was in the locales on the nightly news, and how
they never looked much like my neighborhood,
the misplaced history of what’s happened in-between
so many wars. For the infinity of childhood,
the world expands up and out forever, beyond the whispered
consolation of our parents, the cracking drywall,
the backyard’s maple trees and swingset, beyond the neighbors
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and their leaky pool, the takeout joints and counters,
beyond the highway, too, and into hypotheticals,
the places built more from assumption than from earth,
until, one day, the world begins contracting.
Even the city’s cleanest corners bloat with the grief
of their own impermanence, crying out at nightfall
through the blank stare of the billboards and neon lights.
We stumble down the sidewalk like bargain gumshoes,
scrutinizing the alleys for something that’s been lost
though we’ve forgotten what, only certain of its being
in our lack. I forget myself to sleep and wake past comfort,
adrift, the sickness too entrenched for treatment. The hole
is in the surf, unsettled, where a raft of refugees submerged
mere miles off unfriendly coast. The hole is in the weakening smile
of the boy, dying of leukemia, I sat behind in third grade,
and in the hollow peace of how, yesterday, I didn’t recognize him
in my yearbook, features clouded when I look too close.

4.
What can I call this impulse to unwrap motif?
In the waiting room, bubblegum cigars sit bunched
inside their little blue box, each a fuzzy reproduction
of the other, beside a vase of wilting roses.
The petals drop at their own uneven pace, each unique
in its design like the strange array of faces gathered
here, plucked from disparate moments in my history,
reclining together over islands of chairs.
Distant relatives, acquaintances, and friends
converge, some laughing over half-emptied
cups of coffee, some rocking absent-mindedly
or pacing, anxious for a glimpse, however fleeting,
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of the familiar stranger sprawled against my chest,
of the way his eyes, untrained to process
all but light and motion, are a match for mine,
of how even this cluttered room invokes collage,
each distinctive shape emerging to the sterile canvas
until, somehow, a whole becomes discernible,
a structure unfolding from the darkness
that will hold him
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Age of the Universe
By Sydney Sheltz-Kempf
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If matter cannot be
created or destroyed
then I am the same age
as the universe.
My bones are faceted with the same
calcium as the marble veins
in the ground I stand upon.
My sodium levels pulse with the same
ferocity as seawater churning
deep with the unknown.
My blood burns with the same
iron swirling in the molten
core of the Earth.
If I looked through a telescope
I would see everything
and nothing
Would I even be able to recognize
my own reflection
in the constellations?
It feels like my soul is imploding
with the remnants of reincarnated stars:
is this recognition,
or just a splint ered memory?
If every cell in my body is reborn
every seven years
in the echoes of a celestial jigsaw puzzle,
if the universe is 13.8 billion years old
then so am I,
and I wonder when I’ll run out of pieces.
Temet nosce:
a truly dead concept
in an even deader language
if you don’t even know
how old you are.
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3.14.21 - Spring
By Clayton Meldrum
Abstract: This poem, written in one sitting on a Sunday morning, is a reflection not only
on the transition between the physical seasons, but on the condition of the
authors heart, moving from a personal season of hurt and cold bitterness
(winter), on the way towards one of happiness and warmth (summer). But there
is the season in between - spring.
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Winter is receding… slowly.
I no longer rely on fires to fight the freezing,
thawing numbness to pain to exhaustion,
as my body comes back into itself.

I no longer rely on layers to keep my skin
protected from the biting chill,
oblivious to the cold.

That occasional gust, slipped between the seams, to remind my being
“It’s still winter. Your coat can’t cover you, not completely.”
Winter is receding… surely.
I can begin to imagine a warm sunny day, but not yet.
It is still cold. It is still wet. I am still cold. Not yet.

A new season is stirring, maturing, until it is ready to come, as every season does.
I start to see the sun, but not yet to feel her warmth.
It is right there though. Any day now.

Any day now, it will pour through the window with a promise.
And blow through the opening door with a different kind of gust, a different air, a
different care.

Not how to survive another winter day
Yet not to thrive in other summer day
But yet derive some other way, something in between - spring

To wear one less layer not because it is warm enough yet,
but because it is less cold than yesterday.
The sun is starting to work again, summer is going to come
and I’m tired of fire. My skin needs sun.
Seasons, seasons, seasons…
no more on seasons
who will come and go the same
they do not need poems
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The Star-Gazer
By Jennifer Kean
Abstract: “The Star-Gazer” is modeled loosely on the Old English poem “The Wife’s
Lament.” This medieval elegiac composition expresses beautifully the tensions
that attend unrequited or abandoned love. It is awkward: there are clearly
contrasting sentiments for the absent lover. It is frustrated and distressed: the
reasons for the lover’s truancy are unclear to the reader, and presumably to The
Wife. It is confused: The Wife does not understand why her partner has put
physical and emotional distance between them, and the nature-imagery reflects
how open-ended heartbreak can suspend, or even immobilize, personal growth.
In my composition, I experiment with the possibility that "The Wife’s Lament"
describes not a physical absence but an inexplicable change in the relationship
that feels like a sudden and acute disconnect. “The Star-Gazer” is a story of a
creative-romantic partnership that undergoes a similar transformation. The
narrator and lover here are outcast – or dis/placed – individuals, and this creates
an affinity between the two. This affinity is embedded in the idea that they are
dreaming and creating simultaneously and constructively. They create a space to
claim beyond the reach of others: something new, unexplored, yet safe in that it
was made by and for them only. The space is imagined to be located outside of
this world, but this also is an illusion; as the poem progresses, the space is refigured as a fragile egg or bubble inside of, and vulnerable to, the physical
world.
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We imagined ourselves in a place of no-place
Creating space in the liminal spaces: der Weltraum, our dream-world, or world-dream –
that
outerspace
Conjuring melody from colors and shapes.
The elements praised us; we recreate the sound.
Took refuge in those soundscapes where
We retreat, spellbound.
Yet these artificial skies we paint destabilize with time
And time is cruel to nature as he is to my mind.
The hidden things that dwelled within the shadows of his being
Emerged as warring insects come to sunder ancient trees.
Now what are you, you frightful thing?
I must protect our august dream!
I combed the contours of our soundscape for one solitary seed
But when reality took form, I lost it in the cosmic sea.
The dome cracked
The stars fell through –
And where are you, you shifting thing?
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I’m exiled to the ruins of this insubstantial dream.
The music fades
The earth intrudes –
And where are you, my baneful thing?
The sphere is gone, so too is song.
I will not sing again.
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